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Introduction  
 
 
Financial diplomacy has been one of the areas which have reflected the 
economic and political changes facing the Japanese economy and the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance. Leading up to the culmination of the 
development and expansion of the presence of the Japanese economy in the 
late 1980s, the Japanese financial diplomacy was oriented towards 
strengthening the relationship with the US. The relationship between Japan 
and the US was a cornerstone of the financial diplomacy since 1945 in the 
sense that the US had enjoyed a dominant position in the international 
financial regime and the US and Japan maintained the special diplomatic 
relationship under the Japan-US Security Treaty.               
 
In the 1980s, the Japanese financial diplomacy was characterised by the 
cooperation with the international efforts to coordinate macroeconomic 
policy and foreign currency policy. The US called for international 
macroeconomic policy coordination at the G7. Then the Japanese financial 
diplomacy was oriented towards forming the G2 special relationship 
between Japan and the US and thereby increasing the presence of Japan in 
the international financial regime with the G7 a central forum to formulate 
international financial cooperation.               
 
In the 1990s, especially after the advent of the Clinton administration, the 
US saw Japan as an economic rival rather than an economic and military 
ally after the end of the cold war. As it was increasingly clear that the 
Japanese economy was mired with the bad loan problem, the US attached 
the less importance on the strengthening of the relationship between the US 
and Japan. The US looked at China as the new opportunity to expand their 
business in the Chinese market. When the Asian Financial Crisis hit the 
South-East Asia, the US was not very keen to take an initiative in rescuing 
the ailing Asian countries and stabilising the Asian financial markets. They 
were sceptical about the effectiveness of coordinated efforts to contain the 
financial crisis and still believed that the ailing Asian countries would need 
to complete liberal economic reforms including deregulation and opening 
financial and trade regimes. Faced with the Asian Financial Crisis, the 
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Japanese Finance Ministry play a proactive role in taking the initiative to 
strengthen the framework to make the regional financial system more 
resilient to financial crisis. It could be argued that this was an attempt by 
Japan to establish the regional hegemony in the regional financial regime, 
but in fact, this was led by the strong sense of responsibility that Japan 
would need to contribute to the stability of both the international economy 
and the Asian economy based on the awareness that Japan would be the 
only country capable of doing that in Asia.  
                                 
After the financial crisis in 2008, the G20 has increasingly become a 
dominant forum to discuss the international policy coordination in the 
international monetary and fiscal policy. While G7 has played a central role 
in foreign currency policy, the G7 has been increasingly less influential as a 
forum to formulate the international policy coordination. The emergence of 
China as the second largest economy has influenced the relationship 
between Japan and the US in the financial diplomacy.       
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the Japanese financial 
diplomacy from the viewpoint of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, which 
has played a central role in setting out the international economic and 
financial policy framework in the international financial regime between 
the late 1980s and now.     
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Chapter 1:  Regional Financial Cooperation in the aftermath of 
1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis in the globalising international financial 
regime    
 
 
1-1 Asian Financial Crisis and Asian Monetary Fund  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis represents a watershed in the on-going debate 
over the role of regional financial cooperation vis-à-vis global financial 
architecture. The Crisis raised the awareness among the majority of East 
Asian countries of the need to create and strengthen regional financial 
cooperation as a means of securing regional financial stability. The 
momentum of strengthening regional initiative was driven by the awareness 
of instability of global financial structure and the lack of financial 
mechanism which sufficiently support the countries in need in Asia.  
 
The creation of an “Asian Monetary Fund” proposed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance was the culminating point of the momentum to 
promote financial cooperation in the region. The proposal of “Asian 
Monetary Fund” was not realised mainly due to the opposition of the 
United States. The concept was to some extent reformulated when the 
finance ministers of ASEAN countries plus Japan, China and South Korea 
(ASEAN plus 3) agreed to establish a regional mechanism of bilateral swap 
arrangements within ASEAN plus 3 countries on May 2000 in Chiang Mai, 
which is now called “Chiang-Mai Initiative”. 
 
While it was true that there was growing momentum of establishing new 
regional policy framework to strengthen financial cooperation, it does not 
necessarily mean that the Japanese financial diplomacy was more oriented 
towards regional cooperation than globalised financial cooperation. In fact, 
the Japan’s financial diplomacy was already increasingly oriented towards 
global cooperation. The Asian Financial Crisis accelerated the momentum 
towards not only regional financial cooperation, but also global policy 
coordination such as the creation of the Financial Stability Forum.  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis broke out in July 1997 with the collapse of 
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Thailand’s currency, the baht. It was subject to speculative attach and then 
did spread to other regional countries including Indonesia, Philippines, 
Malaysia, and even South Korea. They currency crises led foreign investors 
to withdraw their money invested towards these countries. The crisis-hit 
countries were all forced to turn to the IMF for financial support to restore 
investors’ confidence in their respective economies.1          
 
The IMF’s approach to the crisis was based upon the so-called 
“Washington consensus” underpinned by a neo-liberal ideological position. 
According to this view, markets are the most efficient way through which 
to allocate resources and create wealth. This approach put emphasis on a 
constellation of virtues of free market, free flow of trade and capital across 
the borders, macroeconomic policy management characterised by sound 
monetary, fiscal prudence and limited role of governments. There was a 
tendency in the IMF to point to some underlying macroeconomic 
weaknesses such as current account and fiscal deficits, overvaluation of the 
currency and relative price distortions caused by overvalued currency.  
 
The IMF’s programmes had three main components: financing, 
macroeconomic policies, and structural reforms. In terms of financing, 
USD 35 billion of IMF financial support was provided for adjustment and 
reform programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, with the assistance for 
Indonesia being augmented further in 1998-99. In terms of macroeconomic 
policies, monetary policy was tightened (at different stages in different 
countries) to halt the collapse of the countries' exchange rate and to prevent 
currency depreciation from leading into a spiral of inflation and continuing 
depreciation. Finally, in terms of structural reforms, steps were taken to 
address the weaknesses in the financial and corporate sectors.
2
  
 
The contentious issues were concerned with to what extent structural 
reforms and macroeconomic policy reforms would be necessary and 
appropriate as the prescription policy measures to tackle the Asian 
Financial Crisis then. The IMF was of the view that structural reforms were 
                                                 
1 “The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis”, Stephan Haggard, Institute for 
International Economics, 2000, p.47-86  
2 “The recovery from the Asian Crisis and the role of the IMF”, June 2000 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm 
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clearly needed to restore confidence on a firm basis, by addressing some of 
the root causes of the crises, especially financial sector and corporate issues. 
For example, in terms of financial sector report, the IMF tried to implement 
the policies including the following four elements:      
 
 the closure of insolvent financial institutions, to stem further losses;  
 
 the recapitalization of potentially viable financial institutions, often 
with government assistance; 
 
 close central bank supervision of weak financial institutions; and 
 
 a strengthening of financial supervision and regulation, to prevent a 
recurrence of the fragilities that had led to the crisis, the objectives 
being to restore the health of financial institutions and bring 
supervision and regulation up to international standards.
3
   
 
In addition, the IMF claimed that the need for corporate debt restructuring, 
including the establishment of viable workout mechanisms, was also 
considered to be an essential component for the restoration of the health of 
the financial system. In addition, other reforms promoted by the IMF 
included:
4
  
 
 efforts to shield poor and vulnerable sections of society from the 
worst of the crisis, by deepening and widening social safety nets and 
(notably in Indonesia) devoting substantial budgetary resources to 
increasing subsidies on basic commodities such as rice; and  
 
 measures to increase transparency in the financial, corporate, and 
government sectors.  
 
From the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s point of view, the sufficiency of 
financing is key to the restoring the confidence of investors. As IMF also 
acknowledged, the Asian crisis countries’ estimated financing needs were 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
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heavily dominated by the capital account and in particular the assumed 
rollover rate on short-term foreign debt with the denomination of the US 
dollar. The size of the short-term liabilities was such that it was essential 
that creditors roll over at least a good part of their positions.  
 
From the IMF’s point of view, structural reform packages and tightening 
macroeconomic policies were intertwined with their financing rescue 
packages and were intended to restore confidence and limit private capital 
outflows. In the IMF’s assessment, several factors contributed to weak 
confidence, including hesitant program implementation, political 
uncertainties, and other factors casting doubt on the authorities’ ownership 
of the programmes. But, the IMF did not change its view that structural 
reforms in particular were essential.
5
    
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the IMF does not have 
sufficient expertise on all the elements included in the structural reforms. 
They considered that the IMF’s approach was misguided and the IMF 
pushed a number of policy measures, which were irrelevant to the restoring 
confidence in the short-term at least and ended up in exacerbating the crisis. 
For example, while the IMF pressed crisis-stricken countries to raise the 
interest rate and tighten monetary and fiscal policy, the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance considered that it was not an appropriate policy response at that 
time.
6
            
 
However, the Japanese Ministry of Finance did not seek to take a regional 
initiative at least from an early stage, but rather tried to play a role as 
mediator between the IMF and the crisis-stricken Asian countries. For 
example, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Indonesia March 1998, after 
the negotiation between the Indonesia and the IMF collapsed. Before the 
visit by the Japanese Prime Minister, the U.S. also sent Former Vice 
President Walter Mondale as a special envoy to press the then Indonesian 
President Haji Mohamed Soeharto to carry out the radical political reform.  
                                                 
5
 Ibid.  
6 Sakakibara, E. (2005), “Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi” (“The Day that Rocked Japan and the 
World”), Krugman, P. “Confidence Game – How Washington worsened the Asia’s crash” 
http://www.pkarchive.org/crises/krugman1.html; Krugman, P. R. (1998, January). "What Happened 
To Asia?" from http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html. 
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In August 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance floated the idea of the 
Asian Monetary Fund, after the agreement was reached between the IMF 
and Thailand on 29 July, 1997. On 2 July, 1997, Thailand announced that 
they would change their currency regime to floating regime, which was 
followed by the currency attack by international investors and resulted in 
rapid depreciation of Thai Baht in a short period of time. Thailand asked 
the IMF and Japan for the provision of liquidity on 28 July, 1997. Japan 
announced the commitment of USD 4 billion, the same amount as the IMF, 
on the following day, which was the largest amount as a bilateral aid.  
 
This swiftness of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on Japan’s commitment 
of as much as USD 4 billion was based upon its view that Japan was the 
greatest stakeholder in the South East Asian economy and the economic 
turmoil of that region would have serious impacts on the Japanese economy 
including the Japanese industries. For example, according to the 1998 
Trade and Commerce White Paper, the Japanese subsidiary accounted for 
around 40% of the machine exported from ASEAN 4 countries (Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia and Philippines). The importance of the South 
East Asian economy to Japan was unparalleled with any other country.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance started informally floating the idea of 
Asian Monetary Fund after the special meeting aimed at discussing the 
support programme towards Thailand held in Tokyo on 11 August, 1997. 
The idea of Asian Monetary Fund came from the argument that a similar 
facility to the ADB as a regional development bank in relation to the World 
Bank could be effective in Asia also in terms of the facility of providing 
short-term loan to facilitate the structural economic reform in recipient 
countries.
7
 On 11 August, 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance did not 
invite the U.S. to make a financial commitment to Thailand. According to 
the book later published by Robert Rubin, there was a discussion internally 
within the U.S. administration as to whether the U.S. should also make 
financial commitment. But, the US did not make a commitment then, as 
they were not sure if there would unforeseen problem at a later stage and 
                                                 
7 Sakakibara, E. (2010) 
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decided that they should preserve that option.
8
      
 
In his book, he described the two types of moral hazards. The first one is 
the “moral hazard” of the recipient countries to encourage them to borrow 
unwisely or adopt unsound policies. The second one is the “moral hazard” 
of investors, who made excessive and undisciplined investment. Robert 
Rubin saw the second a more serious concern. He described “Part of the 
issue in Thailand had clearly been excessive and undisciplined investment 
from the developed world. “Rescuing” could encourage lenders and 
investors to give insufficient weight to risk in pursuit of higher yield in 
other developing countries and undermine the discipline of their 
market-based system”.
9
     
 
Eisuke Sakakibara admitted that the idea of AMF assumed that it did not 
include the participation of the U.S. He guessed that the idea of AMF 
without the participation of the U.S. was taken as a challenge towards the 
U.S. leadership or hegemony in the international finance by Japan. At least, 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance put priority on the need to regain the 
confidence of market by announcing the sufficient size of financial 
commitments and the reached agreement between the IMF and Thailand on 
economic policy reforms on 18 August, 1997.
10
  
 
In fact, the proposal of Asian Monetary Fund by the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance was made only after they realised that the IMF approach was not 
appropriate to contain the currency attack waged by international investors. 
Even before the Thailand made a formal request of financial assistance 
towards the IMF on 29 July, 1997, Thailand informally requested financial 
assistance such as establishing the financial commitment lines between 
central banks to the Japanese Ministry of Finance. However, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance found that there was not sufficient disclosure of 
various information such as the amount of foreign reserves left, how the 
government agency intervened in the foreign exchange markets to protect 
their currency so far. Japan had no choice but to rely on IMF to give further 
                                                 
8 Rubin, R and Weisberg (2003), J. “In an Uncertain World”, Randam House, p.220    
9 Ibid. p.218 
10 Sakakibara, E (2005), p.180-185  
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pressure to the Thailand government authorities to disclose more relevant 
information.                    
 
There was a difference of the sense of imminence between Japan and the 
U.S. Like the IMF, the U.S. Treasury was of the view that to restore the 
confidence of international creditors, the Thailand’s government would 
need to address both macroeconomic problems and structural flows in the 
economy – not just its overvalued currency but also its weak financial 
sector, which had contributed to a real estate and investment boom financed 
in foreign currency.
11
 On the other hand, Japan was of the view that the 
Asian Financial Crisis was mainly driven by not so much macroeconomic 
fundamentals as abrupt movement of short-term capital flows. In the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance’s view, more priority should be given to 
establishing a framework with financial commitments which would provide 
short-term liquidity as quickly as possible to restore confidence of 
international confidence rather than acquiescing even partial default.    
 
The proposal of the so-called Asian Monetary Fund was made only after 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance realised that the IMF and the U.S. were 
reluctant to establish a framework with financial commitments which 
would provide ailing Asian countries with sufficient short-term liquidity. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance saw sudden outflow of short-term capital 
from crisis-stricken countries and contagious impacts on other 
neighbouring countries across country borders, which resulted from 
declining confidence of foreign investors, as the major key features of the 
Asian Financial Crisis. This was especially distinctive from the Latin 
American Financial Crisis in 1995, which mainly derived from more 
traditional type of current account deficits problems.
12
                   
                 
On the other hand, as Sakakibara pointed out in his book, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance understood that their proposal of establishing a 
regional framework with financial commitments to restore market 
                                                 
11 Rubin, R. (2003, p.219)   
12 Report of Council on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions, “Lessons from the Asian 
Currency Crisis – Risks Related to Short-Term Capital Movement and the 21
st
 Century-Type 
Currency Crisis” Japanese Ministry of Finance, 19 May, 1998 
https://www.mof.go.jp/about_mof/councils/gaitame/report/1a703.htm  
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confidence was taken by the US as the Japan’s attempt to take this 
opportunity to establish itself as a regional hegemony challenging against 
the U.S. At least from the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s point view, the 
initiative of creating the AMF was rather more defensive in the sense that 
the major objective was to institutionalise the financial assistance 
mechanism capable of providing liquidity in a flexible manner and 
ultimately to reduce spill-over effects of economic and financial turmoil of 
the stricken countries to the extent possible.           
 
The IMF World Economic Outlook in May 1998 summarised the basic 
ingredients of the IMF-supported programmes in Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand as below:
13
    
 
 Monetary policy must be kept sufficiently firm to resist excessive 
currency depreciation, with its damaging consequences not only for 
domestic inflation but also for the balance sheets of domestic 
financial institutions and nonfinancial enterprises with large foreign 
currency exposures. Excessive depreciation, by weakening the 
competitiveness of partner countries’ currencies and contributing to 
downward pressure on them, also adds to the risk of a downward 
spiral of competitive depreciations, which bring no benefit to any 
country and monetary instability to all. As fundamental policy 
weaknesses are addressed and confidence is restored, interest rates 
can be allowed to return to more normal levels. Indeed, in Korea and 
Thailand some easing of monetary conditions has already been 
possible. But experience—including in the Asian crisis—shows that 
premature easing can be costly. 
 
 Weaknesses in the financial sector are at the root of the Asian crisis 
and require particularly urgent attention, including a clearly 
announced reform agenda in each case. These weaknesses have 
arisen partly as a result of a variety of explicit or implicit 
government guarantees that encouraged excessive exposure to 
foreign exchange and other risks by financial institutions and their 
customers, and contributed to reckless lending. (These problems are 
                                                 
13 IMF (1998), World Economic Outlook May 1998, p.6   
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not confined to Asia; they are widespread globally.) In many cases, 
weak but viable financial institutions will need to be restructured and 
recapitalized. Insolvent institutions will need to be closed or 
absorbed by stronger institutions to facilitate the restoration of 
confidence. Public sector rescue operations should be carried out in 
the context of comprehensive restructuring strategies that contain 
costs to taxpayers—partly by ensuring that equity holders, bond 
holders, and other lenders share losses appropriately—and tighten 
prudential regulations and oversight. 
 
 Improvements in public and corporate governance and a 
strengthening of transparency and accountability are also essential. 
Recent difficulties in part reflect extensive government intervention 
in the economy and widespread political patronage, nepotism, and 
lax accounting practices. Strong and unambiguous signals from 
political leaders that such practices will no longer be tolerated, and 
the adoption of appropriate reforms, are critical to restoring 
confidence. 
 
 Fiscal policies need to contribute to reductions in countries’ reliance 
on external saving and to take into account the significant costs of 
restructuring and recapitalizing banking systems. While fiscal 
discipline is maintained, resources will need to be reallocated from 
unproductive public expenditures to spending that can help to 
minimize the social costs of the crisis, including the strengthening of 
social safety nets. The required degree and composition of fiscal 
adjustment will vary depending on circumstances in individual 
countries, and in the IMF-supported programs fiscal targets have 
been adjusted as circumstances have changed and been reassessed. 
A balance has to be struck between the need to restore 
macroeconomic stability (and to reassure domestic and foreign 
investors on that count) and the need to ensure that domestic demand 
is not unduly compressed.  
 
The IMF considered that IMF financing could increase incentives for risk 
taking by both potential borrowers from the IMF and by lenders to 
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countries without a certain set of conditions. In their view, moral hazard is 
a concern which has been a key in the design of IMF programmes with 
countries at the centre of the Asian Financial Crisis and was preoccupied 
with the risk of moral hazard and how to prevent such moral hazard from 
prevailing in the borrowing countries.
14
       
 
In order to prevent moral hazard, the IMF stressed structural problems 
inherent in economic and financial systems. They saw the weaknesses in 
the financial sector as a key element of the Asian Financial Crisis. For 
example, they considered that there was not a sufficiently robust financial 
system underpinned by effective regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions in Asia. Large private capital flows to Asia were driven to a 
great degree by an underestimation of risks by international investors who 
searched for higher yield. Exchange rates pegged to the US dollar 
contributed to giving investors implicit guarantees and encouraged them to 
take excessively high risks. From the IMF’s point of view, weak 
management of poor control of risks, lax enforcement of prudential rules 
and inadequate supervision, and associated relationship and 
government-directed lending practices led to a sharp deterioration in the 
quality of banks’ loan portfolios. In their view, weakness in the financial 
sector was closely linked with the underdevelopment of governance 
structure of the financial supervision, which was susceptible to the 
intervention by politics such as the inner circle aides of the president and 
the prime minister.
15
  
 
From the Japanese Ministry of Finance point of view, the implementation 
of reforms and other confidence-repairing measures in accordance with the 
IMF’s recommendations worsened the crisis by causing currency and stock 
markets to decline and disrupt industrial activities and the whole economy 
well beyond what was justified by reasonable reassessment of economic 
fundamentals. The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the IMF’s 
approach stressing structural reforms exacerbated the panic and added to 
the difficulties in both the corporate and financial sectors by undermining 
the investors’ confidence. In their view, how to restore “confidence” was a 
                                                 
14 IMF (1998), World Economic Outlook May 1998, p.6-8   
15 Ibid. p.3.   
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key point at the time of confidence. On the other hand, in the IMF’s view, a 
wide range of measures described above ranging from tightening 
macroeconomic policies to overhauling financial systems were necessary to 
restore confidence and support a resumption of growth. Conversely, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance saw the Asian Financial Crisis as a different 
type of crisis from conventional financial crisis in the sense that investors 
became much more sensitive to taking the perceived risks and tended to 
overreact as sentiment changed with the increasing globalisation of 
financial markets and development of financial technology.                      
 
At the time of the crisis, at least until it turned out that South Korea was 
also caught in a financial crisis, the US overall shared the view with the 
IMF in the sense that they were more concerned about the possible moral 
hazard by ailing Asian countries. The US considered that giving the 
financial support without addressing structural reforms would lead to 
undermining the discipline of the market-based system by rescuing the 
investors who gave insufficient consideration to risk in pursuit of higher 
yield in Asian countries. The difference between the US and Japan is 
characterised by the choice between swift action of liquidity provision and 
addressing moral hazard more fundamentally. The latter option would 
entail encouraging long-term reform and stringent conditionality, while the 
former would do encouraging short-term reform such as capital controls.  
 
Under these circumstances, the proposal of Asian Monetary Fund emerged 
as a result of divergence between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the 
US Treasury/the IMF.
16
 This proposal was not so much the ambition by 
Japan to seek geopolitical influence as a regional hegemon, as the attempt 
to present a more practical solution to resolve the Asian Financial Crisis as 
quickly as possible and contribute to the stability of international financial 
markets. The IMF’s policy advice sought to ensure to the extent possible 
that the parties to private transactions bear the cost of their transactions. On 
this basis, the IMF programmes included the closure of insolvent financial 
institutions. In the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s view, requiring private 
creditors to assume a certain share of the burden at the time of a financial 
                                                 
16 Lipscy, P. (2003), ‘Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal’, 3 (2003) Stanford Journal of  
East Asian Affairs 93–104.     
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crisis would not serve to restore the confidence of the international market, 
but rather deteriorate it.          
 
At the time, the policy stances of the US Treasury on the Asian Financial 
Crisis were rather a patchwork. On the one hand, the US Treasury expected 
Japan to play a leadership role in solving the Asian Financial Crisis and 
called on Japan to put its domestic economic and financial crises in order. 
The US was increasingly pressing Japan on take more comprehensive and 
bold reforms to ensure Japan’s economic recovery, which they considered 
was a key to the entire global economy. From the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance’s point of view, the idea of the Asian Monetary Fund was based on 
their awareness of the role of Japan to take an initiative in preventing the 
contagion of the Asian Financial Crisis from spreading to other region and 
contributing to the stability of international financial markets. On the other 
hand, the US Treasury openly opposed to the idea of the Asian Monetary 
Fund. In the US view, establishing a regional fund providing liquidity to 
crisis-stricken countries in Asia would make it even more difficult to ensure 
that credit loan conditions would be complied with by debtor countries, 
which would make regional fund less credible to the eyes of international 
investors. Timothy Geithner raised the issue of lack of transparency such as 
the information about how much reserves were still left in the 
government.
17
                         
 
Faced with the opposition from the US and lack of support from China, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance had no choice but to decide to withdraw the 
idea of Asian Monetary Fund. For the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the 
international cooperation among the G7, especially with the US, has been a 
fundamental elements guiding its financial diplomacy. Under the 
circumstances, Japan could not make a decision to fight openly against the 
US.   
 
While Japanese Ministry of Finance were also aware of the lack of 
transparency, they were equally against the idea of taking no immediate 
actions until the full information is disclosed. In this vein, the proposal of 
the Asian Monetary Fund was more pragmatic and solution-oriented idea 
                                                 
17 Geithner, T. (2014), “Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crisis”, Randam House  
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with the expectation that it would serve to protect Japanese economy from 
its imminent effects from the Asian Financial Crisis and take a leading role 
in containing the contagious effects of the Crisis as quickly as possible 
rather than the idea based on geopolitical or diplomatic considerations 
seeking to establish Japan as a financial regional hegemony in Asia.  
 
However, the fact of the matter is that the Japan’s policy which focused on 
establishing the mechanism of providing swift financial liquidity and 
regaining the market confidence. This policy to some extent set aside at 
least temporarily the risk of moral-hazard at the height of financial crisis. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance was aware of the need to address the 
majority of issues identified by the IMF such as the weakness of financial 
supervision and regulatory framework and the ability of financial 
institutions to manage risks. However, the Japanese Ministry of Finance did 
not link the need to address these issues with the availability of financial 
assistance to the inflicted countries.                     
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance’s policy of focusing on availability of 
liquidity rather than moral-hazard was heavily affected by the dramatic 
change of domestic policy circumstances surrounding the Japanese 
financial system. Within a few months after the Asian Financial Crisis 
started in Thailand in July 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was 
caught by a series of bankruptcy of Japanese securities firms and banks 
which intensified in November 1997 including Sanyo Securities (the 
seventh-largest brokerage firm), Yamaichi securities (the fourth-largest 
brokerage firm) and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. Under these dramatically 
worsening circumstances, the Japanese Government and the ruling party 
were forced to take immediate actions to inject public money to strengthen 
the capital of domestic financial institutions.             
    
In the late 1980s, Japan experienced unprecedented asset bubble 
characterised by the steep rise of asset prices including land prices and 
share prices. The unprecedented magnitude of steep and great rise of asset 
prices and their burst between the late 1980s and the early 1990s in Japan 
made the financial crisis much deeper than previous economic slumps. The 
great difficulty facing the Japanese Ministry of Finance in dealing with the 
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bad loan problem and the resulting financial system crisis gave the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance an opportunity to learn the lesson on what 
would be the priority measures to take to prevent the financial crisis from 
spreading and deepening. 
 
In Japan, the financial crisis characterised by the collapse of a series of 
financial institutions, occurred in 1997 more than 5 years after the burst of 
bubble economy in the beginning of 1990. Between the burst of bubble 
economy and the outbreak of financial crisis, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance were faced with the constraints of policy options available partly 
due to lack of strong political support. When the financial crisis broke out 
in 1997 in the aftermath of the first symptom of Asian Financial Crisis in 
Thailand in 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the 
swift provision of public funds into domestic financial sectors was essential 
to prevent the confidence among market participants on the Japanese 
financial system from further deteriorating. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance realised that the government had no choice but to inject public 
funds swiftly into financial institutions.   
 
The view of putting priority on swift injection of public funds was not 
necessarily consistently shared among the policy-makers of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance and the political leaders since the burst of the bubble 
economy in 1990. It was not formulated until the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance and the ruling party realised that the depth of non-performing loans 
problems held by ailing financial institutions was much more grave than 
could be solved by the steady write-off of non-performing loans using the 
annual profits of financial institutions.       
 
Before the mid-1990s, the Japanese Ministry of Finance could and did 
choose to have another healthier financial institution to absorb a nearly 
bankrupt one without resorting to the implementation of the deposit 
insurance system, where only JPY 10 million would be safeguarded for 
each depositor. The priority of the Japanese Ministry of Finance then was 
how to prevent the confidence of depositors from being lost and avoid 
bank-runs. In retrospect, it could be argued that the hesitance of the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance to close the insolvent financial institutions 
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made the situation further deteriorating. However, the closure of insolvent 
financial institutions was easy to say, but in fact, it was not such a simple 
matter. In the first place, generally speaking, financial institutions are 
solvent as long as they can continue to operate with sufficient liquidity 
somehow. In the second place, there was no legal framework for the 
government to force financial institutions to close their business when the 
top management including the board of directors does not decide to file a 
bankruptcy. Last but not the least, there was a general belief among many 
Japanese policy-makers and the financial sector that land price would 
bottom out at some point soon. The majority of the people concerned 
considered that the burst of the bubble would need a certain period of 
adjustment with the substantial decline of land prices. They believed that 
the Japanese economy would recover from the economic recession as a sort 
of adjustment period as it did right after the two oil crises hit the Japanese 
economy in the 1970s.                               
 
In 1990-1991, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was faced with the 
increasing call from the general public and the media on to deal with the 
high price of land at the unprecedented level. Yasushi Mieno, the then 
Governor of the Bank of Japan, was hailed by the media then as a hero who 
took the draconian measure to raise the interest rates rapidly to burst the 
bubble, with the nickname of “Onihei (a hero of historical drama popular in 
Japan) of Heisei (the name of the current era)”. However, land price did not 
bottom out in the way that most people predicted. Yasushi Mieno raised the 
interest rate from 2.5% to 6% between May 1989 to August 1990 with the 
interest rate rise for as many as 5 times. While there was already a sign of 
burst of bubble in 1990, Yasushi Mieno maintained the interest rate of 6% 
until August 1990. In retrospect, this longer period of financial tightening 
with high interest rate than necessary was one of the reasons which led to 
deteriorating burst of bubble economy and subsequent non-performing loan 
problems.                 
 
Since the Tokyo stock market index peaked at JPY 38,195 on 29 December 
1989, the trend of the Tokyo stock market index reversed to decline steadily. 
While the Japanese Government recognised that a sharp fall of stock 
market would the decline of capital adequacy ratio of financial institutions, 
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the Japanese Government concluded that the amount of non-performing 
loans would be much smaller and negligible in view of the amount of net 
earnings and unrealised capital gains of stocks held by financial 
institutions.
18
 The Japanese Government considered that the Japanese 
economy was entering into a phase of self-sustaining adjustment after the 
unprecedentedly rapid pace of asset price bubble based on the assumption 
that the land price would bottom out at some point. It stated in the 1992 
Economic White Paper that the resolution of non-performing loans would 
not cause any significant problem with the overall health of financial 
institutions by writing off non-performing loans with the annual net profits.                            
 
The Tokyo stock market index continued to drop steadily after it had the 
highest peak on 29 December 1989, and fell under JPY 15,000 on 18 
August 1992 for the first time after it climbed up in the late 1980s 
characterised by the bubble economy. Then Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa indicated the possibility of using public funds along with the 
self-reliance efforts by each financial institution. Following the instruction 
from Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
released the document titled “Policy on Financial Sectors in the immediate 
future” on 18 August, 1992. The document clearly stated that the Japanese 
financial system was now much more resilient than before, and was 
supported by favourable conditions such as high competitiveness of 
Japanese industries, the accumulated assets, and well-established policy 
frameworks. It further stated that the Government was sure that we would 
not see any possibility that the Japanese financial system would suffer 
dysfunction and cause excessively high burden on the national economy. 
Following the release of this document, the Tokyo stock market reversed 
and the Miyazawa’s idea of injecting public funds into the rescue of ailing 
financial institutions was not seriously considered further at least as an 
imminent measure to solve the non-performing loan problem.                       
 
However, the increased non-performing loans gradually worsened the 
balance sheets of financial situations, and the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
was faced with the situation where they somehow need to make ailing 
                                                 
18 The 1992 Economic White Paper, the Japanese Government,   
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je92/wp-je92-00106.html 
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financial institutions absorbed by other still healthy financial institutions. In 
the early 1990s, the traditional style of coping with ailing financial 
institutions with the initiative of the Japanese Ministry of Finance worked 
relatively well without causing the concerns about the overall financial 
system. For example, when the Toyo Credit Union collapsed in October 
1992, the Sanwa bank, one of the then biggest city banks, agreed to take 
over their assets.   
 
But it turned out that this traditional style of rescuing ailing financial 
institutions was increasingly difficult to continue to implement. Since the 
bubble economy collapsed, the amount of the necessary money to rescue 
ailing financial institutions increased dramatically to the level too high for 
another relatively stable financial institution to absorb ailing financial 
institutions by merger or acquisition. As the amount of non-performing 
loans increased and weighed down many financial institutions, the senior 
managements of Japanese financial institutions were increasingly worried 
about the risk of being embroiled in shareholder suits and became reluctant 
to absorb other unhealthy financial institutions even if they received the 
request from the Japanese Ministry of Finance.  
 
At the same time, there was strong sense of unfairness among the general 
public about seeing their taxpayers’ money used to bail out ailing financial 
institutions. When the Japanese Ministry of Finance government dealt with 
housing loan companies, which were established as special companies 
focusing on providing loans to the Japanese customers who bought houses 
in the 1970s, there was great criticism against injecting public funds to 
cover the loss of agricultural cooperatives who lent to housing loan 
companies. While agricultural cooperatives refused to accept any kind of 
debt reduction scheme, the injection of public funds were considered by the 
general public as the rescue of some financial institutions who established 
housing loan companies as a part of their subsidiaries. There were also 
some other reasons why the general public were so distrustful against 
financial institutions. For example, the level of salary of the employees of 
financial institutions was widely known to be much higher than that of 
other industries. There was strong mistrust among the general public that 
financial institutions were generally excessively protected by vested 
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interests without being exposed to as much competition as other industries. 
Under these circumstances, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was not able 
to gain the sufficient political support to use public funds to deal with the 
non-performing loans until a series of bankruptcies of financial institutions 
actually happened.  
 
The general public and the media considered that the Japanese financial 
institutions did not make sufficient efforts to sort out non-performing loans 
by restructuring their costly business models. However, they were not 
sufficiently aware of more damaging results which would arise from the 
leaving the non-performing problems in limbo with the expectation that 
financial institutions themselves would be able to write off their 
non-performing loans. In the US, the public funds of as much as USD 90 
billion were injected to deal with the saving loan problem in the 1980s. In 
stark contrast to the US case, there was not sufficient political consensus 
about injecting public funds for the purpose of protecting financial system 
and depositors. In Japan, maintaining the stability of financial system was 
not considered by the general public as the sufficient reason to justify the 
injection of tax-payers’ money.             
 
Since the government completed its work on a set of legislation and 
budgetary measures necessary for the resolution of housing loan companies 
and they were approved by the parliament shortly in early 1996, a Japanese 
economy showed a short period of optimism in the financial system. The 
Economic White Paper 1997 stated that the Japanese economy was getting 
out of the economic recession in the early 1990s and gradually back on 
track of the self-sustained economic growth. The Economic White Paper 
1997 also concluded that the non-performing loans were slowly but 
steadily written off and would be dealt with sufficiently within the annual 
profits of financial institutions as a whole. The Hashimoto government 
raised the 6 key reforms with the highest priority attached on financial 
reform characterised by the overhaul of financial regulations towards 
radical liberalisation with the aim of making the Tokyo financial market 
more competitive with the NY and London financial markets. Making the 
so-called Japanese financial “big-bang” possible was the ultimate aim of 
the financial reform. The then Japanese financial reform was characterised 
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by the three principles of free, fair and global. The term “big-bang” is the 
one commonly used to refer to the financial reform undertaken by the UK 
conservative government initiated by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. The 
term “big-bang” implicitly contained the intention of the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance to raise the international reputation of the Tokyo financial 
market comparable to NY and London.  
 
However, the Japanese economy slipped back into the deeper financial 
crisis in the late 1997. In November 1997, following the collapse of the 
Sanyo securities, the Hokkaido Takushoku bank and the Yamaichi 
securities also fell into the bankruptcy. In the first ever default in the 
short-term financial market at the time of the collapse of the Sanyo 
securities in the post-war era, the financial institutions became extremely 
cautious about lending in the short-term financial markets and it led to the 
vicious cycle of credit crunch in the short-term financial and the shortage 
of liquidity available in the inter-bank market. This made financial market 
participants almost panicked and gave rise to domino effects on some 
financial institutions already in the brink of bankruptcy. Especially, the 
collapse of the Yamaichi securities, which was considered as one of the big 
4 security companies, along with Nomura, Daiwa and Nikko, gave huge 
impact on the minds of financial investors both domestically and 
internationally.  
 
The first default in the inter-bank bank market at the time of the Sanyo 
securities in 1997 had much greater impact to the market participants than 
the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance anticipated.
19
 
The inter-bank market is the market where financial institutions finance 
their liquidity needs in the short-term including on a daily basis. The 
default of JPN 10 billion loan of the Sanyo-securities was not considered as 
so damaging as it actually was by the Securities Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance. The Securities Bureau took much more radical 
approach than the Banking Bureau in dealing with ailing financial 
institutions, which would leave the selection to the market. It was as if the 
Securities Bureau proclaimed the policy would need to shift from the 
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traditional convoy system. But, it triggered the collapse of the Japanese 
financial system and gave the damaging effects on the confidence of 
investors and depositors. At that time, the Securities Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance gave priority to being not so much the guardian of the 
financial market as the supporter of the judgement of market forces.
20
                      
 
In June 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance released the new reform 
plan of the so-called Japanese “big-bang”. This plan was based on 3 pillars: 
(1) deregulation across and within the sectors, (2) liberalisation of capital 
transaction, and (3) review of regulation and supervision by the authorities. 
The review of regulation and supervision included the removal of the 
traditional convoy system in the Japanese financial system. The traditional 
convoy system had essentially guaranteed that financial institutions would 
never collapse and had provided the general public with the confidence 
about the Japanese financial system as a whole. On the other hand, the 
traditional convoy system prevented more competitive financial institutions 
from making dominant profits and restricted the activities of financial 
institutions of each sector. On a positive side, the traditional convoy system 
provided a sort of social security network across the country in that even 
less competitive financial institutions in rural areas made certain profit and 
continued to play a role of financing local companies. The traditional 
convoy system played a certain important role in achieving a balanced 
economic growth without causing much unemployment and economic 
disparity between regions.              
 
The collapse of the Yamaichi securities triggered the worsening spiral 
towards the loss of confidence among investors about the Japanese 
financial system as a whole. It paved the way for the collapse of the 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank in 1998. The 
collapse of the Yamaichi securities gave the deep impact on the confidence 
of investors and depositors about not only the Japanese financial system but 
also about the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s willingness to protect the 
financial system as a whole. In other words, the general public and 
investors were increasingly worried about the outright willingness and 
intention to keep the Japanese financial system as a whole.  
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
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In the right before the deep financial crisis erupted in November 1997, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance was faced with the dilemma between whether 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance should continue to be the guardian of the 
whole financial market or not. In the Japanese financial “big-bang”, the 
review of regulation and supervision by the authorities was among the key 
pillars. What made the Japanese Ministry of Finance most shocked was that 
it was decided that the role of the financial regulation and supervision 
would be removed from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and was given to 
the newly established “Financial Service Authority”, along with the 
amendment of the Bank of Japan Law designed to give explicit 
independence to the Bank of Japan. The review of regulation and 
supervision by the financial authorities included the shift from 
discretionary approach to rule-based approach. In this process, it was 
decided that all administrative guidance from the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance would be abolished and those of real necessity would be stipulated 
by means of laws and government orders.                      
                
The shift to the rule-based approach in the financial regulation and 
supervision was based on the lessons learned from severe criticism about 
the lack of transparency of financial regulation and supervision, especially 
as was observed in the great disorder in the process of resolving the 
bankruptcy of the two credit unions (the Tokyo Credit Union and the Anzen 
Credit Union) and the housing-loan companies in 1995-1996. The shift to 
the rule-based approach was intended to make it clear that the resolution of 
bankrupt financial institutions was based on the clear criteria by which the 
authorities could give the final decision about when to close the ailing 
financial institutions. This was intended to protect the government 
authorities from any political pressure.
21
 However, in the case of the 
collapse of the Yamaichi securities, the shift to the rule-based approach was 
taken as the lack of the willingness of the government to protect ailing 
financial institutions from bankruptcy, irrespective of the size of the 
financial institutions and the potential impact of the collapse of financial 
institutions.  
                                                 
21 Nishimura, Yoshimasa (1997), “Kinyu-Gyosei-no-Haiin (Causes of the Failure of Financial 
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When the Yamaichi Securities was faced with the verge of its collapse, the 
Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance did not show the 
willingness to rescue the Yamaichi securities at any cost. When the Moodys 
announced the possible downgrading the Yamaichi securities on 6 
November 1997, the stock price of the Yamaichi securities fell as low as 
JPY 58 on 19 November 1997. Then the Securities Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance told the CEO of the Yamaichi securities to choose to 
file for voluntary closure of business with the Ministry of Finance. The 
Japanese Ministry of Finance did not choose to show its willingness to be 
the guardian of the financial market, but rather to respect and follow the 
judgement of the financial market on the stableness of financial institutions.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it exacerbated the concerns of ordinary 
depositors and investors about the Japanese financial system. Just before a 
series of collapses of financial institutions, there was a strong argument that 
protecting the confidence about the financial system as a whole was one 
thing, and preventing ailing financial institutions from collapsing was 
another thing. However, when the confidence about the whole financial 
system was weak, it was difficult to make a clear distinction between the 
confidence about the financial system as a whole and that of each financial 
institution. The straightforward argument that the mismanagement of the 
financial institutions should not be compensated by the tax payers’ money 
was prevailing. The traditional convoy approach was symbolised as the 
pre-modern financial regulatory style of financial regulatory and 
supervisory policies.             
 
At that time, the pre-modern Japanese financial regulatory style was 
characterised by the traditional convoy financial supervision, the reluctance 
of the authorities to implement so-called “pay-off” which protect the 
deposits only up to the certain ceiling, and the restriction of the types of 
business activities undertaken by financial institutions. The traditional 
convoy approach was based on the assumption that the regulatory 
authorities always make the utmost efforts to save ailing financial 
institutions at any cost. But, once the government announced that it would 
undertake a financial reform to promote more liberalisation of business 
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activities and competition and rule-based administrative approach, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance found itself in dilemma and constrained with 
the policy options.                        
        
It could be argued that blanket provisions of public guarantees to creditors 
of financial institutions would unnecessarily raise taxpayer costs, 
inappropriately shield creditors and equity holders from losses, and 
exacerbate problems of moral hazard. However, once the confidence of the 
general public about the financial system as a whole was lost, it was 
difficult to make a distinction between the financial institutions to be 
recapitalised with public funds and the other institutions to be closed 
without the support of public funds. The worsening market sentiment tends 
to overreact to the news of a mere fact of bankruptcies of financial 
institutions, irrespective of whether they were still solvent or insolvent. At 
the time of worsening financial crisis, it was extremely difficult to expect 
the general public and market investors to be calm and wise enough to 
make a selective distinction between solvent institutions and insolvent 
institutions.         
      
However, it took some time for the Japanese general public and the media 
to stand ready to realise that public funds are necessary to address the heart 
of non-performing problem. In the early 1990s, there was a mood in the 
Japanese public that the bubble would need to be burst and that asset prices 
which had risen to an unprecedented level need to be corrected. As a result 
of sharp rise of asset prices, notably land prices, it led to the dissatisfaction 
among the ordinary public about the growing disparity of wealth between 
those who owned land and those who did not. Just before the burst of the 
bubble economy, there was growing call for the Japanese government to 
introduce various measures which would discourage financial institutions 
to provide funding to the lenders who would invest in the land.        
 
For the Japanese Ministry of Finance, a series of collapses of financial 
institutions were something unexpected after it seems that the Japanese 
economy got back to the path of sustainable economic recovery with the 
modest rate of economic growth partly due to the depreciation of yen 
against US dollar in the latter half of 1995 and 1996. The capital 
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investment in 1995 bottomed out for the first time after starting to fall in 
1991. The Economic White Paper 1996 stated that the Japanese economy 
was back on track of the sustainable economy recovery with the increased 
export helped by the Japanese yen depreciation and the improvement of 
labour market.  
 
The Japanese financial reform “big-bang” and the fiscal consolidation 
efforts attempted by the Hashimoto government in 1996 was based on the 
assumption that the Japanese economy was already getting out of the worst 
situation of the financial sector problem characterised by the accumulated 
non-performing loan, especially which incurred in housing loan company 
problems. The resolution of the housing loan problems with injecting 
public funds in 1996 was severely criticised by the public for the use of 
taxpayers’ money, but it was seen as indicating the end of the worst stage of 
the non-performing problem in the Japanese financial sector. The attempt to 
shift the priority from protecting the financial stability at all cost to giving 
respect to the market forces placed constraints on the policy options to be 
taken by the government when faced with a series of bankruptcies of 
Japanese financial institutions. The Japanese financial market reform with 
the emphasis on market discipline market competitiveness was based upon 
the belief that the market-oriented increased competition and the selection 
of market forces would limit the risk of a deeper and more prolonged 
economic recession and promote an early and sustainable recovery. The 
IMF also stated that “Decisive action to address strains in the financial 
sector, including the closure of insolvent institutions”
22
. But, in fact, the 
Japanese financial market was vulnerable to sudden reversal of market 
sentiments, and this closure of insolvent institutions exacerbated the 
worsening perceptions by the general public, depositors, and investors 
about the stability of the Japanese financial system.         
 
Faced with a series of bankruptcies of Japanese financial institutions in 
1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was aware of the urgent need to 
avoid the contagious spread of the Asian Financial Crisis to Japan and the 
responsibility of Japan to do whatever it could to prevent the Asian 
Financial Crisis from spreading to other regions in the world. This sense of 
                                                 
22 IMF (1997), World Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, December 1997 
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doing whatever the government could do like was based on the two beliefs, 
i.e. (1) the sense of international policy cooperation that Japanese would 
need to undertake a significant role in contributing to stable world economy 
as the second largest economic power after the US and must not cause any 
economic disorder to other countries, and (2) the sense of urgency to get 
out of the domestic economic recession as soon as possible and to put itself 
back on track of stable economic growth by removing the concern of 
overseas financial crisis.                             
 
The Asian Financial Crisis urged the Japanese Finance Ministry to further 
strengthen its efforts to use the G7 Finance Ministers meeting process as an 
opportunity to promote their agenda. The Japanese Finance Ministry put 
special focus on the discussion of international financial architecture. 
Especially, Japan began to take a proactive role in leading the discussion on 
international financial architecture. In the G7 Finance Ministers meeting in 
Birmingham in May 1998, a report of the G7 Finance Ministers to the G7 
Heads of State or Government on strengthening the architecture of the 
global financial system was transmitted to the G7 Heads of State. The 
Japanese Finance Ministry worked to insert the elements of their arguments 
on the origin of the Asian Financial Crisis. In the paragraph 12, the report 
stated that  
 
“International capital flows enable a better global allocation of capital and 
foster economic development. However, events in Asia have shown that 
weaknesses can suddenly be exposed by global capital markets, making 
countries with weak fundamentals, including weak financial systems, more 
vulnerable to external shocks. It has also highlighted the dangers of poorly 
sequenced and unbalanced liberalisation. To ensure that the process of 
capital account liberalisation is orderly, it is important that sound 
macroeconomic policies and supervisory and regulatory practices are put 
in place. Correct management of the liberalisation process is crucial. And 
the process needs to be accompanied by reforms to strengthen the domestic 
financial system.” 
 
While the report called on the IMF to continue to play an important role in 
this area and providing advice on how best to manage orderly capital 
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account liberalisation and monitoring countries' vulnerability to capital 
flows. It explicitly pointed out the risks of the dangers of poorly sequenced 
and unbalanced liberalisation of capital account, taking into account the 
danger of short-term capital flows. It is worth noting that the report stated 
that open access to domestic markets for foreign firms can help with the 
development of the deep and liquid domestic financial markets, with 
soundly managed and well capitalised firms. The communique is based on 
the delicate balance between the argument calling for balanced 
liberalisation of capital account and that doing for increased access for 
foreign financial firms, and carefully drafted not to deny the latter 
argument. 
 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Finance focused 
on three agenda in the G7 Finance Ministers process: (1) the reform of IMF 
such as limiting the conditionality to the areas where the IMF has real 
expertise, the review of quota giving excessively favourable treatment to 
European countries and underrepresentation of the Asian countries, (2) 
bailing in the private investors in a transparent manner, and (3) 
strengthening of regulation towards highly-leveraged institutions including 
hedge-funds.
23
 The Japanese Finance Ministry considered that the Asian 
Financial Crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of the international 
financial system rather than just a regional financial system and the real 
solution need to involve the reform of the international financial 
architecture and the G7 Finance Ministers process needs to be the 
cornerstone of this reform.  
 
At least at the early stage of the Asian Financial Crisis, the IMF was 
reluctant to admit the downside risks of capital account liberalisation 
squarely. In September 1997, Stanley Fisher, then the first Deputy 
Managing Director, stated that liberalisation of capital account can bring 
more benefits than the costs and it would enable residents and governments 
in recipient countries to borrow and lend more favourable terms, which 
would lead to better allocation of savings and investments. In this vein, he 
further stated that controls are generally inefficient and costly for the 
economy, and prolonged use of capital control would present investors with 
                                                 
23 Kuroda, H. (2003), “Tuuka-gaiko (Currency Diplomacy)”  
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an additional country risk factor and could lead to capital flight.
24
 In April 
1997, the Interim Committee of the IMF agreed to amend its Articles of the 
Agreement to make the liberalisation of international capital movements a 
central purpose of the IMF and to extend the IMF’s jurisdiction to capital 
movements. At least in the immediate aftermath of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the IMF did not admit the capital account liberalisation per se was a 
cause of the Asian Financial Crisis. Rather they considered that the 
liberalisation of capital account did not cause a risk itself, but should have 
accompanied by supporting measures which would encourage stronger 
management and supervision in banking sector as well as avoid moral 
hazard problems for corporations and banks. They considered that 
inadequate transparency and information flows also contributed to sharp 
shifts in market sentiment in response to uncertainties, along with 
underdevelopment of instruments for hedging and managing risks.
25
              
       
The IMF’s approach was to a great extent oriented towards their favour 
seeking long-term structural reform. For example, the IMF considered that 
insolvent institutions need to be closed to facilitate an early restoration of 
confidence and prevent the complete collapse of already weak financial 
systems, while weak but viable institutions will need to be restructured and 
recapitalised. In the IMF’s view that sweeping guarantees to domestic and 
foreign creditors of financial institutions would unnecessarily raise 
taxpayer costs, inappropriately protect creditors from losses, and 
exacerbate moral hazard. On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance considered that at the time of financial crisis, it is difficult for 
private investors to make a clear distinction between insolvent financial 
institutions and viable financial institutions. In their view, it is not 
impossible to expect investors to make a reasonable distinction between 
insolvent financial institutions and viable ones at the time of financial crisis 
and the announcement of closure of financial institutions would lead to the 
panic among investors.              
 
As the international discussion on the effectiveness of capital controls, the 
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IMF was gradually accommodating the capital controls in the 2000s. While 
they still believe that capital controls could not be a substitute for the 
required adjustments in macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, the 
IMF displayed a certain degree of sympathy with some countries in the use 
of capital controls such as Russia and Peru as the second-best instrument.
26
 
For example, the IMF staff report for the 1999 Article IV consultation with 
China stated that the capital controls had helped the country reduce external 
vulnerability. Also in the case of the Malaysia’s capital outflow control 
measures introduced in September 1998, the IMF staff paper in 1999 
recognised that the controls were operated effectively and supported them 
as temporary measures. This is the stark contrast to the IMF’s call on 
Thailand to eliminate their controls on baht sales to non-residents 
introduced in 1997, which were eventually relaxed by September 1998.
27
   
     
The gradual shift of the IMF’s view on capital controls corresponds to the 
development of the discussion at the G7 on international financial 
architecture. Taking advantage of the position of the chair of the G7 in 
2000, the Japanese Ministry of Finance worked hard to use the G7 as the 
opportunity to obtain the mandate of pressing the IMF and other forums to 
reflect their views. For example, in the report of G7 Finance Ministers to 
the Heads of State and Government in 2000, Japan succeeded in inserting a 
paragraph recognising the role of regional financial cooperation as a means 
of improving regional financial stability. It also stated that “Regional 
cooperation through more intensified surveillance can help contribute to 
financial stability by strengthening the policy framework at the national 
level. Cooperative financing arrangements at the regional level designed to 
supplement resources provided by the IFIs in support of IMF programs can 
be effective in crisis prevention and resolution.” While the effectiveness of 
regional financial cooperation was recognised the extent to which it is 
supportive of the IMF's objectives and responsibilities in the global 
economy, the pursuit of financial cooperation in Asia was clearly given the 
mandate at the G7 the effectiveness of regional financial cooperation as 
something which can improve regional stability and thus contribute to the 
stability of the global economy. It explicitly supported the work in Asia 
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aimed at establishing the frameworks for regional surveillance and 
cooperation in finance including bilateral swap mechanisms.  
   
As we have seen, the Japanese Ministry of Finance had consistent strategy 
that the issues raised in the Asian Financial Crisis could be effectively 
addressed only when they are put on the table of the international 
agreement. In their view, the Asian Financial Crisis was distinct in that 
dramatic deterioration of investor sentiment did spread to other economies 
with large currency depreciations and capital outflows in such a short 
period of time. The crisis-stricken countries which relied heavily on 
short-term borrowing, 
 
In the late 1990s, the concerns about the fragilities about the Japanese 
financial sector were mounting. At the heart of the concerns was the 
financial stability of the Japanese financial institutions with a large volume 
of problem loans whose roots were in asset price bubbles of the late 1980s. 
As a result of the concerns about the health of the financial systems, the 
so-called “Japan premium” was charged to Japanese banks in international 
money markets with dollar-financing in 1997. In October and November 
1998, several Japanese banks indicated their intention to withdraw at least 
partially from overseas activities by closing a large number of foreign 
branches. The deterioration of the Asian Financial Crisis was considered to 
have further negative impact on Japan of financial turmoil. Therefore, 
addressing the remaining risks associated with the Asian Financial Crisis is 
also necessary to restore the confidence about the Japanese economy.             
 
The Asian Financial Crisis was followed by the Russia’s decision in 1998 
to devalue the ruble. This led to the reassessment of the risks associated 
with holding emerging market financial instruments. Some highly 
leveraged institutions suffered large losses as a result of the Russian debt 
restructuring and faced higher margin calls. Growing concerns among 
investors about liquidity adversely affected emerging market economies 
with large domestic and external refinancing needs. The reduced capacity 
to undertake risks led to substantial capital outflows and sustained pressure 
on foreign exchange and domestic money markets in a number of countries, 
in Asia and Latin America.  
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In September and early October 1998, there were growing concerns about 
liquidity and counterparty risks – ultimately led to the near collapse and 
rescue of Long-Term Capital Management, a US hedge fund, which 
attempted to profit from discrepancies in the relative value of governments 
bonds, fixed-income derivatives, equities and equity derivatives. The 
private capital inflows to the emerging markets surged during the 1990s. 
The private capital flows accounted for the largest proportion of flows to 
emerging markets since 1995. Unlike FDI flows, this portfolio flows to 
emerging markets later turned out to be volatile.       
      
Faced with deepening of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Japanese Finance 
Ministry had no choice but to change the policy stance of fiscal policy 
towards more active fiscal policy. In 1997, the Japanese Finance Ministry 
succeeded in making the Fiscal Consolidation Law passed in the parliament. 
In addition, the Japanese Finance Ministry announced providing financial 
support amounting at USD 30 billion for stricken Asian countries. On 4 
December 1998, the Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced that the 
Japanese government would provide financial assistance to the Asian 
countries in order to help them to put their real economy on track of 
substantial recovery in view of the large role of Japan in the risk to the 
global economy.
28
  
 
The Finance Ministers’ speech on 4 December 1998 was significant in two 
elements. First, it officially announced that the Japanese Finance Ministry 
suspended the Fiscal Consolidation Law and instead would present fiscal 
stimulus package to achieve the stabilisation of financial markets economic 
recovery totalling at JPN 20 trillion (around USD 200 billion) as the urgent 
economic package. The speech explicitly stated that this urgent economic 
package is intended to get out of economic sluggishness and restore the 
confidence about the Japanese economy in the domestic and international 
market. Secondly, it announced that Japanese Finance Ministry provided 
financial support for Asian countries, based on the view that Japan and 
Asian countries are inter-dependent and Japan had a special responsibility 
                                                 
28 Finance Minister’s Speech at the Parliament, 4 December 1998, 
http://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/statement/fiscal_policy_speech/1e054.htm   
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for addressing the risks which threaten the global economy. What struck 
most in this Finance Minister’s speech was that it emphasised the special 
role of Japanese economy to the world economy both in the context of 
suspending the course of fiscal consolidation once decided by the cabinet 
and put into legislation and providing financial assistance for the stricken 
Asian countries.                                     
 
What was the “special role” of Japan to the world economy and the Asia, 
which the Japanese Finance Ministry referred to? The “special role” of 
Japan was classified into two meanings. First, the idea of “special role of 
Japan to the world economy” dates back to the mid-1980s, where Japan 
was pressed by the US to undertake more active role in the world economy 
by opening the market and orienting its economic structure towards more 
domestic-demand driven economy rather than export-driven economy. The 
Japan was called upon by the G7, and notably by the US to take the lead in 
domestic demand. Second, the idea of “special role of Japan to Asia” was 
based on the view that Asia’s stable growth is in the interests of Japan and 
Japan has special stakes on the economic stability of the Asia.  
 
The idea of “special role of Japan to Asia” was further divided into the 
three elements. First, there was a strong belief that Asia’s recession would 
have a repercussion with the economic recovery of Japan through the fall 
of export of Japanese goods to Asia. Second, there was shared recognition 
that Asia’s recession would affect Japanese companies doing business in 
Asia. Thirdly, at least at the time when the crisis broke out in 1997, Japan 
considered itself to be the only country capable of providing financial 
assistance to the Asia.                    
 
In terms of the negative effect of Asia’s recession on the Japanese economy, 
the export of Japanese goods to Asia accounted for 5.7% out of the 
Japanese GDPs in 1997. The Economic White Paper in 1997 concluded 
that the Asia’s recession would lead to the reduction in the exported goods 
from Japan to the Asia, and it could be a key element contributing to the 
reduction of the GDP by 0.5%. In the Q1 of 1998, the Japanese exports 
declined by 12% to Asia and 30% to the ASEAN 4 countries compared 
with the figures of Q1 of 1997. As the importance of Asia was growing in 
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the 1990s as the export markets rather than the location of factories 
supported by cheap labour, the Asia’s recession was considered as the 
threat to the recovery of the Japanese economy.
29
                
 
In terms of the negative effect of the Asia’s recession on Japanese 
companies, Japanese companies, who used to make foreign direct 
investment to Asian countries to seek cheap labour or secure natural 
resources, were rather motivated to increase their foreign direct investment 
to seek the great potential of broadening consumer bases underpinned by 
rapid urbanisation and increased purchasing power of growing middle-class 
households. The foreign direct investment from Japan to the ASEAN 4 
countries dropped by 27% in the first half of 1997 compared with the same 
periods of 1996. In addition, the Japanese banks had as much loan as more 
than USD 110 billion to the Asian countries. Other Japanese ordinary 
companies such as trading companies than financial institutions had as 
much claim as USD 10 billion to Asian countries. 
 
In terms of the role of Japan in rescuing the crisis-stricken Asian countries, 
the Japanese Finance Ministry had no doubt about Japan being the only 
country to be able to provide financial assistance to the crisis-stricken 
Asian countries. Faced with the domestic financial crisis culminating in 
November 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Finance put priority on 
preventing Japan from being the origin of the world-wide financial crisis 
and exacerbating the Asian Financial Crisis, which already started in July 
1997 as the major member of the G7 countries. The Miyazawa Initiative 
had 4 key objectives: (1) promoting the restructuring of debts in private 
sectors and stabilisation of the financial system, (2) boosting domestic 
demand, (3) rescuing socially vulnerable group of people, and (4) 
mitigating credit crunch. What is noteworthy in these objectives is that it 
included not only “promoting the restructuring of debts in private sectors 
and stabilising of financial system” and “mitigating credit crunch”, but also 
other objectives such as “boosting domestic demand” and “rescuing the 
socially vulnerable”. The latter two objectives were usually the key 
objectives which domestic expenditures are used for. This showed that the 
                                                 
29 Economic White Paper (1998), Government of Japan  
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je98/wp-je98-000i1.html  
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Miyazawa initiative was intended to not only respond to short-term needs 
of financial liquidity, but also to support the deficit of revenues and enable 
governments to increase government expenditures for a wide range of 
objectives including the rescuing the SMEs and improving social 
safety-network.           
 
For example, in relation to Thailand, the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
provided a wide range of loans ranging from infrastructure projects which 
would serve to create a great number of jobs for the unemployed and 
helping manufacturing companies including domestic local SMEs to 
modernise equipment, as well as assist local Japanese subsidiaries with 
capital investment and operating fund. In the World Bank’s social 
investment projects, the loans under the Miyazawa Initiative were also 
provided to building various infrastructures such as airports, schools, roads, 
banks, and reservoir. The Miyazawa initiative played a role in boosting the 
demand when the IMF-led programme had the effect of contracting the 
domestic economy. In Malaysia, the loans under the Miyazawa Initiative 
served to rebuild their manufacturing sectors to increase their 
competitiveness of exporting.                                
 
 
1-2 Chiang-Mai Initiative 
 
In spite of the failure of the AMF proposal, it did certainly contribute to 
continued intensive discussion on closer regional financial cooperation. 
The development of regional movement of financial cooperation has been 
undertaken under the framework of original ASEAN 5 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) plus China, Japan, and 
South Korea (so-called “ASEAN plus 3”).  
 
The cooperation among the ASEAN plus 3 members started in December 
1997 when an informal Summit among the leaders of ASEAN plus 3 was 
convened at the margin of the Second AEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia. 
In the Joint Statement of Heads of State/Government of the Member States 
of ASEAN and the Prime Minister of Japan, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
16 December 1997, it stated in the paragraph 7:  
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7. They noted that the Finance Ministers of ASEAN and Japan at the recent 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 December 1997 discussed national efforts 
and regional and international cooperation to address the present financial 
situation in the region. They endorsed the Finance Ministers' agreement on 
the rapid implementation of the Manila Framework as a constructive step 
towards promoting financial stability in the region. They noted that Japan 
would convene a meeting of Asian Finance and Central Bank Deputies in 
early 1998 to carry forward the initiatives under the Manila Framework 
and work closely with the IMF, World Bank, ADB and international 
regulatory bodies. The ASEAN member states noted with appreciation 
Japan's contribution to the recent financing packages in the region and 
both sides reaffirmed the importance of enhanced cooperation on economic 
and financial issues between the Finance Ministers of ASEAN and Japan. 
 
The ASEAN and the President of China released the same statement as that 
with Japan.    
 
7. They noted that the Finance Ministers of ASEAN and the People's 
Republic of China at the recent meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 2 December 
1997 discussed national efforts and regional and international cooperation 
to address the present financial situation in the region. They endorsed the 
Finance Ministers' agreement on the rapid implementation of the Manila 
Framework as a constructive step towards promoting financial stability in 
the region. They encouraged efforts to carry forward the initiatives under 
the Manila Framework and work closely with the IMF, World Bank, ADB 
and international regulatory bodies. ASEAN member states noted with 
appreciation China's contribution to the recent financing packages in the 
region and both sides reaffirmed the importance of enhanced cooperation 
on economic and financial issues between the Finance Ministers of ASEAN 
and the People's Republic of China. 
 
At the Finance Ministers Meeting of ASEAN states plus 3 on 6 May 2000 
at the margin of the annual meeting of the board of governors of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the finance ministers laid down a broad set of 
agenda including “Chiang Mai Initiative”, regional surveillance, 
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capital-flow monitoring and the training of personnel to enhance the value 
of these exercises.     
 
3. We appreciated the presentation by the Asian Development Bank on the 
East Asian economic financial situations and welcomed the 
stronger-than-expected recovery of our member economies. To further 
sustain this economic growth, we agreed to strengthen our policy dialogues 
and regional cooperation activities in, among others, the areas of capital 
flows monitoring, self-help and support mechanism and international 
financial reforms. 
 
4. On the monitoring of capital flows, our experts met in Manila in late 
April this year to exchanging views on capital flows monitoring 
mechanisms and discussed possible approaches to establish a regional 
monitoring framework in East Asia. We agreed to use the ASEAN + 3 
framework to facilitate the exchange of consistent and timely data and 
information on capital flows.  
 
5. As a first step towards establishing a well-coordinated economic and 
financial monitoring system in East Asia, we agreed to establish a network 
of contact person to facilitate regional surveillance in East Asia. This 
would enhance the effectiveness of our economic reviews and policy 
dialogues.  
 
6. In order to strengthen our self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia 
through the ASEAN + 3 framework, we recognized a need to establish a 
regional financing arrangement to supplement the existing international 
facilities. As a start, we agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative 
frameworks among our monetary authorities through the “Chiang Mai 
Initiative”. The Initiative involves an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
that would include ASEAN countries, and a network of bilateral swap and 
repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea.  
         
The Chiang Mai Initiative is compose of two financial arrangements: an 
expanded long-standing ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA); and a network 
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of bilateral currency swap and repurchase arrangements among the eight 
member countries of ASEAN plus 3.  
 
The ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) was agreed in 1977 among the 
central banks of the original five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) with a view to providing 
immediate, short-term swap facilities to any member facing temporary 
liquidity shortage or a balance of payment problems. The total facility was 
USD 100 million, with each member contributing USD 20 million, which 
was later increased by twice to USD 200 million and USD 40 million 
respectively in 1978. While the ASA served as a symbol of ASEAN 
solidarity, the role of the ASA was limited because this facility was small 
relative to the volume of trade and capital flows of the countries in the 
region. During the Asian Financial Crisis, the facility was not 
implemented.
30
           
 
At the ASEAN Finance Ministers meeting in March 2000, it was agreed 
that the ASA would extend its membership to include Brunei, Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. At the same time, the total amount of the 
facility was increased from USD 200 million to USD 1 billion with a view 
to responding more effectively to the needs of its members. The original 5 
ASEAN countries, together with Brunei, contributed USD 150 million each, 
while the other new 4 countries contributed various amounts up to USD 60 
million. Under the ASA arrangement, the central banks of member 
countries were allowed to swap their domestic currencies with major 
international currencies such as US Dollar, Japanese Yen, and Euro, for an 
amount of up to twice their commitment amount under the facility and for a 
period of up to 6 months.
31
   
 
The Financial Ministers’ meetings of ASEAN plus 3 in May also agreed to 
establish a regional network of bilateral currency swap arrangements 
                                                 
30 Henning, C.R. “East Asian Financial Cooperation”, Institute for International Economics, 2002, 
Kuroda, H. Kawai, M. “Strengthening Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia”, PRI 
Discussion Paper Series, May 2003, Ministry of Finance, Japan.     
31 Henning, C.R. “East Asian Financial Cooperation”, Institute for International Economics, 2002, 
Kuroda, H. Kawai, M. “Strengthening Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia”, PRI 
Discussion Paper Series, May 2003, Ministry of Finance, Japan.  
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(BSAs) under the Chiang Mai Initiative. The Chiang Mai Initiative network 
of bilateral swap arrangements among the eight members of ASEAN plus 3 
is designed to provide liquidity assistance mainly in the form of swap of 
US dollars with the domestic currencies of participating countries. The 
maximum amount of liquidity available was decided to be negotiated by 
the contracting parties.  
 
In terms of the relationship between the BSAs the IMF financing and 
conditionality, the network of BSAs was placed as complementary to the 
IMF lending facilities. Initially the amount of liquidity available 
independent of the IMF conditionality was limited to only 10 per cent of 
the maximum amount of drawing. A member drawing more than the 10 per 
cent was required to have completed, or be close to completing an 
agreement with the IMF on the programme for macroeconomic and 
structural adjustments. 10 per cent of the facility can be drawn with the 
consent of creditor countries on a 90-day basis, renewable once. The 
remaining 90 per cent of the swap facility was also based on the maturity of 
90 days, renewable seven times at the creditor’s discretion.  
 
Given that the momentum of Chiang Mai Initiative arose from mostly the 
dissatisfaction with the speed of disbursement of the IMF funds and the 
conditions attached to the IMF lending and the failure of the Asian 
Monetary Fund, the link between the BSAs and the IMF lending was 
apparently the most critical issue in terms of the overall operation. This 
raised the question of whether there are alternative and superior forms of 
conditionality that would address the problem of moral hazard.        
 
The link between the BSAs and the IMF lending had two meanings. In the 
first place, it represented that the ASEAN plus 3 countries recognised the 
central role of the IMF in the international monetary system including the 
monetary system in Asia. In the second place, it reflected the reality that 
there was no effective regional surveillance mechanism in Asia. In the 
meeting in Philippine on 18-19 November 1997, which paved the way for 
the Manila Framework and the subsequent Chiang Mai Initiative, the 
finance and central bank deputies agreed that there was a need to establish 
the regional surveillance mechanism to complement global surveillance 
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system by the IMF. In terms of regional surveillance, there was no 
agreement on to what extent the surveillance mechanism would need to be 
stringent beyond the mere policy dialogue, what kind of penalty would be 
imposed if one county cannot comply with their commitments about their 
economic performances, and by which criteria they assess the member 
countries’ economic performances, for example.  
 
Since the initial launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative, there was a strong 
argument calling for loosening the linkage between the BSAs and the IMF 
conditionality and increasing the automatic 10% drawing. The heart of the 
issue is how to address a fundamental issue relating to moral hazard and 
make sure that an establishment of the independent monitoring and 
surveillance system among the ASEAN plus 3 members would serve as an 
institutional framework not only for policy dialogue and coordination 
among the members but also for imposing structural and policy reform on 
the countries drawing from the BSAs.  
 
At the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers meeting in April 2004, the 
ASEAN plus 3 finance ministers agreed to undertake further review of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative to enhance its effectiveness.  
 
5. On the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), we are pleased to note the 
continued expansion of its network of bilateral swap arrangements. 
Since we last net in Makati City in the Philippines, in August 2003, 
four more Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) have been concluded. 
That brings the total number of BSAs to sixteen, and the size of the 
network to USD 36.5 billion.  
 
6. We agreed to undertake further review of the CMI to explore ways of 
enhancing its effectiveness. A working group will be tasked to 
conduct the review and report the outcome, by the end of 2004, to 
our Deputies who will report to us at the next AFMM plus 3.   
 
Then the above initiative was followed by the ASEAN plus 3 Finance 
Ministers meeting in Istanbul in May 2005, where the finance ministers 
agreed to take the measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Chiang Mai 
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Initiative such as (1) the integration and enhancement of ASEAN plus 3 
economic surveillance to the Chiang Mai Initiative; (2) the adoption of 
collective decision-making system; (3) the increase of the size of the BSAs; 
and (4) the increase of the disbursement available independently of the IMF 
conditionality from 10% to 20%.  
 
There were three elements worthwhile noting in the Joint Statement of the 
ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ meeting in 2005. Firstly, the ASEAN 
plus 3 Finance Ministers’ meeting in 2005 raised the issue of the collective 
decision-making system. The issue arose from the fact that, under the 
original Chiang Mai Initiative, a country under financial crisis wishing to 
obtain short-term liquidity was required to negotiate the activation with all 
parties of bilateral swap arrangements. Each party was still allowed to 
choose to opt out. The negotiations with a multiple of contractual parties 
may take long time and hence may deprive the BSAs of the ability to 
respond to speculative attacks effectively and promptly at the time of 
financial crises. The finance ministers agreed to create a collective 
mechanism which would determine joint activation of all swap contracts of 
the swap requesting countries as the first step of multilaterisation of the 
BSAs.  
 
Secondly, the finance ministers made clear the two core objectives of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, i.e. (1) to address short-term liquidity difficulties in 
the region, and (2) to supplement the existing international financial 
architecture, in particular. This made it clear that while Chiang Mai 
Initiative was intended to contribute to promoting the stability of the 
regional financial system, it should play a supplementary role to the 
existing international financial architecture.     
 
Thirdly, the finance ministers explicitly admitted that multilateralisation of 
the Chiang Mai Initiative, together with the increase in the drawing limit 
initially set at 10% of the overall facilities, would not be possible unless 
they establish a more effective surveillance system.  
              
5. On the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), we reaffirmed our resolution to 
strengthen our self-help and support mechanism in East Asia by 
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making the CMI a more effective and disciplined framework. As a 
basic principle for the review, we agreed to firmly maintain the 
CMI’s two core objectives, namely (1) to address short-term liquidity 
difficulties in the region, and (2) to supplement the existing 
international financial arrangements.  
 
6. Taking into account (i) the improvement in our economic and 
financial situations and (ii) the advancement in our various 
initiatives for regional financial cooperation, such as regional 
surveillance and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, as well as 
reflecting the existing vulnerabilities in the global financial markets, 
we agreed upon the following measures to enhance the effectiveness 
of the CMI as a self-help and support mechanism:  
 
(i) Integration and enhancement of ASEAN plus 3 economic 
surveillance into the CMI framework to enable early 
detection of irregularities and swift policy actions, with a 
view to developing effective regional surveillance capabilities 
that complements the current undertaking by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
(ii) Clear-defining of the swap activation process and the 
adoption of a collective decision-making mechanism of the 
current network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) as a 
first step of multilateralization so that the relevant BSAs 
would be activated collectively and promptly in case of 
emergency; and  
 
(iii) Significant increase in the size of swaps. The size of the BSAs 
should be increased by (i) increasing the amount of existing 
bilateral commitment, (ii) concluding new BSAs, for example, 
among ASEAN countries, (iii) transforming one-way BSAs to 
two-way BSAs. Member countries favoured an enhancement 
of up to 100% increase of the existing individual 
arrangements while noting that the size could be flexibly 
decided by bilateral negotiations. In this context, the ASEAN 
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Swap Arrangements has been doubled from USD 1 billion to 
USD 2 billion.  
 
(iv) Improving the drawdown mechanism. The size of swaps that 
could be withdrawn without the IMF-supported program 
would be increased from the current 10% to 20% in order to 
better cope with sudden market irregularities while the 
current framework to complement the international financial 
arrangements and other disciplined conditions would be 
firmly maintained.  
 
 
1-3 Asian Bond Market Initiative  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis also highlighted the underdevelopment of local 
currency bond markets at both national and regional levels. The key 
objectives of the Asian Bond Market Initiative were to (1) to reduce the 
risks associated with excessive reliance on short-term external financing, 
thereby mitigating the currency and maturity mismatch problems, and (2) 
to provide an alternative vehicle for channelling domestic savings into 
productive investment and reducing dependence on bank lending. This was 
based upon the view that the Asian Financial Crisis resulted from excessive 
short-term foreign currency-denominated financing and the “maturity” and 
“currency” mismatches in the financing structure in East Asia made the 
region more vulnerable to volatility in short-term capital movements. In the 
view, relative underdevelopment of domestic bond markets and the absence 
of efficient regional bond markets exacerbated capital outflows in East Asia 
during the financial crisis. Developing the local currency denominated 
bond markets was expected to be an effective means of addressing the 
“currency” and “maturity” mismatches as well as to make better use of the 
savings in East Asia.
32
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On the other hand, well-developed market infrastructures were needed to 
construct efficient domestic capital markets that were broad and deep in 
terms of the variety of financial instruments, issuers, and investors. The 
ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers in 2003 agreed to launch a substantive 
work on the feasibility of creating new and improving existing Asian bond 
market under the framework of the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ 
meeting. They agreed to organise six working groups to conduct detailed 
studies on the construction of market infrastructure and create new debt 
instruments including bond denominated in local currencies. The topics 
dealt with by the six groups include: (1) creating new securitised debt 
instruments; (2) credit guarantee mechanism; (3) foreign exchange 
transactions and settlement; (4) issuance of bonds denominated in local 
currency by Multilateral Development Banks, foreign government agencies 
and Asian multinational corporations; (5) local and regional rating 
agencies; and (6) technical assistance coordination. 
 
10.  We agreed to intensify our efforts to develop regional bond 
markets. This will further strengthen our financial systems by better 
utilizing the aggregate savings in the region and minimizing the risk 
of maturity and currency mismatches. Voluntary working groups 
have been established to further discuss a range of key issues 
crucial to further development of the domestic and regional bond 
markets, such as, securitization, credit guarantee, promotion of 
local currency denominated bonds, credit rating, and foreign 
exchange transactions and settlement issues.   
 
At the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ meeting in 2004, substantial part 
of the Joint Finance Ministers’ statement was devoted to the work on the 
Asian Bond Market Initiative. It is noteworthy that the Joint Statement 
explicitly described the purpose of establishing the Asian Bond Markets as 
assisting in the efficient allocation of the large pool of savings in Asia to 
fund productive investment in the region. It implied that they shared the 
view that the underdevelopment of domestic and regional capital markets 
prevented the efficient allocation of the large pool of savings in Asia.  
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7. We are pleased with the substantial progress made by the six working 
groups under the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). We believe 
that such efforts, in consultation with the private sector, will 
contribute significantly to the development of deeper and more liquid 
regional bond markets that will assist in the efficient allocation of 
the large pool of savings in Asia to fund productive investment in the 
region. We also noted the establishment of the ABMI Focal Group, 
which was set up to coordinate the activities of six working groups.   
 
8. We appreciated the assistance by the ADB in conducting studies on 
credit guarantee mechanisms and regional clearing and settlement 
mechanisms as well as the joint effort by Japan and Malaysia to 
conduct a study on the impediments on cross-border bond 
investments and issuance. We supported Korea and China 
co-chairing the working group to explore ways to further enhance 
the regional credit guarantee and investment mechanisms. We also 
welcomed our members’ efforts in modifying existing regulations to 
facilitate the issuance of and investment in local currency 
denominated bond under the ABMI.  
 
9. We recognized the importance of disseminating information about 
bond market infrastructure as the dissemination of such information 
will promote market transparency and facilitate the decision-making 
process by both issuers and investors. In this respect, we welcomed 
the launch of the AsianBondsOnline Website (ABW) today. The ABW 
will play an important role in providing the public with information 
about the bond markets in the region as well as updates on the 
progress made by each working group under the ABMI. We also 
noted the importance of active involvement of the private sector in 
fostering the regional bond market and promoting regional economic 
integration, and welcomed the initiatives to be taken under the 
ABMI.  
 
10. We also recognised the importance of capacity building efforts for 
the further development of regional bond markets and welcomed the 
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technical assistance provided by the Japan-ASEAN Financial 
Technical Assistance Fund (JAFTA) to assist participating members. 
We appreciated Korea’s and Malaysia’s offer to provide additional 
technical support in this area. To enhance the effectiveness of the 
economic review and policy dialogue process, JAFTA has also 
provided assistance to strengthen participating and compiling more 
accurate and timely data. We also welcomed China’s offer to 
continue with training courses and seminars on the regional 
economy and financial cooperation.  
   
At the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ meeting in 2005, each of the six 
working groups presented progress reports to ASEAN plus 3 Finance 
Ministers, but did not contain substantive development except agreeing 
with the general principles, i.e. (1) introducing a roadmap with a view to 
creating a mechanism to gather, share, and disseminate information on 
bond markets development in Asia, and (2) launching new studies on Asian 
Bond Standard, which would identify necessary market infrastructure and 
market procedures comparable on those of global bond markets. It was 
worth noting that the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers acknowledged the 
need to undertake the study of Asian Bond Standards to explore the 
development of international bond market in Asia through tailoring 
necessary infrastructure and setting the procedure entrusted by global 
issuers and investors.      
 
The Asian Financial Crisis highlighted the need to establish the mechanism 
to prevent future financial crises. The contagious nature of financial crises 
demonstrated that financial crises in one country should not be considered 
as the matters of indifference to the rest of the countries in the region. The 
Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market Initiative purported to be 
the concerted actions to better safeguard the region from potential future 
financial crises. While the momentum of the Chiang Mai Initiative and the 
Asian Bond Market Initiative came from the political will to better protect 
the financial crises from the region, it was soon realised among the 
policy-makers in Asia that the substantial degree of harmonisation of 
various standards, procedures, rules and regulations including accounting 
standards compatible with the internationally accepted rules was necessary 
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in order to gain the sufficient confidence of international investors. The 
harmonisation of the various standards and regulations would require 
substantial degree of the market liberalisation and opening in each country, 
but in Asia there is no mechanism to surrender part of sovereignty to a sort 
of supra-national body like the European Commission.  
     
The lack of enforcement mechanism to stabilise the regional framework 
was the key feature of the Asian approaches to promote the regional 
financial integration. While the importance of a regular monitoring and 
surveillance process including sharing the collected information among the 
countries in the region was recognised especially since the Asian Financial 
Crisis, there was not yet a consensus about what issues should be addressed 
under a monitoring and surveillance mechanism and to what extent a 
monitoring and surveillance mechanism should have the binding nature in 
relation to economic and financial policies of each member state.  
 
With regard to the issues to be focused, the coverage of economic 
monitoring could include: (1) macroeconomic trends and policy changes, 
(2) financial markets development including cross-border capital flows; 
and (3) institutional and legal changes relating to financial regulation.
33
 As 
for the extent to which a monitoring and surveillance mechanism has 
enforceability, there were three different levels depending on the levels of 
commitments on the part of participating countries: (1) information 
sharing; (2) peer review and peer pressure; and (3) conditions for 
contingent credit line. For example, the Manila Framework, which was 
convened and established in November 1997, would be classified into the 
first group.
34
    
 
In October 1998, the ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed to establish an 
ASEAN Surveillance Process based on the principles of peer review. The 
responsibilities of the ASEAN Surveillance Process include capacity 
                                                 
33 Wang, Yunjoing, Woo, Wing Thye., “A timely information exchange mechanism”, an effective 
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Basingstoke, 2004, pp.422-423.  
34
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building, institutional strengthening, and information sharing. The ASEAN 
finance ministers were designed to meet twice a year for policy 
coordination under the ASEAN Surveillance Process. The key objective of 
the ASEAN Surveillance Process was to strengthen regional cooperation 
by: (1) exchanging information and discussing economic and financial 
development of member states in the region; (2) providing an early warning 
system and a peer review process to enhance macroeconomic stability and 
the financial system in the region; (3) highlighting possible policy options 
and encouraging early unilateral or collective actions to prevent a crisis, 
and (4) monitoring and discussing global economic financial developments 
which could have implications on the region and propose possible regional 
national level actions.
35
           
      
The ASEAN Surveillance Process was further developed as the ASEAN 
plus 3 Surveillance Process, which was formalised in November 1999. The 
ASEAN plus 3 Surveillance Process has developed as the ASEAN plus 3 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue process. Under the ASEAN plus 3 
Finance Ministers’ framework, a regional mechanism of monitoring and 
surveillance was placed as a part of the institutional structure of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative. The Joint Statement of ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ 
meeting in 2000 indicated that the key objective of monitoring and 
surveillance mechanism was to enable early detection of irregularities and 
swift remedial policy actions, with a view to developing effective regional 
surveillance capabilities that complements the current undertaking by the 
international organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the BIS. On 
the basis of the Joint Statement of the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers’ 
meeting in 2002, it was decided that the ASEAN plus 3 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Deputies would meet informally once a year to discuss 
economic and policy issues and prepare for the ASEAN plus 3 Finance 
Ministers’ meeting. The linkage between the Chiang Mai Initiative and the 
monitoring and surveillance was considered in terms of how to address the 
problem of moral hazard. To prevent moral hazard, it was essential to 
strengthen the surveillance process, improve the capacity to formulate 
appropriate adjustment policy in the event of financial crises. 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid. pp5 
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On the other hand, there remain contentious arguments as to what role the 
regional surveillance mechanism would play vis-à-vis the IMF, to what 
extent the issues to be discussed in the regional framework should be 
comprehensive vis-à-vis the IMF, and to what extent regional surveillance 
mechanism should have enforceability. As the languages of relevant 
sections in a series of Joint Statement of the ASEAN plus 3 Finance 
Ministers indicated, the scope of the ASEAN plus 3 Surveillance process 
was not supposed to be so comprehensive but rather mainly limited to the 
monitoring of capital flows. It was not designed to exert peer pressure to 
harmonise or coordinate macroeconomic policies or financial regulations.  
 
The OECD uses a framework of peer review and peer pressure and 
describes its characteristics.  
 
“Peer review is a discussion among equals, not a hearing by a superior 
body that will hand down a judgement or punishment. This makes them a 
more flexible tool; a state may be more willing to accept criticism, and its 
neighbours to give it, if both sides know it does not commit them to a rigid 
position or obligatory course of action. Peer reviews are not intended to 
resolve differences among states, but they may play some of the role of a 
dispute settlement mechanism by encouraging open dialogue that can help 
clarify positions in non-adversarial setting. The key to the effectiveness of 
the peer reviews is the “peer pressure” exerted by the states carrying out 
the review, and the willingness of the state concerned to accept it. This 
pressure can make itself felt in several ways, both public and private.”
36
 
 
In short, peer pressure can thus be characterised by the influence and 
persuasion exercised by the peers during the peer review process. Peer 
reviews can be generated in a number of forms, but the most common form 
of peer review is to assess a country’s performance in implementing policy 
recommendations and guidelines. “Peer review and peer pressure” was  
usually conducted by inducing each country to improve its policy-making, 
adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles, 
which often take the form of recommendations and best practices.  
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As regional financial cooperation was developing to the creation of an 
enhanced Chiang Mai Initiative, a moral hazard issue posed a strong case 
for the due diligence of potential borrowing countries, and for a clear need 
for specific enforcement mechanism. At present, it remains ambiguous to 
what extent the member countries in the ASEAN plus 3 were already ready 
to accept the peer pressure mechanism. At least what seems to be obvious 
now is that it has a long way to go for the regional monitoring and 
surveillance to function as an efficient mechanism to induce member 
countries to adopt best practices.      
 
Among the key challenges was the absence of leadership that can keep 
participating counties as a coherent group dedicated to achieving a set of 
common objectives. Japan considered that Japan was the only country able 
to provide financial assistance at the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, and 
many countries considered that it is the case. But, Japan did not use the 
long-term and short term loans as the leverage to encourage each Asian 
country to surrender their own sovereignty about economic and financial 
policies. At the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, China was considered as 
only a military power, but not an economic power. The Chinese 
government was extremely cautious of liberalisation of capital controls and 
unwilling to undertake the economic leadership at least at the time of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, while they avoided giving the impression that they 
yielded to the Japan’s economic leadership.   
 
Japan was aware of the need to represent the Asian countries in the major 
international financial frameworks including the G7 Finance Ministers 
processes and a number of Washington-based international financial 
institutions such as IMF and the World Bank. However, this Japan’s 
awareness of the need for them to represent the interests of the Asian 
countries was not linked with the desire to be the regional hegemony in the 
financial diplomacy in the Asia, but rather was more oriented towards 
policy-driven discussion from the viewpoint of establishing the more 
resilient international financial system. At least from the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance’s point of view, the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) was 
designed to address the excessive reliance on US dollar. In their view, the 
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Asian economies informally pegged their currencies to the US dollar, and 
soft dollar pegs made these economies vulnerable to sudden reversal of 
capital flows and resulting depreciation of their own domestic currencies.  
 
In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance promoted the internationalisation of the Japanese Yen as a part of 
their efforts to correct the imbalance of dominant use of the US dollar. The 
Japanese Ministry of Finance identified the 3 key objectives of promoting 
the internationalisation of the Japanese Yen, i.e. (1) contributing to the 
stability of the international financial system by facilitating the use of the 
Japanese Yen and helping to diversify the financial risks, (2) contributing to 
the stability of the Asian financial market by facilitating the use of the 
savings of Japanese households and corporate sectors for the development 
of Asia, and (3) contributing to the stability of the Japanese financial 
system by reducing the financial risks associated with the transactions 
between the Japanese Yen and other foreign currencies.           
 
The ambition of the internationalisation of the Japanese Yen was 
compatible with that of the Japanese financial reform, the so-called 
Japanese “big-bang” in that it aimed at contributing to making the Tokyo 
financial market one of the core international financial centres, along with 
London and New York. The advent of Euro made the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance more aware of the need to promote the competitiveness of 
Japanese Yen as an international currency. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance considered that the increased use of the Japanese Yen in the 
international financial markets, especially in Asia, could expand the 
business opportunities for weakening Japanese financial institutions and 
contribute to their increased profits. To this end, a number of measures 
were taken with the intention of promoting the internationalisation of 
Japanese Yen, including the exemption of withholding taxes on the interests 
deriving from Japanese government bonds received by non-residents, the 
improvement of clearing system such as the introduction of the real time 
gross settlement. The Japanese Ministry of Finance expected that the 
provision of loan to crisis-stricken Asian countries under the “the 
Miyazawa Initiative” would serve to promote the internationalisation of the 
Japanese Yen, as well.  
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In essence, the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s strategy in the aftermath of 
the Asian Financial Crisis was characterised by the strong sense of 
responsibility that Japan would need to contribute to the stability of both 
the international economy and the Asian economy based on the awareness 
that Japan would be the only country capable of doing that in Asia. The 
awareness of responsibility of Japan of contributing to the stability of the 
international and Asian economy was associated with the sense shared 
among the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the political leaders that Japan 
must not be the origin of the global financial crisis. This Japan’s strong 
sense of their own responsibility for the stability of Asia’s economy and 
international economy were welcomed by Asian countries, as long as it 
provided them certain comfort and helped to recover their economy. The 
Japan’s approach was particularly welcomed by the Asian countries in 
comparisons with the IMF, which demanded a number of conditions with a 
heavy-handed approach. This approach was based on the desire and the 
sense of responsibility of Japan to contribute to the stability of the Asian 
economy, ultimately the international economy, by undertaking the role and 
responsibility proportionate to their economic presence. This was not based 
on the desire to seek the regional hegemony in Asia, but rather on the 
combination of economic pragmatism, which took into account the extent 
to which Japanese economies and companies were affected by the 
instability of the Asian economy, and the desire and the sense of 
responsibility of Japan to contribute to the Asian and international economy. 
On the other hand, at the same time, the Japanese financial diplomacy had 
been always based on the sense of obligation to maintain the cooperative 
and constructive relationship with the US. The co-existence of the sense of 
responsibility to contribute to the international economy and to maintain 
the cooperative relationship with the US was the key concept characterising 
the financial diplomacy of the Japanese Ministry of Finance since the 
1980s.                          
 56 
                      
Chapter 2: The dominance of US-Japan relationships in the Japan’s 
financial diplomacy               
 
 
2-1 The Plaza and Louvre Accord era in the 1980s 
 
For the Japanese financial diplomacy, the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the 
Louvre Accord in 1987 were the turning point in the sense that Japan was 
under particular pressure to take a leading role in appreciating its currency 
against US dollar. In the early 1980s, Japan’s trade and current surplus 
increased sharply and this was accompanied by increased external pressure 
especially in relation to the US. The financial diplomacy of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance was driven by how to respond to the political pressure 
from the United States.      
 
In the mid-1980s, the Japanese Ministry of Finance understood that the 
world economy has become more interdependent, and this fundamental 
changes in the world economy that have been evolving over a longer period 
of time especially since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, led to 
the increased interest in international economic cooperation. This was also 
based on the belief that Japan has become a major economic power, along 
with the European Community that competes effectively in trade and 
finance. While Japan pointed out that the biggest reason for the current 
imbalance in the 1980s was the US economic policy under the Regan 
administration, which increased their domestic fiscal deficit, Japan 
accepted the view that policy cooperation was essential to make the 
exchange rate fluctuation more orderly and stable under the floating 
exchange rate system. The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that 
economic policy coordination was aimed at strengthening the discipline to 
encourage each government to implement economic policies to achieve 
sustainable economic growth of the world economy without inflation, with 
more stable exchange rate under the floating exchange rate system.                                    
 
In other words, how to control the exchange rate fluctuation and achieve 
more orderly exchange rate under the floating exchange rate system was 
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the key consideration for the Japanese Ministry of Finance. In their view, 
the sudden and great fluctuation of the exchange rate would incur huge cost 
of the domestic industry (e.g. by requiring domestic industries to adjust 
their cost mechanism to maintain their competitiveness) and lead to the 
trends of protectionism (e.g. by demanding the exporting country to 
constrain the volume of exported goods).  
 
The objective of achieving the objective of controlling the exchange rate 
fluctuation gave the Japanese Ministry of Finance the justification to 
pursue the coordination of economic policy among the G7 major countries 
underpinned by the surveillance mechanism. The 1986 Economic White 
Paper stated that rising protectionism could risk damaging the free trade 
system and Japan would need to undertake the responsibility of achieving 
the domestic-demand economic growth and contributing to maintaining 
and strengthening free trade system. The 1986 Trade and Commerce White 
Paper also stated that Japan enjoyed the benefits of free trade system by 
increasing its exports and would need to play the major role of maintaining 
free trade system. This assessment reflected that the post-war Japanese 
economic growth and prosperity was based on its increased exports and 
Japan would need to pay more costs by itself in order to maintain free trade 
system and continue to enjoy its benefits in the long-term.       
 
In fact, G7 Summit itself was established in 1975 and was considered as 
the place for the leaders of the G7 (the US, Japan, West Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy, and Canada) to discuss the adjustment and coordination of 
their policies as the collective leadership by major advanced countries on 
the international economic issues. The background of the establishment of 
the G7 Summit was the increased uncertainty of the world economy after 
the shift to the floating exchange rate system and the economic difficulties 
of a number of major advanced countries after the first oil shock in 1972. 
Since the mid-1976, there was an increasing argument mainly led by the 
US that Japan and Germany would need to play a role of “locomotive” of 
the world economy by expanding their fiscal expenditure and increasing 
their imports arising from increased economic growth, which ultimately 
would help other major advance countries with economic difficulties to 
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recover their economies more quickly.
37
                    
 
In the Bonn Summit in 1978, Japan accepted that they would increase 
additional fiscal expenditures to achieve the annual economic growth of 
7%, along with Germany who committed to doing likewise equivalent to 
1% of their GDP. Based on this commitment, Japan increased public 
investment by JPY 2.5 trillion but failed to achieve the annual economic 
growth of 7%. The US, which committed to strengthening anti-inflationary 
measures and saved the consumption of oil, could not achieve the 
commitments and ended up in the further increase of budgetary deficits. 
The other European countries such as the UK and France also did not show 
any significant progress in inflation, budgetary deficits, current account 
deficits, and unemployment. Before the Plaza Accord, the framework of 
economic policy coordination was essentially on ad-hoc basis and each 
country did not have specific obligations unless there was no explicit 
commitment made by each country to achieve the agreed objectives.           
 
Throughout the first Regan administration between 1981 and 1984, the 
Reagan administration took the stance of non-interventionist policy toward 
the foreign exchange market. Beryl Sprinkel, the then undersecretary for 
international affairs of the US Treasury, was a long-time monetarist who 
studied economics under Milton Friedman. In his view, foreign exchange 
rate is determined by the market and foreign exchange intervention was 
necessary only in the case of disorderly movement. In the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance, the dollar’s strength in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
was driven by its tight monetary policy stance aimed at reducing 
inflationary pressure and the special status of the US dollar as the major 
reserve currency which encouraged other countries to increase their 
portfolio investment in the US dollar-denominated assets including the US 
Treasury bonds.
38
         
 
In terms of monetary policy, Paul Volker, the then FED chairman, 
continued its policy of high interest rates to squeeze inflation out of the 
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economy. The Federal Funds Rates were kept over 10% almost throughout 
the early 1980s. However, while high interest rates helped attract more and 
more foreign funds from abroad to help finance our deficits and 
investments, it led to appreciation of the US dollar. By early 1985, the 
dollar appreciated by about 45% above 1980s levels against the mark. This 
strong US dollar adversely affected the US business sector and “the 
question naturally arose as to whether we might back off from our tough 
monetary targets and attempt to ameliorate the situation by lowering 
interest rates”.39  
 
To some extent, the US dollar’s appreciation were natural consequences of 
higher interest rates policy as the Reagan won the 1980 presidential 
election with the emphasis on the need to fight inflation and return to the 
price stability.
40
 The Fed tightened their fund rates by 600 basis points in 
less than two months immediately after the 1980 presidential election. This 
monetary contraction pushed the US economy into deep recession with the 
sharp rise of unemployment rate from 7.5% in January 1981 to 10.2% in 
September 1982.  
  
The US Treasury stance against Japan regarding international finance 
showed a dramatic change in the autumn of 1983. The US Treasury started 
to demand Japan to take concrete measures to address artificially weak 
Japanese Yen against the US dollar.
41
 The US Treasury led by the then 
Treasury Secretary Don Regan believed that yen’s exchange rate against 
the US dollar was artificially weak due to the lack of opportunity for 
overseas investors to invest in the Japanese financial markets and products 
denominated in the Japanese Yen.  
 
It was also politically necessary for the US administration to be seen 
attempting to respond to the public and congressional concerns over the 
rising US trade deficits against Japan, feeling threatened by the increased 
competitiveness of Japanese counterparts. The US business circle took 
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increasingly tough approach against Japan. For example, the Caterpillar 
Report in September 1983 called for correcting the strong dollar by 
pressing the Japanese authorities to further open their Japanese financial 
markets. In their view, the artificially weak Japanese Yen led to the 
excessive bilateral trade imbalance between the United States and Japan. In 
other words, the United States pressed the Japanese Ministry of Finance to 
liberalise the Japanese Financial markets to further promote the 
internationalisation of Japanese Yen. From the US point of view, how to 
achieve the correcting stronger dollar without losing their face of their 
traditional doctrine of “strong dollar is in the interest of the US” was a 
critical issue.           
 
In political terms, there was a good reason for the then US Reagan 
administration to fear that the US trade deficit against Japan would give the 
Democrat a potentially good weapon to criticise the Reagan administration 
leading up to the November 1984 presidential election and the growing 
frustration in the Congress could lead to protectionist legislation on Capitol 
Hill. Within the Japanese Ministry of Finance, there was a general view 
that the Japanese Yen and US dollar exchange rate did not reflect the 
strength of the Japanese economy, which overcame the second oil-shock in 
1979 well. The Japanese Ministry of Finance also considered that the level 
of Japanese Yen against the US dollar reflected the stereo-type image of the 
Japanese economy which had been susceptible to the hike of oil prices in 
view of the reliance of the Japanese economy on the imports of crude oil.
42
           
 
At the margin of the President Reagan’s visit to Japan in November 1983, 
the US Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of Finance formally agreed to 
create the Yen/Dollar Committee to discuss the Japanese financial 
liberalisation. The then US Treasury Secretary Don Regan followed the 
argument made by Caterpillar Tractor Chairman Lee Morgan in his report 
compiled late September 1983. Morgan argued that Japanese financial 
liberalisation would help promote capital flow from the US to Japan, rather 
than the reverse, and would help reduce the corresponding US trade deficit 
through yen’s appreciation. At that stage, foreign exchange rate between 
the US dollar and the Japanese yen was not the direct objective of the 
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US-Japan policy dialogue, but merely the consequence of the financial 
liberalisation.  
 
In response to the US Treasury’s requests, the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
worked hard to avoid the appearance of being forced to open the Japanese 
capital markets. The Ministry concurrently prepared a report for domestic 
consumption on financial liberalisation and yen internationalisation. The 
report titled ‘The present status and outlook on financial liberalisation and 
yen internationalisation’, was released at the same time as the Yen/Dollar 
Committee report. The measures included the liberalisation of euro-yen 
market aimed at making it easier for non-resident investors to buy yen as 
well as liberalisation of Japanese domestic financial and capital markets 
including interest rates liberalisation.      
  
While the Yen/Dollar committee played a catalytic role of opening up a set 
of financial liberalisation measures in Japan, it did not lead to the 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen as the US Treasury expected. The 
proposition that the highly regulated Japanese financial and capital market 
discourage the flow of capital into Japan and depressed the value of the yen 
was more driven by long-termism rather than short-termism. As Beryl 
Sprinkel admitted in the negotiation, a set of US requests were intended to 
increase the business opportunities of the US financial firms in the 
Japanese financial and capital markets as increasingly attractive markets by 
facilitating their access to the Japanese markets. In terms of Japanese Yen’s 
appreciation, the Yen/Dollar committee did not bring about any result, 
which paved the way for the Plaza Accord. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance did not consider from the beginning of the negotiation that the 
liberalisation of the Japanese financial market and the internationalisation 
of the Japanese Yen would lead to Japanese Yen’s appreciation. However, it 
used the negotiation with the US Treasury as the opportunity to persuade 
the domestic Japanese financial industries to accept the liberalisation.             
 
The pivotal event in the making of exchange rate policy in the 1980s was 
the inauguration of the second Reagan administration with the replacement 
of Don Regan and Beryl Sprinkel with James Baker and his aide Richard 
Darman. The new team of James Baker and Richard Darman leading the 
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Treasury shifted its policy focus towards the more direct exchanger rate 
adjustment underpinned by macroeconomic policy coordination. They 
attached the importance on the institutionalisation of macroeconomic 
policy coordination as a continuous framework rather than an ad-hoc one. 
At that time, the primary interest of the Japanese Ministry of Finance was 
to how to make the US commit to the orderly exchange rate fluctuation. 
The Economic White paper in 1986 stated that the surge of protectionism 
would risk collapsing the free trade system and Japan need to change the 
economic structure characterised by export-driven growth to the 
domestic-demand driven economic growth model, taking into account the 
status of Japan in the international economy. This was based on the view 
that Japan enjoyed much more benefits than the US from the free trade 
system, and if the US takes more aggressive protectionism measures, the 
Japanese industries and then subsequently Japanese economic growth 
would be severely damaged.          
 
The perception of the overvalued US dollar was quickly spreading within 
the administration and the Capitol Hill. In February 1984, the annual 
Economic Report of the President led by Martin Feldstein, the then 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors clearly stated that the high 
value of the US dollar in foreign exchange markets is the most important 
cause of the recent increases of trade deficit. As of December 1983, the 
dollar had risen 52% against an average 10 trading partners’ currencies 
weighed by their shares in world trade, relative to the average for 1980. It 
showed that the real appreciation of the dollar as of December 1983 
amounted at 33%, if one takes the average over the period of 1973-1979 as 
the standard of comparison. While Donald Regan came from the Wall 
Street with the CEO of the giant brokerage firm Merrill Lynch, James 
Baker practiced law in a legal firm in Texas before switching to a political 
career. James Baker preferred to take a more direct approach to rebalance 
overvalued dollar.     
 
In the confirmation hearing of James Baker in the Congress in January 
1985, he clearly stated that the dollar was overvalued and the US Treasury 
would encourage trading partners to adopt the same macroeconomic 
policies as the US in the Reagan administration. In the Committee, James 
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Baker stated:
43
  
 
I would rather say that the dollar is very, very strong, Senator. I 
think the term ‘overvalued’ has a technical meaning. Since the value of the 
dollar is set by the market, I suppose one could argue it’s not overvalued 
because it is set by the market. It’s obviously very, very strong. I do think 
there are some things that can be done to help with that situation, and I 
have already mentioned that one of them, which is getting our fiscal deficit 
down so that we have less pressure on interest rates, and therefore, perhaps 
less inclination to invest the dollar. I also think that it’s in the interest of 
this country to encourage our trading partners to adopt those policies that 
we have adopted in this country which have given us the sustained 
economic growth that we are now enjoying. That is, freedom from 
overtaxation, freedom from overregulation. That if we can encourage our 
trading partners to adopt these policies, their economies will come back 
just like ours has. And that will help with the value of the dollar.  
 
On the question of question of intervention, it’s been the position of 
this Government as long as Ronald Reagan has been the president that we 
would intervene only in instance of disorderly markets. I understand that 
there have been some discussions between Secretary Regan and the finance 
ministers of Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and France looking toward the 
possibility of perhaps a little bit activity in this area. Nothing has been 
done, as far as I know. And quite frankly, I’m told that there are serious 
doubts about whether intervention today – whether or not intervention is 
effective in light of the vast amount of private capital that now flows out of 
there in the exchange markets. So I should not express, nor do I have, an 
opinion on whether our policy of intervening only where markets are 
disorderly should be changed. But that’s obviously something that should 
be looked at because some will argue that that could have a dramatic effect 
on the value of the dollar.  
 
(To the question by Senator Bradley of ‘Do you believe that the 
dollar is too high or do you think it should come down?’) 
                                                 
43
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I think the dollar is very, very strong. And I said in answer to a 
prior question, I think there are pluses and minuses with respect to that 
strength of the dollar. And it’s not a case of too high or too low. I think we 
have to look at the consequences of moving it down or permitting it to 
continue upward.                              
 
 (To the remark by Senator Bradley of ‘So that when we consider the 
deficits, we consider not just trade deficits but also capital accounts surplus 
or deficits in order to get a true picture.’)     
 
 That’s correct.  
  
 (To the written question by Senator Heinz of ‘do you support any 
change in current law to reduce the independence of the Federal Reserve 
Board and correspondingly increase the power of the Treasury Department 
with respect to setting targets for growth in the money supply?’)     
 
 My primary concern about monetary policy is that it provide 
consistent support for solid real economic growth at non-inflationary rates. 
(in written answer)   
 
What was worth noting in James Baker’s remark at the confirmation 
hearing at the Senate Committee in January 1985 was that he explicitly 
stated that the US dollar was very strong, and also expressed the wish to 
drive down overvalued dollar by seeking more active macroeconomic 
policy coordination among trading partners. Then James Baker was faced 
with the dilemma of achieving the two contradicting goals at the same time, 
i.e. (1) driving down overvalued dollar and (2) securing capital inflows 
from overseas. The strong-dollar policy aimed at fighting inflation and 
returning to price stability worked to attract overseas capital inflows to the 
US and secure capital inflows from overseas.  
 
In order to counter the inflationary pressure in the financial markets, he 
maintained the stance of containing inflationary pressure. But at the same 
time, he expressed that the primary objective of monetary policy would be 
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to provide support for solid real economic growth. Here he clearly 
signalled that monetary policy should be oriented towards economic 
growth rather than solely anti-inflation as the primary objective. 
Macroeconomic policy coordination was needed to enable the US to drive 
down interest rates to stimulate growth while continuing to secure capital 
inflows to the US at the same time. If the interest rates of the other major 
trading partner countries are driven down in parallel with the US, the 
negative effects of the US interest rates reduction on capital inflows to the 
US would be minimised. The US demanded to Japan and Germany that 
both countries adopt monetary easing with lower interest rates and 
expansionary fiscal policy.       
 
In essence, the US Treasury pursued macroeconomic policy coordination as 
the means of achieving their domestic agendas such as reducing trade 
deficits and lowering their interest rates to economic stimulate growth 
without securing capital inflows to the US. In the first place, even for the 
purpose of reducing trade deficits, it was politically embarrassing for James 
Baker to explicitly admit the major policy shift of the strong-dollar policy 
once proclaimed by their President Donald Reagan. In the second place, the 
macroeconomic policy coordination was necessary to achieve the both 
goals of reducing the deficits and securing the capital inflows to the US by 
ensuring the yield gaps between the US and trading partners to maintain the 
attractiveness the US Treasury bonds.                     
 
Faced with the US’s demands for macroeconomic policy coordination, 
Japan tried to first use coordinated exchange rate intervention to drive 
down the overvalued US dollar without going so far as macroeconomic 
policy coordination including as wide a range of policy as fiscal policy and 
tax policy. The officials in charge of international affairs were always under 
pressure not to make any commitment for either budgetary policy or tax 
policy. In view of the administrative structure of the Japanese Finance 
Ministry where each Bureau has separate authority and duty, it was natural 
for neither Budget Bureau nor Tax Bureau to give generous mandate to 
their colleagues in charge of international affairs. Especially in terms of 
budgetary policy, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was always surrounded 
by political circle and other ministries putting pressure of expansionary 
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budget on them and tended to be isolated about its cautiousness about any 
expansionary budgetary pressure. As a result, foreign exchange 
intervention was essentially the only tool for the officials of the Japanese 
Finance Ministry to use within at least some degree of discretion of the 
officials in charge of international affairs.                    
 
However, the then Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita made concession to 
agreeing with starting the macroeconomic policy coordination at the 
preparation process to the Plaza Accord in September 1985. Domestically 
he was considered as one of the three candidates who would succeed Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, along with Kiichi Miyazawa and Shintaro 
Abe (the then Foreign Minister). While Noboru Takeshita was leading the 
biggest political faction in the Liberal Democratic Party, he admitted that 
his name was not as well recognised internationally as the other two key 
rivals Kiichi Miyazawa, who was a former Finance Minister official 
working as a private secretary and interpreter of former Prime Minister 
Hayato Ikeda in the 1950s before entering into a political career, and 
Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe. Noboru Takeshita was concerned that if he 
could not show political leadership as Finance Minister to the US and make 
James Baker, who was a close ally to Ronald Reagan, see him as a strong 
and reliable partner with the US, he could be at disadvantage compared 
with his other two political rivals. In the process leading up to the Plaza 
Accord in September 1985, Noboru Takeshita finally decided to accept the 
Plaza Accord as the starting-point of macroeconomic policy coordination as 
well as coordinated foreign exchange intervention.
44
           
 
While the Plaza Accord was sometimes described as the tipping-point of 
the macroeconomic policy coordination as well as coordinated foreign 
exchange intervention, this macroeconomic policy coordination was 
essentially the rescue of the US economy by the other major trading 
partners especially Japan and Germany taking the form of international 
macroeconomic policy coordination.
45
 The international macroeconomic 
policy coordination helped the US administration in two respects: (1) it 
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enabled the US administration to describe it as the adjustment of 
overvalued dollar through international policy coordination rather than the 
U-turn or renunciation of the Reagan’s strong-dollar policy; and (2) it 
enabled the US to continue to attract the capital inflows to the US by 
locking in the monetary policies of Japan and Germany downward in 
parallel, which eventually served to maintain the attractiveness of the US  
Treasury bonds to plug the fiscal gap even when the FED shifted its policy 
stance towards low-interest rate policy. The Japanese government was 
worried that the bilateral trade imbalances would exacerbate anti-Japanese 
sentiments especially at the Capitol Hill and cause the protectionist 
measures to be taken to adversely affect the Japanese manufacturing 
sectors.  
 
After the Plaza Accord, the Japanese Yen appreciated against the US dollar 
from around 230 to 150 between September 1985 and September 1986. 
James Baker’s ambition was as extensive as calling on other trading 
partners to adopt a system of so-called objective indicators. At the Louvre 
Agreement in February 1987, the Ministers and Governors agreed that the 
substantial exchange rates since the Plaza Agreement brought their 
currencies within ranges broadly consistent with underlying economic 
fundamentals and agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of 
exchange rates around current levels. In return for including the languages 
indicating that the dollar should be stabilised ‘around current levels’, Japan 
had no choice but to agree that Japan would follow ‘monetary and fiscal 
policies which will help to expand domestic demand and thereby contribute 
to reducing external surplus. Between the Plaza and the Louvre Accord, the 
negotiations of foreign exchange interventions and macroeconomic policy 
coordination were highly politicised.         
 
The Plaza Accord agreed with the coordinated intervention to drive down 
dollar to achieve realignment between the dollar and the yen and mark. But 
from the US point of view, it also paved the way for the international 
macroeconomic coordination. At the Tokyo Summit of May 1986, it was 
decided that with the initiative of the US, G7 countries would focus in their 
meetings on a set of objective indicators: the growth rate of GNP, interest 
rate, inflation rate, unemployment, ratio of the fiscal deficit to GNP, current 
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account and trade balances, money growth rate, international reserve 
holding, and exchange rate. The 1986 Tokyo Summit agreed that G7 
finance ministers would meet at least once a year to review the 
compatibility of their economic objectives.      
 
After the Plaza Accord, the Japanese Yen appreciated against the dollar 
rapidly, it did not lead to substantive reduction of trade deficit between 
Japan and the US, as is well understood in the J-curve in trade surplus. In 
general, it takes a certain period of time for exchange appreciation and 
depreciation to affect the volume of imports and exports. In the short term, 
as a result, the Japanese Yen’s appreciation resulted in the deterioration of 
the US trade deficit denominated in the US dollar against Japan. For the US 
who intended to use exchange rate appreciation as the effective means of 
readdressing the trade deficit against Japan, it forced the US government to 
shift their focus on from exchange rate to macroeconomic policy 
coordination in order to call on Japan to steer its economy towards 
domestic demand driven economy.
46
       
 
The US initiative to use international policy coordination as a means of 
pressing other countries to take some actions on domestic fiscal and 
monetary policies caused the domestic conflict and friction both within the 
Ministry of Finance and between the Ministry of Finance and the other 
ministries. In the post-war period, the trade friction between Japan and the 
US was sorted out by voluntary constraints of the volume of exported 
goods, which started with textile in the late 1950s and 1960s and extended 
to steel and television in the 1970s. The trade friction issue was 
traditionally the one dealt with by the Ministry of Trade and International 
Trade. In the mid-1980s, the battlefield was extended to macroeconomic 
policies as broad as budget, fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy, 
which were the territory of the Ministry of Finance.            
 
In Japan, budgetary policies and tax policies are primarily administered by 
the Budget Bureau and the Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. 
Budgetary policy and tax policy are by nature domestic process and highly 
politicised with the engagement of various political stakeholders. Both 
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budgetary policy and tax policy begin with the submission of budget 
requests and tax reform requests from all the ministries in September. In 
Japan, the budget examination process continues until December. The final 
deliberation of both budget and tax reform plan for the next budget year 
needs to go through the process of the ruling party. The final negotiation on 
the budget draft is held between the minister of the Finance Ministry and 
the requesting ministries with a group of MPs (member of parliaments) and 
interests groups. The tax reform draft is even more politicised and each 
item of tax reform request is fully subject to the discussion at the Liberal 
Democratic Party Tax Commission. As a result, the international finance 
bureau did not have any mandate to negotiate with the US on either 
budgetary or tax policies.  
 
As a result, the officials of the International Finance Bureau of the Ministry 
of Finance saw only exchange policy at their discretion. There was some 
degree of awareness among some officials in the Ministry that the yen was 
undervalued and some degree of appreciation could be tolerable. The 
Japanese business community was so afraid about escalating unilateral 
protectionist measures led by the US congress that it was of the view that 
some degree of yen’s appreciation was the price they could put up with. 
However, the pace of the Japanese Yen’s appreciation after the Plaza 
Accord in September 1985 was far faster than the extent the Japanese 
business community could be ready to accept. This led to the call on the 
Japanese government to seek the stability of foreign exchange market.  
 
In contrast to the mid-1980s, the Japanese Yen’s appreciation was not 
necessarily considered much negative to the Japanese economy. Between 
1977 and 1978, the yen appreciated from the range of 290 yen against US 
dollar to 182 yen at its peak on 15 August, 1978. This rapid appreciation of 
the Japanese Yen is mostly due to the growing trade surplus of Japan and 
trade deficit of the US. The Economic White Paper in 1978, which was 
written by the Economic Planning Agency and the official analysis of the 
domestic economy as the Japanese government, pointed out that the 
Japanese Yen’s appreciation would lead to the fall of the price of imported 
goods and the improved terms of trade. The Japanese Yen’s appreciation 
was more positively seen as a desirable variable appeasing the increased 
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imported price of natural resources such as crude oil.                 
 
But, the decline in oil price in the mid-1980s worked to offset the 
advantage of currency appreciation as the shock-absorber of price hike of 
natural resources. The currency appreciation was highlighted as something 
which brings about the decline in profits through the loss of 
competitiveness rather than as a shock-absorber. The acceptance of the 
Japanese Yen’s appreciation forced the Japanese Ministry of Finance to 
take more fiscal stimulus policy and loose monetary policy to absorb its 
shocks.  
 
When Japan clearly emerged as the second largest economy in the 
non-communist world, the then Prime Minister Nakasone clearly steered 
the traditional Japanese passive diplomatic stance towards more pro-active 
one especially in relation to the US. He attempted to establish the special 
relationship with the US to leverage the Japan’s position in the G7. In terms 
of the currency, he believed that the Japanese Yen were significantly 
undervalued and the strong yen should represent the strong Japanese 
economy and the more proactive role of Japan as the second largest 
economy next to the US. He saw the Plaza Accord a clear sign for Japan to 
pursue the G2 in the global financial order.                          
 
By contrast, the Japan’s pursuit of the G2 in the global financial order was 
not necessarily shared with the domestic fiscal authorities such as the 
Budget Bureau and the Tax Bureau in the Ministry of Finance and the 
monetary authority of the Bank of Japan. The International Finance Bureau, 
which was in charge of international finance matters, represented the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance as a whole and tried to shield the autonomy 
of the domestic fiscal policy from the pressure deriving from the 
international macroeconomic policy coordination. The International 
Finance Bureau did not share all the information about the negotiations 
with the other bureaus within the Ministry in view of the confidentiality of 
the information.                  
      
The US’s call for international macroeconomic policy coordination led to 
the tense relationship between the Finance Ministry and the other ministries. 
 71 
The international macroeconomic policy coordination called on Japan to 
undertake more expansionary Keynesian budgetary policy and easier 
monetary policy with the reduction of discount rate. The Finance Ministry 
was naturally oriented towards achieving budgetary neutrality and 
minimising budget deficits. On the contrary, the other ministries were eager 
to make the best use of the US pressure to demand the Finance Ministry 
more budget in the interests of achieving their domestic agenda.                          
 
Since the Ohira cabinet failed to increase the consumption tax rate in 1979, 
the first priority of the domestic economic policy of a series of Japanese 
governments including the Suzuki cabinet and the early years of Nakasone 
cabinet was to achieve fiscal consolidation and administrative reform 
without tax increase. Thus, in the early 1980s, the break-away from the 
dependence of deficit-financing bonds was the first priority for the Budget 
bureau of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The rapid Japanese Yen’s appreciation and the international 
macroeconomic policy coordination resulted in the call for Japan to 
increase government expenditure and promote domestic-demand driven 
economy, thereby worked to tilt the balance against maintaining fiscal 
authority in two respects. In the first place, the rapid Japanese Yen’s 
appreciation hurt domestic exporting sectors such as shipbuilding and steel 
and small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, this led the 
politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to give pressure on the 
Finance Ministry to take more active fiscal measures to offset the pain by 
providing fiscal support such as loans at a preferable rates and guarantees. 
In the second place, the international macroeconomic policy coordination 
called on Japan to take fiscal stimulus to stimulate domestic demand to 
address external imbalance.                              
 
In the late 1980s after the Plaza Accord, there was a growing tension 
between the argument stressing the role of Japan in the international 
economy and the argument stressing the role of government measures to 
protect the domestic industries that were put at disadvantage by rapid yen 
appreciation. On the one hand, the Japanese economic diplomacy in the late 
1980s was characterised by the sense of a sort of guilt about growing trade 
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deficits. This posed a fundamental question to the export-led growth of the 
Japanese economy in the post-war period. The sense of guilt was associated 
with the reliance of Japan upon the US military forces since the Second 
World War and the pursuit of economic prosperity without a proportionate 
burden-sharing about defence policy.  
 
The so-called Maekawa-Report released in April 1986, commissioned by 
Prime Minister Nakasone to a former Bank of Japan Governor Haruo 
Maekawa, stressed that the Japanese economy needed to be transformed 
from export driven economy to domestic demand driven economy. It also 
further stated that the excessively accumulating current account surplus 
was threatening the stability of world economy and the orderly reduction of 
current account surplus should be explicitly placed as the mid-term 
objective of the government economic policy. There was an underlying 
belief that current account surplus and deficit determines the economic 
power game in the world and Japan was disproportionately monopolising 
the wealth of the world economy and needed to share it with other trading 
partners. The report called for the Japanese budgetary and tax policies to be 
more oriented towards increased domestic demand, the consumption of 
private sector, in particular.
47
         
 
In essence, at the heart of the international macroeconomic policy 
coordination after the Plaza Accord was the coordinated rescue among the 
G7 of the US economy without making the US administration lose their 
faces. From the US point of view of addressing the growing trade deficits, 
Japan was the primary target in this whole exercise led by the US. Even 
before the Plaza Accord, the US-Japan trade conflicts dated back to the 
1950s with the US’s call for Japan on voluntary limitation of textile exports 
to protect the US textile industry. In response to the rather political 
responses against Japan highlighting the bilateral trade imbalances, Japan 
made as much efforts as it could to accommodate their demands by 
resolving the bilateral trade imbalance with the justification that the US 
was the most important trade partner, and any restrictive unilateral US 
actions would have negative impact on the Japanese industries in the long 
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term.      
 
In the 1980s, Japan played an active role in the debt problems in emerging 
and developing countries in the international finance. In the early 1980s, 
Latin American countries were faced with accumulating debt problems. 
Historically there was not much direct economic or political for Japan in 
the Latin America, where the US had a dominant presence. But, then Japan 
made proactive responses to the call from the international community 
based on the belief that the contribution to the stability of the international 
economy would ultimately serve the interests of Japan. At that time, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that Japan would undertake the 
role of providing capital as the largest saving surplus country to maintain 
the stability of the international financial market. It considered that giving 
more emphasis on providing non-concessional loan including the 
co-financing with the international financial institutions by the Japan 
Export-Import Bank and private financial institutions would make it easier 
for those financing to be used for the development of their domestic 
industries in developing countries rather than for the simple repayment of 
the past debts.  
 
In October 1986, Japan announced the USD 10 billion capital recycling 
programme designed to recycle Japan’s trade surplus to developing 
countries over the following 3 years. This programme was further 
expanded to USD 30 billion capital recycling programme in May 1987, 
which included the untied loan provided by the Japan Export and Import 
Bank amounting at USD 3 billion, the contribution to the international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank (USD 8 billion), the 
expansion of co-financing with the international financial institutions by 
the Japan Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
and private financial institutions (USD 9 billion), along with the Japan’s 
contribution amounting at USD 2 billion to Japan Special Fund at the 
World Bank, the USD 3.6 billion loan to the IMF and the USD 3.9 billion 
capital provision to the International Development Association and the 
Asian Development Bank.  
 
Faced with the accumulating debt problem, the Japanese Ministry of 
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Finance considered that the issue could not be resolved by the traditional 
approach of forcing the debtor countries to implement tight macroeconomic 
policies, but rather more important was it to restore the ability of repayment 
in the medium and long-term underpinned by sustainable economic growth 
of debtor countries. The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that it 
was necessary to provide new money necessary via private financial 
institutions as well as public funds for the economic growth of debtor 
countries. The Japanese Ministry of Finance was aware that this 
forward-looking growth would contribute to alleviating the dissatisfaction 
of the general public of debtor countries and achieving more political 
stability.
48
 There is much common between the Japanese proposal in the 
late 1980s for resolving the debt problem and the Japanese proposal in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, notably in that it attached the 
emphasis on the importance of providing the new money as a means of 
restoring the confidence of private investors and achieving the economic 
growth. In the case of the Latin American countries, the Latin American 
countries was lacking of sufficiently high level of saving to finance the 
development of their domestic industries. The provision of new money was 
an essential component of resolving the accumulating debts in the Latin 
American countries. In terms of the accumulating debt problem, Japan 
worked to play a certain role of providing new capital as the current 
account surplus country. The Japanese government considered that while 
the US needed to address domestic fiscal deficit and had difficulty in 
providing new capital from the public sector, Japan would need to 
undertake a certain responsibility of providing new capital using their 
abundant capital in private sector.
49
 This sentiment reflected the view that 
Japan was expected and able to undertake the leadership role to fill in the 
vacuum created by the situation where the US had difficulty in managing 
their domestic economic agendas including the domestic fiscal deficits and 
current account deficits.              
 
When the Bush administration started in 1989, the US-Japan bilateral 
relationship continued to focus on the bilateral trade imbalance problem. 
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What differed from the Regan administration was that the Bush 
administration focused on more specific policy issues such as land policy 
and vertical distribution practices. President Bush proposed to then 
Japanese Minister Uno to establish the US-Japan Structural Impediments 
Initiatives to discuss more specific policy issues. The background of this 
proposal was the US administration’s view that the coordination of 
macroeconomic policy pursued since the Plaza accord did not lead to the 
expected result of declining trade imbalances between the two countries.  
 
The proposal of establishing the US-Japan Structural Impediments 
Initiative was based on the increasing US’s frustration about the continued 
trade imbalance between the two countries. Strengthening of the so-called 
Super 301 act of the Trade Act 1974, which authorised the President to take 
all necessary measures including unilateral retaliation, created the anxiety 
among the Japanese government. While Japan was critical of the US’s 
move to use unilateral measures as the negotiation strategy to coerce the 
other country to the US’s demands, Japan accepted the establishment of the 
US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative on the fear that unless Japan 
did not accept the establishment of the US-Japan Structural Impediments 
Initiatives it would give the US administration the excuse to implement the 
Super 301 earlier than otherwise.
50
 From the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance’s point of view, the macroeconomic imbalance and the US’s call on 
Japan to increase public expenditure for public works was the most difficult 
topic. The US administration pressed the Japan to increase the amount of 
fiscal expenditure for public works for the next 10 years and specify it in 
the bilaterally agreed document. The US administration focused on the 
macroeconomic balance and the lack of public investment to offset the 
current account surplus.
51
  
 
Faced with the escalating demands from the US administration, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance tried to make the bilateral commercial 
negotiations as the major issues to be discussed between the bilateral 
negotiations. However, the US Treasury adamantly insisted that the explicit 
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figure of the amount of public expenditure for public works need to be 
filled in in the agreement. The US administration knew that there were the 
ministries who would benefit from the increase in the public expenditure 
for public works and the politicians of the ruling party would welcome the 
US pressures as the justification of the increased public expenditure for 
public works.
52
           
 
In the Japanese sides, there was clear difference of interests among the 
Ministries. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
was reluctant to admit that the trade imbalances were due to 
anti-competitive industrial behaviour and structural impediments in the 
Japanese markets such as the legal and administrative constraints. The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry insisted that the core problem 
of the Japanese current account surplus was due to the macroeconomic 
imbalance between savings and investments in Japan. From the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance’s point of view, the commitment of fiscal expenditures 
for public works will constrain the future flexibility and autonomy of the 
budget planning, which was the last thing for the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance to accept. The 1990 Trade and Commerce White Paper stated that 
the multilateral trade system was a key pillar of the Japanese economy, and 
the pursuit of domestic-demand led growth and improvement of standard of 
living would contribute to addressing the trade imbalance through 
increased imports of foreign goods. The Trade and Commerce White Paper 
raised the concern about the risk of regional integration in the North 
American and the European countries becoming regional trade blocks and 
overriding the multilateral free trade system, and underscored the need of 
Japan undertaking the certain responsibility of maintaining the multilateral 
free trade system. The Trade and Commerce White Paper hailed the rise of 
the Japanese economic power in the 1980s as the success of export-led 
growth policy and post-war industrial policy, but at the same time, admitted 
that the rise of the Japanese economic power was taken by other countries 
as the threat and expressed the concern about the increasing trend towards 
protectionism in some countries calling for sometimes even the numerical 
target. In other words, there was a sort of confidence that a rise of Japan as 
a major economic power in the international economy would require more 
                                                 
52 Ibid.  
 77 
domestic-demand driven economic growth, and recycle the benefits which 
the Japanese enjoyed to other countries as the contribution to the 
international common goods such as the free trade system.      
        
In the Structural Impediments Initiatives negotiations, the US called for the 
Japanese government to commit to JPY 500 trillion over the next 10 years 
as for the fiscal expenditure for public works. Apart from a discussion on 
whether there was any economic rationale for the US to call on Japan to 
reduce the trade surplus, the US government assumed that their economic 
malaise was most due to the Japan’s trade surplus. From the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance’s point of view, what the US would need to call upon 
to address was the business practices of the Japanese companies and the 
legal and administrative regimes by the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, as well as the strengthening competition law and 
enforcement mechanism of anti-monopoly law. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry stressed that the trade imbalance between 
the US and Japan was due to the macroeconomic imbalance between 
savings and investment, with the intention of shifting more attention to 
macroeconomic imbalances rather than the closedness of the Japanese 
market.  
 
At the end of the negotiations, the Japanese Ministry of Finance agreed that 
the Japanese government would commit to JPY 430 trillion over the next 
10 years as the public expenditure for public works. During the negotiation, 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance insisted that the commitment of the 
increase of public expenditure for public works would be the breach of the 
budget authority. Apparently there was no link between the increase of 
public expenditure for public works and the reduction of trade account 
imbalances between the two countries. However, in the end, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance conceded that they would commit to JPY 430 trillion 
over the next 10 years. Then Vice Minister for International Affairs of the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, Makoto Utsumi was internally severely 
criticised by the budget bureau’s colleagues of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance colleagues for his failure to carve out the budgetary commitment in 
the US-Japan Strategic Impediments Initiative. However, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance eventually accepted the explicit figure of the amount in 
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order to avoid the political damage of the break-up of the US-Japan 
Strategic Impediments Initiative.          
       
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japan took a rather proactive stance on 
the financial diplomacy, responding to the demands from the US about the 
Japan’s continued expansionary macroeconomic policies. The Prime 
Minister Nakasone took this opportunity to raise the international profile of 
Japan among the G7 by establishing the special personal relationship with 
the US Ronald Regan and taking an initiative in steering the Japanese 
economy towards a domestic-demand driven economy. The Prime Minister 
Nakasone was convinced that Japan should be aware of the need to 
undertake the corresponding responsibility to the second largest economy 
in the international community in both economic and military terms within 
the constraints of the current constitution prohibiting the exercise of 
military forces in general. While Japan made utmost efforts to avoid 
making the US lose their faces in their negotiations, the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance took advantage of the stronger G2 cooperation as the means of 
promoting the interests of Japan in financial diplomacy in other relevant 
financial diplomacy issues such as the increase of Japan of the quota share 
in the multilateral development banks including the World Bank.  
 
In the process of establishing the strong G2 cooperation between Japan and 
the US, the Japanese Ministry of Finance worked hard by go so far as even 
sacrificing a part of budgetary authority to avoid causing severe political 
damage with the US administration. This is based on the growing 
confidence by the Japanese Ministry of Finance that the Japanese economic 
power dramatically increased in the 1980s in the international economy and 
finance while the US economy had difficulty of the twin deficits of fiscal 
and current account balances, and the sense of responsibility underpinned 
by that confidence that the Japan would need to undertake the greater 
responsibility of maintaining the sustainable growth of the international 
economy.                 
 
 
2-2 “Awkward Partnership” between the US and Japan under the 
Clinton Administration in financial diplomacy and the Asian Financial 
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Crisis  
 
In the early 1990s, the US-Japan relationship was still driven by the trade 
imbalance problem between the two countries. In the early 1990s, the 
Clinton administration pressed Japan to take even more aggressive stances 
against Japan to address the bilateral trade imbalances. The end of the cold 
war between the US block and the Soviet Union (USSR) also worked to 
reduce the urgent need for the US to take into account the strategic 
importance of Japan as a military ally.  
 
The Clinton administration can be divided into the two phases. In the first 
phase, the trade-centric view was prevalent in the first two years of the 
Clinton administration until the advent of Robert Rubin. In second phase, 
the trade-centric view was replaced by the finance-centric view in support 
of strong dollar. In the trade-centric view, exchange rate was considered to 
be a tool for addressing trade imbalances. This was promoted by the trade 
negotiator group who believed that talking down US dollar and resulting 
strong Japanese yen would work to reduce the US trade deficits against 
Japan.
53
                 
 
In the early days of the first Clinton Administration, they were pressing 
Japan to give way to setting the quantitative targets in each sector such as 
automobile in a designated timing to show the political commitment. In 
their process, the US administration was not hesitant to say that the 
Japanese yen appreciation is a one of the tools for addressing the US trade 
deficits. For example, in the joint-press conference of Clinton and 
Miyazawa on 15 April, 1993, Clinton stated that Japanese yen appreciation 
was the number one priority policy action along with expansionary 
budgetary policy and the improved market access of the US goods and 
services towards the Japanese market through the discussion the US-Japan 
Framework Talks focusing on specific sectors.
54
 The market received this 
message as the US’s willingness to see further Japanese yen appreciation to 
address the US-Japan trade imbalances, and the Japanese Yen further 
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appreciated above 110 yen/dollar on the following day.                             
 
In the early days of the Clinton Administration, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance considered that the US democratic administration’s financial 
diplomacy was oriented towards the bilateral trade imbalances. The US 
administration continued to press Japan to increase fiscal stimulus 
measures to change the economic structure towards a more 
domestic-demand driven growth and open the Japanese market with 
specific sectors with numerical targets. The Japanese Ministry of Finance 
took this pressure as the US’s populist response to the traditional 
supporting groups of the democrat such as the trade unions affected by the 
trade imbalance between the two countries.
55
 As the 1992 Trade and 
Commerce White Paper stated, the then Japanese government took this as 
the lost confidence of the US due to their declining leadership coming from 
the loss of the dominant position in the international economy and finance. 
The 1994 Trade and Commerce White Paper further stated that the GNP of 
Japan was likely to surpass that of the US within the next 10 years.  
 
The US strategy of using the yen appreciation as a means of addressing the 
trade imbalances was gradually modified by Robert Rubin and Larry 
Summers. Robert Rubin was of the view that strong dollar helps to attract 
from abroad to the US and it would lead to lower costs to consumers and 
producers and ultimately lower inflation, lower interest, higher standard of 
living and greater productivity.
56
 The shift of the US exchange rate policy 
towards “strong dollar” had another implication for emerging and 
developing countries, especially the East Asian countries which relied on 
shorter-term cross-border capital inflows denominated in the US dollar.
57
  
 
While the arrival of Robert Rubin brought about a policy change in the 
previous US policy of using the exchange rate as a means of correcting the 
bilateral trade imbalance, the yen-dollar exchange rates appreciated 
dramatically in the first half of early 1995. As the 1995 Economic White 
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Paper stated, the Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the yen’s 
appreciation in the early 1995 was driven by speculative forces in the 
market which tried to link the yen’s appreciation with the accumulating the 
trade imbalances between Japan and the US. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance considered that the excessive Japanese Yen’s appreciation would 
prevent the Japanese economy from going back to the path of sustainable 
growth and getting out of the recession due to the collapse of the bubble 
economy. Therefore the Japanese Ministry of Finance attempted to 
intervene in the foreign exchange markets in the coordinated way with the 
US to give the message to the markets that the US government would not 
seek the weaker dollar as the markets had predicted. The G7 Finance 
Ministers’ statement 24 April 1995 explicitly admitted that the pace of 
fluctuations was unjustified, stating that “The ministers and governors 
expressed concerns about recent developments in exchange markets. They 
agreed that recent movements have gone beyond the levels justified by 
underlying economic conditions in the major countries. They also agreed 
that orderly reversal of those movements is desirable, would provide a 
better basis for a continued expansion of international trade and 
investment, and would contribute to our common objectives of sustained 
noninflationary growth. They further agreed to strengthen their efforts in 
reducing internal and external imbalances and to continue to cooperate 
closely in exchange markets (underlined by the author) ”.        
 
The G7 Finance Ministers’ statement marked the watershed in terms of 
correcting the excessively speculative movements of the foreign exchange 
markets. The US-Japan coordinated intervention at the foreign exchange 
markets worked successfully to send the clear message that both the US 
and Japan considered that the current level of Japanese Yen against the US 
dollar was not justified by the market fundamentals and either of the 
countries did not seek. The Japanese Ministry of Finance was aware of the 
need for the two countries to work in a coordinate way to send more 
effective messages to the markets.
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 The G7 Finance Ministers’ statement 
in October 1995 reaffirmed the line agreed by the previous one in April 
1995, stating that “Ministers and Governors welcomed the orderly reversal 
in the movements of the major currencies that began following their April 
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meeting. They would welcome a continuation of these trends consistent with 
underlying economic fundamentals. They reaffirmed their commitment to 
reduce imbalances and to cooperate closely in exchange markets”. 
 
The G7 Finance Ministers’ framework also played a major role as the 
forum of coordinating the G7 positions on the rescue of Mexico. The 
February 1995 statement showed the support for the IMF package for the 
Mexican economy, stating that “We agreed that Mexico must pursue 
vigorously its economic program, which the IMF has described as strong, 
coherent and credible. The decision by the International Monetary Fund to 
join the international package assembled recently with an exceptionally 
large standby agreement for Mexico of up to some 17.8 billion dollars 
represents an important source of support. The great stride that the 
Mexican economy has made in recent years provides a sound basis for our 
confidence in the ability of the Mexican authorities to fulfil their 
commitments under the new economic program. We also reviewed the 
broader implications of volatility in Mexico's financial markets”. This G7 
Finance Ministers’ statement showed the coordinated support by the G7 for 
the US action to provide the US-led support including the IMF on 31 
January 1995 just before the G7 Finance Ministers meeting. This G7 
Finance Ministers’ support was also explicitly shown in the G7 Finance 
Ministers’ statement in April 1995, which stated “In preparation for the 
annual Economic Summit, the ministers and governors reaffirmed their 
strong support for the Bretton Woods Institutions, and discussed how their 
role could be adapted to meet the challenges of today's global economy. In 
this context, they reviewed the lessons that can be drawn from Mexico's 
recent financial problems and had an extensive discussion of approaches 
which may be desirable to facilitate continued progress toward sustained 
growth and employment, the maintenance of financial stability, and the 
promotion of sustainable development.” 
 
 
The reversal of the exchange rate markets also worked better for the US 
economy. From the US Treasury perspective, the appreciation of the US 
dollar contributed to attracting more capital from the overseas to the US 
and containing the inflation risks by reducing the increase of the prices of 
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imported goods. The decrease of the budgetary deficit led to lower interest 
rates, which helped private sector to finance their investments.  
 
In the mid-1990s, the recovery of the US economy was clearly observed, 
and the bilateral trade imbalances was no longer the political issues 
between the US and Japan. Instead, as the Japanese economy was mired in 
the financial sector crisis, the US Treasury called on Japan to address the 
non-performing loans problem and stimulate the Japanese economy. Just 
before the Asian financial crisis erupted in Thailand in July 1997, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that Japanese economy was 
getting back on the path of economic recovery. The Economic White Paper 
1997 stated that the Japanese economy was now finally heading towards 
the path of self-sustainable recovery after the long period of adjustment of 
the collapse of the bubble. At the same time, the Economic White Paper 
raised a concern about the rapid pace of the Yen’s depreciation from around 
80 yen to 127 yen against a US dollar between mid-1995 and mid-1997, 
pointing out that this depreciation could be interpreted as the selling Japan 
rather than the adjustment of exchange rates based on the fundamentals. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance kept an eye of the capital inflow from 
overseas investors to the Nikkei Index and considered that Japan was under 
attack from overseas investors in November 1995 when it was revealed that 
a series of Japanese financial institutions collapsed.
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 The Nikkei Index, 
which was stable above 20,000 until June 1997, fell below 16500 at the end 
of October 1997.                              
    
As the financial crisis deepened in Japan, the US called on Japan to address 
its economic problem. In the US Treasury view, the Japan’s economic 
difficulty had a spill-over effect on the Asia and Japan’s economic trouble 
led to the deteriorating financial crisis in Asia.
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 The US Treasury 
considered that the then Japanese monetary and fiscal policies were too 
tight and urged to take more aggressive measures to soften the damages 
caused by accelerating the resolution of non-performing loans at the 
Japanese financial sectors. From the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s point 
of view, the deteriorating Asian financial crisis was the problem of the lack 
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of resilient Asian financial markets and regulatory regimes against the 
speculative short-term movements of capital on their own, rather than the 
problem caused by the Japanese economic difficulty.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance regarded the Asian Financial Crisis as 
the problem caused by short-term speculative capital movements and the 
weak financial system in the Asia, well before a series of financial 
institutions collapsed in November 1997. Japan proposed the creation of 
“the Asian Monetary Fund” in September 1997 as a means of ensuring 
financial stability and preventing the financial contagion in Asia at an as 
early stage as possible. The key element in this proposal was the creation of 
the networks of providing liquidity within a more flexible framework than 
the IMF to give more confidence to international investors. The proposal 
was well received by a majority of East Asian countries, but opposed by the 
objection by mainly from the US and China. The concept of “Asian 
Monetary Fund” was inherited by a regional mechanism of bilateral swap 
arrangements within the ASEAN plus 3 countries on May 2000 in Chiang 
Mai, which was called as “Chiang Mai Initiative”.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance proposed the creation of the AMF at the 
G7-IMF meetings in Hong Kong during September 20-25, 1997. The 
proposed was drafted by Eisuke Sakakibara (then Vice Minister for 
International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance) and Haruhiko Kuroda 
(then Director of the International Finance Bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance, later Vice Minister for International Affairs succeeding Eisuke 
Sakakibara). The key concept of the AMF was pooling reserves held by 
each Asian state could be effective in dealing with financial crises by 
providing liquidity assistance when financial crises strike. In the original 
plan drawn by the Japanese Ministry of Finance officials, the AMF was 
envisioned as a USD 100 billion fund composed of ten members, i.e. China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Philippines.   
 
The desire to create the AMF as an alternative to the IMF was based upon 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s) view that the IMF prescriptions were 
not effective but rather deteriorating the financial crisis. The IMF’s 
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approach to the crisis was based upon the so-called “Washington 
consensus” underpinned by a neo-liberal ideological position.61 According 
to this view, markets are the most efficient and productive way through 
which to allocate resources and create wealth. This approach put emphasis 
on a constellation of virtues such as free markets, free flows of trade and 
capital across the border, macroeconomic management characterised by 
sound fiscal and monetary prudence. The IMF initially applied their usual 
prescriptions including tight fiscal and monetary policies as the standard 
prescription, demanding that the governments need to raise interest rates 
and reduce government spending. But these policies were abandoned by 
mid-1998 when it became clear that they worsened rather than ameliorated 
the crisis.    
 
In the Japan’s assessment, it was clear that the measures prescribed by the 
IMF were not effective but rather misguided. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance considered these was growing awareness of the need to create a 
new solution to prevent future crises from threatening the region again. 
Against this background, Japan proposed the creation of the Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) as a framework for multilateral liquidity provision 
and policy co-ordination as a vehicle of a sort of Asian version of the IMF 
taking into account the specific needs and conditions of the Asian 
countries.  
 
In the IMF’s view, the liberalisation of financial transactions, including the 
deregulation of financial markets, the removal of controls on international 
capital movements, and the liberalisation of trade and exchange controls is 
one of the principal forces driving the growth of international trade and 
investment. IMF acclaimed that a rapid liberalisation of exchange controls 
on transactions and controls on capital movements outstripped the growth 
of international trade in the 1990s. In their view, the forces of globalisation, 
liberalisation, and technological and financial innovation exerted an 
important influence on the exchange arrangements and led to the trend by 
IMF member countries to adopt more flexible market-based exchange rate 
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arrangements.  
 
In contrast, the Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the IMF’s 
package of policies were not effective but rather deteriorating the Asian 
Financial Crisis. In their view, the IMF policies pay insufficient attention to 
the need to provide liquidity promptly than necessary and were 
preoccupied with promoting liberalisation of capital controls. They 
considered the benefits of liberalisation of capital movement are not so 
self-evident in Asia and more cautious approach with the emphasis on 
sequencing is appropriate. They also considered that the IMF’s 
prescriptions of tight macroeconomic policy focusing on interest rate hike 
and budgetary consolidation worsened the economic situation in ailing 
Asian countries.
62
           
 
When the IMF provides financial assistance to member countries to solve a 
problem of balance of payment adjustments, the IMF negotiates with 
national governments the arrangement (or programme) specifying the 
conditions in return. The negotiated arrangement (or programme) requires 
the aided countries to accept and undertake a certain set of policy packages 
as prior conditions for financial assistance from the IMF. In addition, the 
actual provision of financial assistance is not lump sum payment but rather 
available over the certain period of time in several tranches and the 
disbursement of each tranche is dependent on the extent to which such 
agreed policy packages as prior conditions are duly implemented. This 
mechanism was intended to make sure that the governments receiving the 
IMF assistance duly implement a set of policy packages and adopt sound 
policies.               
 
The AMF proposal was intended to address the two major drawbacks of the 
then existing IMF programme, i.e. the lack of the mechanisms of providing 
necessary liquidity promptly, and the shortage of funds necessary funds 
necessary to cure financial crises.
63
 When the IMF provides financial 
assistance to member countries to solve a problem of balance of payment 
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adjustment, the IMF negotiate with national governments the arrangement 
or programme specifying the conditions governing financial assistance. The 
negotiated arrangement or programme requires countries to undertake a 
certain set of policy packages as prior conditions for financial assistance 
from the IMF. The actual provision of financial assistance is not lump sum 
payment but rather available over the certain period of time in several 
tranches and the disbursement of each tranche is dependent on the extent to 
which such agreed policy package as to prior conditions are duly 
implemented. In addition, when the meeting was held in Tokyo to discuss 
the Thai rescue package in August 1997, the amount of necessary financial 
liquidity was not provided by the IMF and other international organisations. 
In fact, IMF provided only USD 40 billion while it estimated USD 140 
billion as the necessary to rescue the Thai baht. More than half of the total 
aid came from other Asian governments.
64
              
 
The proposal of AMF was not realised mostly due to the opposition of the 
US and China, but was followed by a different framework for regional 
co-operation called “Manila Framework” at a meeting of the Finance and 
Central Bank Deputies in Manila on 18-19 November, 1997. 14 countries 
(Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the US) 
attended the meeting, along with the international organisations including 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB as observers. The statement titled 
“A New Framework for Enhanced Asian Regional Cooperation to Promote 
Financial Stability” stated that “This framework, which recognizes the 
central role of the IMF in the international monetary system, includes the 
following initiatives: (a) a mechanism for regional surveillance to 
complement global surveillance by the IMF; (b) enhanced economic and 
technical cooperation particularly in strengthening domestic financial 
systems and regulatory capacities; (c) measures to strengthen the IMF's 
capacity to respond to financial crises; and (d) a cooperative financing 
arrangement that would supplement IMF resources.”   
 
The Manila Framework was far less ambitious than the AMF in that the 
Manila Framework was designed to play a supplementary role to the IMF 
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in respect of regional economic surveillance and regional financial 
arrangement. It was not designed to pool a part of reserves of member 
countries, but rather provide the opportunity to exchange the information 
on economic outlook and financial sector reforms among members. But, 
the Manila Framework statement showed, the Asian countries agreed to call 
on the IMF to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises. 
While the original idea of establishing the AMF was abandoned, there were 
a group of like-minded Asian countries led by Japan who pressed the IMF 
to take a new approach focusing on the provision of short-term liquidity 
which would be more flexible and different from the conventional IMF 
approach.  
 
The initiatives taken by the Japanese Ministry of Finance during the Asian 
financial crisis was based on policy-driven arguments rather than political 
hegemony-driven arguments. The prevailing argument at that time was 
so-called “crony-capitalism”. The Japanese Ministry of Finance took a 
rather different view from that stereo-type argument and considered that 
more fundamental solutions would be needed including establishing a 
network of providing liquidity to ensure the confidence of investors in the 
international financial markets supported by regional policy dialogues and 
surveillance and developing Asian bond markets. This policy-driven 
argument was oriented towards fundamental reform of the international 
financial architecture. The Japanese Ministry of Finance took the Asian 
financial crisis as the wake-up call for the need of correction of excessive 
liberalisation of international financial markets.
65
 In this process, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance always endeavoured to work with the other 
G7 countries, most particularly with the US.     
     
On the other hand, this policy-driven argument was domestically distorted 
by political pressure to justify excessively expansionary fiscal measures. 
After the Hashimoto cabinet stepped down, the Obuchi cabinet, which 
came into being in June 1998, changed the course of fiscal policy 
completely. The Obuchi cabinet aborted the Fiscal Structure Reform Act 
approved by the cabinet in 1997 and took the unprecedented amount of 
expansionary measures. The Hashimoto cabinet originally included fiscal 
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consolidation as one of the key reforms along with the financial market 
reform so-called “Big-bang”. This fiscal consolidation effort reflected the 
strong views held by the Budget Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance. As the Economic White Paper 1997 stated, this fiscal 
consolidation was based on the views that (1) the deteriorating fiscal 
balance would lead to the absorption of the savings held by private sectors 
and would prevent necessary capital from accumulating as ageing of 
society brings about the reduction of saving; (2) the accumulating fiscal 
deficit would reduce the budgetary flexibility and lead to efficient resource 
allocation; (3) the accumulating fiscal deficit would lead to increased 
taxation to repay the debt in the future generation and result in the 
inequality between generations; and (4) the deteriorating fiscal balance 
would undermine the confidence of the market about governments debts 
and result in the increase in the interests rates and could have negative 
impact on the economy. In December 1996, the Hashimoto cabinet finally 
approved the principles of reducing the annual budgetary deficit under 3% 
of the Japan’s GDP.  
 
It was apparent that this fiscal consolidation effort was heavily influenced 
by the trend of fiscal consolidation in other countries, notably in the EU 
and the US. The 3% of the GDP was the same threshold set by the 
Maastricht treaty to join the currency union. Behind this strong sense of 
urgency held by the Budget Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
derived from a series of expansionary budgetary measures taken in the 
early 1990s designed to stimulate the demand in the economy after the 
collapse of the bubble economy. The expansionary budgetary measures 
were taken as the ones to boost the economy as the recession after the 
collapse of the bubble economy deepened in the early 1990s. The US 
administration also pressed Japan to stimulate the economy with a different 
reason of reducing the trade imbalances from what the political 
heavy-weight of the ruling party intended. In the early 1990s, priority was 
given to the public works for the construction of information and 
telecommunication network infrastructure and research and development 
facilities, which were called then “new social infrastructure capital”. The 
Economic White paper 1994 raised the issue of whether a series of stimulus 
measures were as effective as expected, and concluded that a series of 
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stimulus expenditure for public works was offset by the decline in capital 
spending in private sectors and did not contribute to the overall increase in 
demand in the Japanese economy.  
 
The fiscal consolidation effort in the Hashimoto cabinet was a drastic 
attempt to contain the conventional argument of using public expenditure 
as a measure to boost the economy. It was placed as one of the structural 
reforms led by the Hashimoto cabinet. This was based on the view that the 
success of the various structural reforms would remove the regulatory 
obstacles and create additional business opportunities in private sectors 
including financial services, in particular. This was compatible with the 
view that the non-performing problems should be resolved by financial 
institutions themselves. For example, the Economic White Paper 1997 
stated that the financial asset held by the Japanese household were biased 
in favour of safe assets such as cashes due to the lack of investment 
opportunities and the financial market reform would ensure that a greater 
number of investment opportunities would be given to investors. In the 
report, the development of the Japanese securities market was a key to 
encouraging investors to take more risks and ensuring that their savings 
would be channelled to be used as the capital for innovative business 
activities.           
 
From the viewpoint of the Budget Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance, it was a blessing that a prime minister took the initiative of fiscal 
consolidation. However, the financial turmoil in November 1997 showed 
that it was difficult to rely on the assumption that the non-performing 
problems could be resolved by financial institutions themselves. The 
Hashimoto cabinet’s ambition to undertake structural reforms were 
preoccupied with the strong belief of self-responsibility of financial 
institutions and the principles of market-discipline with minimum 
intervention by the government. The fiscal consolidation act compiled by 
the Hashimoto cabinet did not include any clause of taking into account a 
possible temporary repeal of the implementation of the law. After the 
collapse of the Yamaichi securities, the Hashimoto cabinet completely 
changed the policy course and worked to make it possible for the 
government to inject public money to ailing financial institutions. In 
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February 1998, the deposit insurance act was amended to enable the 
government to inject as much as JPY 30 trillion including JPY 13 trillion 
intended to inject financial institutions even before their final collapse. The 
Hashimoto cabinet made it clear that the new policy measures would be 
aimed at restoring the stability of the Japanese financial system and the 
confidence of international investors in the Japanese financial market. The 
Hashimoto cabinet tried to respond to the concerns that the Japanese 
financial crisis could trigger more global financial crisis along with the 
Asian financial crisis.
66
         
 
Faced with the sharp depreciation of the Japanese Yen, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance worked with the US Treasury to take the coordinated 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets. The US Treasury called on 
Japan to take the stimulus fiscal measures to boost the demand.  In June 
1998, the US Treasury proposed to Japan that Japan would make it clear 
that the government would commit to the restoration of the stability of the 
Japanese financial system and boosting the domestic demand in return for 
agreeing to make coordinated interventions, in the bilateral meeting over 
phone between the US Treasury secretary and the Japanese Minister of 
Finance. The injection of public money to financial institutions including 
the ones which were not as bad as ailing financial institutions were 
intended to achieve a quick and forceful recapitalisation and restricting the 
financial health and profitability of the Japanese banking system. The 
macroeconomic policy was expected to play a major role in stimulating 
domestic demand and facilitate the resolution of non-performing loans.  
 
Before the Asian financial crisis was contained, the financial crisis in 
Russia in mid-August 1998 resulted in a drying up of private financial 
flows to emerging economies and encouraged financial investors to act 
more in risk aversion. This concern quickly spread to Latin American 
countries as well. With the concern about a global credit crunch spreading 
among investors, the turbulence in world financial markets led the US 
Treasury to take more coordinated action to reduce uncertainty about global 
prospects of financial markets. In Japan, the Japanese financial crisis 
further escalated into the nationalisation of Long-Term Credit Bank 
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(LTCB). In the package approved by the Japanese parliament in October 
1998, the funds available to the banking sector were raised to JPY 60 
trillion, with 25 trillion targeted to the recapitalisation of “viable banks” 
and JPY 18 trillion mainly targeted to failure resolution schemes including 
public bridge banks and the nationalisation of failed banks. JPY 17 trillion 
was reserved for guaranteeing deposits at failed banks. The package also 
included the creation of a new high-level body (the Financial Revitalisation 
Commission, FRC) within the Prime Minister’s Office, which will be 
responsible for drafting and implementing the regulations necessary for 
bridge banks and carrying out the nationalisation of failed banks, and also 
responsible for overseeing the recapitalisation of banks, and centralising all 
financial supervisory activities. The package of the new laws were intended 
to reduce the risk of a collapse of the Japanese banking system and 
provided some institutional and financial mechanisms that could help to 
accelerate the restructuring and consolidation of the banking system. The 
provisions allowed Japanese banks to receive funds in order to facilitate 
realignments or consolidation in the sector. In this package, it was clear that 
the government considered that a quick and forceful injection of public 
funds were given more priority than leaving the resolution of 
non-performing loans completely to the market-disciple and the 
self-responsibility of financial institutions.  
 
In October 1998, the Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) filed for temporary 
nationalisation, about four months after its market valuation had dropped 
markedly, on rumours that the bank was faced with the difficulty in raising 
funds. The Banking Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance originally 
planned to merge the LTCB with the smaller Sumitomo Trust Bank. But, 
this plan was abandoned due to the reluctance of the Sumitomo Trust Bank 
to take over the LTCB substandard loans. In September 1998, after one of 
the main affiliates of LTCB with more than JPY 1.5 trillion in debts failed, 
the LTCB failed for nationalisation and declared a negative net worth of 
JPY 350 billion, including unrealised losses on securities holding.
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 The 
Nippon Credit Bank, one of the three long-term credit banks, also failed for 
nationalisation in December 1998.    
                                                 
67 IMF (1998), “World Economic Outlook and International Capital Market Interim Assessment” 
December 1998.  
 93 
 
The turbulence in global financial markets in 1998 showed even more 
explicitly that the volatility of financial market could lead to a sudden 
heightened perception of, and aversion to, risk following Russia’s effective 
debt default in August 1998 and an associated flight to quality. Emerging 
markets were particularly seriously affected as interest rate spreads on their 
external debt increased significantly and new private external financing 
virtually ground to a halt. The process of deleveraging and portfolio 
rebalancing in response to heightened risk aversion triggered a massive 
global reassessment and re-pricing of emerging market risk and generated 
severe strains, sharp increases in credit and liquidity spreads, and extreme 
price movements in not only emerging markets but also the markets of 
developed countries including the US market, especially in the wake of the 
near-collapse of LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management), a private hedge 
fund.
68
  
 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund that attempted 
to profit from discrepancies in the relative value of governments bonds, 
fixed income derivatives, equities and equity derivatives primarily in the 
US, Japanese and European markets. The LTCM also invested in a few 
markets outside the G7 countries. In the week of 21 September 1998, 
following the rumours in the market about insolvency of the LTCM and 
some of its major creditors and counterparts over potential liquidity 
problems, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped to organise and 
coordinate USD 3.6 billion private rescue of the LTCM by a consortium of 
14 major international financial institutions. All of these institutions were 
either counterparties, creditors, or investors of the LTCM. At that time, 
there were the two major reasons as the necessity of the rescue package of 
the LTCM: LTCM’s financial condition deteriorated to the point where it 
might not be able to make either loan repayments or margin calls on its 
highly leveraged positions in the US, Japanese, and European bond markets, 
and might require either recapitalisation or liquidation; and immediate 
closure of LTCM would have worsened the financial condition of some 
already weakened international financial institutions and could have 
triggered a massive simultaneous sale of LTCM’s collateral securities by 
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creditor institutions. LTCM’s trading book was “long” in relatively illiquid, 
low-quality securities and “short” in liquid, high-quality securities such as 
the US securities. Contrary to LTCM’s judgement, interest rate spreads 
widened throughout most of 1998 in most of their operations, as the 
intensification of the financial crises in Asia encouraged a flight to quality 
in the G7 government securities markets, and later in the year, as the credit 
spreads of Russian ruble-denominated discount debt instruments widened. 
The rescue package of the LTCM was led by the US Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve. Their main concern was that with LTCM’s large balance 
sheet exposures and additional large off-balance-sheet positions, a 
bankruptcy filing could have triggered the instability of financial market 
and a liquidation of collateral would have had repercussion in the 
underlying repo and swap markets, which would make liquidity dry up. 
These concerns encouraged the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank 
New York to arrange the rescue in order to avoid a panic and the potential 
for systemic problems.
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The Russian financial crisis had its origins in the large fiscal deficit and the 
associated increase in holdings of Russian government debt by domestic 
and foreign investors. The Russian government was relatively successful in 
selling ruble-denominated debts, with non-resident investors holding about 
one-third of domestic treasury securities by May 1998. However, a series of 
domestic political events and external shocks including weak oil prices in 
the first half of 1998 led to increased difficulties in selling 
ruble-denominated debt. As investors’ confidence fell, selling pressures 
mounted in debt, equity, and foreign exchange markets, and liquidity dried 
up in the interbank market as fears of bank failures led to the increased 
withdrawal of deposits from banks.
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 On 17 August, 1998, the Russian 
government announced a package of measures aimed at dealing with the 
currency, debt, and banking crises. The exchange rate band was devalued, a 
90 day moratorium was placed on principal payments on private external 
obligations including payments on forward contracts, and it was announced 
that a compulsory restructuring of the domestic government debt would 
take place.  
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Shortly after the Russian government’s announcement of moratorium, the 
Malaysian government announced that they would impose capital controls 
to try to protect the domestic economy from international financial 
volatility, to curb capital flight and speculation against the ringgit, and to 
eliminate offshore transactions in the domestic currency. Bank Nagara 
Malaysia announced that proceeds from the sale or maturing of local 
currency securities must be placed in local currency deposits for one year 
from the date of the transaction and cannot be converted into foreign 
exchange. In addition, domestic credit to non-resident banks and brokers 
was prohibited, and general payments and transfers between external 
accounts required official approval for any amount. Domestic residents 
were not allowed to invest abroad more than MYR 10,000 without official 
approval. These measures did not contravene Malaysia’s commitments 
under the IMF’s Article VIII and they differentiate foreign direct 
investment from portfolio investment. Foreign direct investors were still 
free to repatriate interests, dividends, capital gains, and capital at any 
time.
71
         
 
The financial market turmoil that followed the Russian debt restructuring 
led to a sharp deterioration in the terms and conditions under which many 
emerging market economies, including Latin American countries such as 
Brazil and Mexico with the perception of large domestic currency 
denominated debt heavily dependent on foreign investors, could access 
global financial markets. As a result, issuance of new emerging market debt 
and equity instruments virtually collapsed in the period July-October 1998. 
From the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s point of view, there was clear 
double standard between what the US argued at the beginning of the Asian 
financial crisis and what the US did in the aftermath of the Russian 
financial crisis followed by the near-collapse of the LTCM. The Japanese 
Ministry of Finance was unhappy with the US Treasury’s attitude to leave 
the prescriptions of the Asian financial crisis to the IMF based on the view 
that the Asian financial crisis was caused by the reasons specific to the 
Asian countries characterised by crony capitalism. In the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance’s view, the US Treasury did not argue the necessity of strict 
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conditions attached to a rescue package when speaking of the Russian 
financial crisis and the near collapse of the LTCM. The Japanese Ministry 
of Finance considered that the roots of the financial crises is the same and 
that the impact of the simultaneous rush of many investors to close out 
positions and deleverage could result in a sort of panic spreading to even in 
the mature financial market. In their view, the turbulence of financial 
markets would need to be understood as a systemic problem of financial 
system. This was the reason why the Japanese Ministry of Finance argued 
for the need to discuss the international financial architecture. In the 
financial crises between 1997 and 1998 revealed that financial markets 
could be adversely affected by the manner in which individual financial 
institutions react to market pressures, stresses and turbulence, particularly 
when many of them hold similar highly leveraged positions. The highly 
integrated and complex nature of financial position taking, institutions, and 
markets and the linkages of financial positions across national and 
international markets could impair the ability of the mature financial 
markets to smoothly and efficiently facilitate the closing out and 
deleveraging of positions and exposures.
72
 
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance gave a positive assessment to the 
temporary introduction of capital controls such as the ones the Malaysian 
government announced at a rather early stage shortly after they were 
introduced.
73
 In the process of formulating the rescue package for Brazil, 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the US Treasury basically agreed that 
Japan would not ultimately block the rescue package for Brazil, while the 
US would not block the bilateral rescue package of the “Miyazawa 
Initiative” announced in October 1998. The terms of a USD 41 billion 
IMF-led financial assistance package for Brazil were finally announced on 
13 November 1998. Of the total amount, USD 18.1 billion was provided by 
the IMF in the form of a three-year Stand-By arrangement, about USD 4 
billion each from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and USD 14.5 billion from 20 governments channelled through, or 
provided in collaboration with, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). 
The US agreed to provide the largest bilateral contribution with a credit line 
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of USD 5 billion. The financial package for Brazil was significantly 
front-loaded, with about USD 37 billion available, if needed, in the first 13 
months, with a view to responding to the financing needs immediately.
74
 In 
the process of preparing the rescue package for Brazil, Russia and Asian 
countries, there was a sort of consensus between the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance and the US Treasury that the provision of liquidity was essential to 
counter the effects of the deleveraging of investors’ financial positions and 
on-going withdrawal of commercial bank lending seen evidently in the 
emerging and mature markets in the world. 
 
In the Obuchi cabinet, at the same time as the government used the 
budgetary policy as a measure to boost the demand giving the priority to 
economic recovery, the Obuchi cabinet was not hesitant to provide the 
bilateral aid package called “Miyazawa Initiative” for the five afflicted 
countries by the Asian financial crisis including South Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines totalling USD 30 billion for the 2 
years. This was intended to help to provide financial flows to these 
countries when the liquidity of the emerging markets dried up in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in Russian and many Latin American 
countries. After the Japanese Yen hit the record high at JPY 79.75 against 
US dollar in mid-1995, the yen depreciated by some 40 percent during the 
past three years and reached an eight-year low at JPY 147.26 against US 
dollar on 11 August, 1998. Yen-carry trades, which were tempted by low 
borrowing costs in Japanese Yen, helped to accelerate the trend of the Yen’s 
depreciation until the August 1998 partly due to the lack of confidence in 
the stability of the Japanese financial system. Major financial institutions 
and hedge funds had borrowed in Japanese Yen to invest in US, European 
and emerging market assets, thereby shorting the Japanese Yen. This 
long-running appreciation of the dollar and the depreciation of the Japanese 
Yen was abruptly and sharply reversed in the wake of financial turbulence 
in Russia and Latin American countries. The “Miyazawa Initiative” 
announced in October 1998 was designed to address the shortage of 
liquidity when the pool of liquidity especially to emerging markets was 
dramatically shrinking when leveraging of investments magnified losses by 
urging investors to simultaneously sell assets to liquidate positions as 
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quickly as possible. The “Miyazawa Initiative” was based on the view that 
Japan had the responsibility of preventing global financial crises from 
undermining the stability of the Asian financial markets and the Asian 
economies.  
 
At that time, there was essentially no argument that China could replace 
Japan with the role to provide the bilateral financial assistance package to 
the crisis-stricken Asian countries. China did not take a proactive action to 
undertake the role of providing liquidity to the neighbouring Asian 
countries, either. The Japanese Ministry of Finance had no doubt that it was 
Japan who would undertake the primary responsibility of maintaining the 
stability of Asian economies and financial markets. More generally, this 
sense of responsibility was also closely linked with the idea that Japan must 
not be the source of an international financial crisis and must take any 
possible measure to restore the economic growth and the confidence of 
international investors. This sense of responsibility was further combined 
with the argument that restoring economic growth must be given more 
priority than fiscal consolidation and fiscal consolidation would not be 
achievable without sustainable economic growth.  
 
At that time, Japan still provided the official development assistance 
(ODA) to China, making China the destination of the greatest amount of 
the bilateral ODA. The key reasons why the Japanese government 
considered that they needed to provide ODA to China were that (1) the 
stable development of the Chinese economy based on market mechanism 
would contribute to the economic prosperity of the Asia as a whole region; 
(2) the economic development of Japan would benefit Japanese, and (3) the 
ODA would contribute to improving the sentiment of the Chinese public to 
Japan and the Japanese.
75
 The ODA White Paper 1998 stated that Japan 
needed to undertake a role proportionate to the economic power in the 
international society and remember that Japan benefited from ODA in the 
early years of economic restoration in the 1960s and 1970s.
76
 China 
accounted for the largest portion of the then Japanese ODA as much as 
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12%. This reflected the increasing economic link between China and Japan 
mainly through the increased foreign direct investment of Japanese 
industries towards China to seek cheaper labour forces and the great 
potential of the Chinese market as a consumption market. In such a period 
of time, there was essentially no argument on which country was capable of 
providing economic support to other Asian countries other than Japan. At 
that time, China was not yet even a member of the WTO. The Japanese 
government welcomed the accession of China to the WTO as the 
opportunity to encourage China to comply with the international standards 
and contribute to the increased business opportunities for the Japanese 
companies. As the Trade and Commerce White Paper 2001 pointed out, the 
Japanese companies and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
considered that the accession of China to the WTO would promote the 
liberalisation of the Chinese markets in various sectors and contribute to 
making China comply with the internationally accepted rules of the 
protection of intellectual property rights.
77
 Japan expected China to be one 
of the leading “manufacturing bases” in the international economy and 
commerce.                   
 
At that time, the Japanese government considered that faced with the 
increasing trends towards strengthening the regional trade relationship via 
free trade agreements (FTA), Japan attached the priority on the launch of a 
new round negotiation process at the WTO. Japan was concerned about 
lagging behind the increasing number of concluded FTAs and undermining 
the competitiveness of Japanese industries and put them in a 
disadvantageous position. They fear that the proliferation of FTAs would 
undermine the role of WTO as the multilateral framework. Japan 
considered that the accession of China to the WTO would contribute to 
giving better conditions to Japanese companies rather than giving huge 
economic opportunities eventually as much as exceeding Japan in the GDP. 
The Japanese government was aware of the great potential of the Chinese 
market as the growing consumption markets for the Japanese companies 
and the manufacturing bases for them to take advantage of cheaper labour 
force and growing demands. But, then the Japanese government did not 
                                                 
77 Trade and Commerce White Pape 2001, Government of Japan 
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8296268/www.meti.go.jp/report/tsuhaku/index.htm 
 100 
seriously call into question the dominance of Japanese economy in Asia.         
                           
 
2-3  Prolonged deflation and the bad loan problem in the Japanese 
financial sector in the late 1990s  
 
In the prolonged deflation and the bad loan problems in the Japanese 
financial sector since the burst of the bubble in the 1990s, the power 
balance between Japan and the US has completely changed. The Economic 
White Paper in 1998 analysed the reasons why the US booming economy 
continued for such a long period of time in 1990s. It pointed out that the 
lower interest rate underpinned by appropriate macroeconomic policies 
such as better fiscal balances and shrinking government deficit gave the 
resilience and flexibility of economic policy, thereby giving the confidence 
to the market. It also pointed out that the productivity growth of the US 
industry increased especially in the sectors relating to high-technology 
industries.     
         
When there were strong concerns about the deflation and the health of the 
Japanese financial system, the US increased the pressure on Japan to call 
on them to address the non-performing loans problem and increase the 
domestic demand by taking more aggressive fiscal measures and monetary 
policies. This caused a complicated domestic problem between the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. Since the advent of 
the Obuchi cabinet, the Japanese government expanded the budgetary 
expenditure to ensure that the level of stimulus would be maintained as 
long as the recovery in private demand did not firmly take hold as the 
short-term requirements.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance was faced with the increased pressure 
from the political circle including the Obuchi cabinet about the increase of 
the public expenditure. At that time, the Japanese Ministry of Finance felt 
that the political pressure to stimulate the economy was too more heavily 
put on fiscal policy than monetary policy and considered that the Bank of 
Japan did not take as much proactive measures as should do. In July 1998, 
the Bank of Japan Act was amended to increase the independence of the 
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Bank of Japan as a central bank. The purpose of this amendment was to 
make the independence of the Bank of Japan clear in the legal framework 
based on the belief that the strong independence of a central bank should be 
guaranteed to shield the Bank of Japan from the political pressure put on 
monetary policy and the subsequent risk of inflation out of control. This 
was based on the lessons learned from the bubble economy in the late 
1980s. Apparently this amendment was based on the lessons learned in the 
causes of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.  
 
As Haruhiko Kuroda pointed out, the Japanese monetary policy in the late 
1980s after the Plaza Accord in 1985 was too accommodative for a longer 
period of time than necessary. At that time, the sharp appreciation of 
Japanese Yen after the Plaza Accord hit the Japanese exporting industries 
and there was increasing political pressure to ease monetary policy and take 
additional stimulus measures. The Bank of Japan lowered the interest rate 
from 3% to 2.5% immediately after the Louvre accord in February 1987. 
The Bank of Japan already lowered the interest rate from 3.5% to 3.0% on 
October 1986. The Japanese Ministry of Finance wanted to avoid the risk 
of disproportionately heavy burden being put on fiscal policy and accepted 
to allow a certain degree of further appreciation of the Japanese Yen. The 
US Treasury pressed Japan to lower the interest rate as a Japan’s 
contribution based on the Louvre Accord. The then Bank of Japan governor 
Satoshi Sumita was a former Administrative Vice Minister of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance, equivalent to a Permanent Under-Secretary in the UK 
Treasury. In the 1990s, when there were various discussions on the causes 
of the bubble economy in the late 1980s, there was almost the consensus 
view that monetary policy was put behind the international policy 
coordination and as a result of it monetary policy was excessively 
accommodative for a longer period of time than necessary.
78
 
 
Even in the late 1980s the Bank of Japan was not satisfied with the way in 
which the Bank of Japan was subject to the increased pressure from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance and the political circle including the prime 
minister’s office. The Bank of Japan considered that the international 
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policy coordination was disproportionately biased against monetary policy 
and that excessive burden was put on monetary policy. As the discussion on 
the origins and causes of the outbreak of the bubble economy in Japan in 
the late 1980s drew increased attention and became a topic of heated 
discussion in the mid-1990s, the Bank of Japan considered that the 
increased independence of the Bank of Japan was indispensable to more 
autonomy of monetary policy-making.
79
  
 
The Bank of Japan restructured their governance system in 1998. The new 
Governor Masaru Hayami did not take as bold actions as the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance expected. He believed that deflation would not cause 
as much harm to the economy as others claim and the appreciation of the 
Japanese Yen reflected somehow the strength of the Japanese economy. He 
considered that the fall of prices was mainly due to the reduction in 
distribution costs and more competition derived from deregulation in 
various commercial sectors.
80
 He stressed the concerns about the risk of 
inflation getting out of control and the risk of Japanese Yen’s depreciation 
of leading to the depreciation of other Asian countries rather than the risk 
of deflation from taking hold in the Japanese economy. He understated the 
role of monetary policy to boost the Japanese economy, but rather stressed 
the role of stimulus fiscal measures and financial regulatory measures to 
encourage financial institutions to write off the non-performing loans from 
their balance-sheet. He even pointed out the risk of further decline in 
interest rate leading to the decrease in interest revenue and subsequent 
contraction of household consumption.
81
  
 
In a few years leading up to the Great Intervention, the Bank of Japan was 
under increased pressure to take a series of aggressive monetary easing 
policies to address deepening deflation. The first commitment was made in 
February 1999 when the Bank of Japan introduced the so-called 
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zero-interest rate, where it decided that it would initially aim to guide the 
overnight call rate to move around 0.15%, and subsequently induce further 
decline in view of the market developments.
82
 There was further heated 
discussion on what other measures the Bank of Japan could do including 
quantitative easing policies such as the purchase of government bonds. At 
this time, the Bank of Japan kept taking conservative attitudes on monetary 
policy and was afraid of being seen to have given way to the pressure from 
the government and the political circle. 
 
In mid-September 1999, the Japanese yen appreciated from 120 yen against 
dollar in June 1999 to around 100 yen in September. The Japanese Ministry 
of Finance worked with the US to insert a sentence indicating the concerns 
shared by the G7 countries about the recent appreciation of Japanese Yen in 
the G7 Finance Ministers’ statement on 25 September 1999. The Japanese 
Ministry of Finance urged the Bank of Japan to send a clear signal to 
further easing of monetary policy including the informal bilateral meeting 
between the then Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and the Bank of Japan 
Governor Masaru Hayami.  
 
The US Treasury pressed the Bank of Japan to at least indicate further 
monetary easing in return for the insertion of the sentence about the 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen. In the G7 Finance Ministers’ statement 
on 25 September 1999, it stated “We shared Japan’s concern about the 
potential impact of the yen’s appreciation for the Japanese economy and 
the world economy. We welcomed indications by the Japanese authorities 
that policies would be conducted appropriately in view of this potential 
impact. We will continue to monitor developments in exchange markets and 
cooperate as appropriate”. The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered 
that while the stability of the Japanese financial system was not yet fully 
restored, the Japanese Yen’s appreciation could have negative impact on the 
profits of the Japanese industries and retard the economic recovery.  
 
The Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami had a strong conviction that 
the zero-interest rate was abnormal and it needed to be terminated as 
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quickly as possible to regain the normality of monetary policy. However, 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance was severely opposed to the idea of 
terminating the zero-interest rate policy. From the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance’s perspective, the Japanese economy was still fragile and did not 
show sufficiently strong indication of getting back to the path of economic 
recovery. The Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the stability of 
the Japanese financial system was still called into question by the market 
participants and there was no rationale to run the risk of weakening the 
Japanese economy while there was little sign of improvement of business 
confidence.
83
                                 
 
The IMF also pointed out in the World Economic Outlook 2000 that the 
Japanese monetary and fiscal policies needed to continue to be directed 
towards encouraging a lasting recovery in domestic demand when the 
Japanese Yen rose by over 10% in nominal effective terms between July 
1999 and mid-March 2000 and this rise tended to reduce external demand. 
At least in 2000, the IMF was in favour of the policy stance of the Japanese 
government putting self-sustaining recovery as the chief economic policy 
goal in the belief that it in turn would provide a supportive environment for 
restructuring. The IMF clearly stated that growing concerns about the fiscal 
situation, the need to prevent deflation, and the continued strength of the 
Japanese yen, underlined the need to keep monetary policy as 
accommodative as possible. The IMF firmly believed that when the 
Japanese economy was faced with fragile recovery, additional steps to ease 
liquidity to the “zero-interest rate” seemed appropriate to provide further 
support to activity.
84
 
 
In spite of strong opposition from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the 
Bank of Japan lifted the zero-interest rate policy in August 2000. The IMF 
had a different view from that. They took the view that where consumer 
confidence remains weak and deflationary pressures persisted in Japan, 
monetary policy should be highly accommodative until clear signs that the 
recovery became self-supporting emerge. But, the Bank of Japan Governor 
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Masaru Hayami stuck to the belief that zero-interest rate policy should be 
removed as early as possible to the normal state of monetary policy. He 
described “dispelling the concern about the deflation” as the criteria for 
lifting the zero-interest rate policy. He rephrased it as self-sustainable 
recovery of demands in private sector. In the aftermath of the bankruptcy of 
the Sogo Group, one of the major retail group companies in Japan, there 
were increasing calls from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and political 
circle to continue the zero-interest rate policy.
85
                    
 
Since the Bank of Japan was reformed and given more degree of 
independence in 1998, the Bank of Japan was preoccupied with how they 
were seen by the general public through the media. They were too much 
sensitive about how they were seen to make a decision-making without the 
interference of the government, notably the Japanese Ministry of Finance. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance tried to give influence on the 
decision-making on the Bank of Japan directly or indirectly. Sometimes, 
the Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made phone calls directly to the 
Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami to urge him to take more 
proactive monetary policy measures and refrain from sending a wrong 
message of tightening the monetary policy prematurely to the market at a 
wrong timing.
86
     
  
Apparently there was lack of communication between the Bank of Japan 
and the Japanese Ministry of Finance during the office of Masaru Hayami 
between 1998 and 2001 due to the strong preoccupation by the Bank of 
Japan about its independence as a central bank and the personal belief by 
Masaru Hayami himself that more priority should be given to preventing 
inflation in monetary policy based on his personal experiences in the 1970s 
and 1980s after the oil shocks. The Bank of Japan was preoccupied with 
not being seen succumb to the political pressure to ease monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that while 
the Bank of Japan needed to be politically neutral, there should not be a 
difference about how they see the Japanese and overseas economy and 
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what monetary policy would be needed at a given time. The Bank of Japan 
tried to show their independence by making their own decision on the basis 
of their own view on how they saw the state of the Japanese economy.  
 
In the disagreement between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank of Japan, the Japanese Ministry of Finance tried to make the Bank of 
Japan exposed to the pressure from the US Treasury and the US Federal 
Reserve Board. At that time, the Japanese Ministry of Finance considered 
that the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting was the 
most important and primary forum to send a signal to the market and 
coordinate economic policies when necessary. Especially, the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance attached particular importance on the bilateral meeting 
between Japan and the US, which already became the tradition essentially 
institutionalised as a part of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors meeting. The bilateral meeting between the Japanese Minister of 
Finance and the US Treasury Secretary was the highest level meeting 
between the two economic and financial authorities in Japan and the US. 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance was concerned about the risk that the 
effects of expansionary fiscal policies could be offset by tighter monetary 
policies.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance had a strong wish to end the 
expansionary fiscal policies as soon as they can and return to the policy of 
fiscal consolidation. They were aware of the pressure from the Japanese 
and overseas financial markets to undertake fiscal consolidation in the long 
term. Faced with growing fiscal deficits since the advent of the Obuchi 
government in 1998, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was increasingly 
aware of the need to return to the trends towards fiscal consolidation. They 
felt increasingly frustrated about the lack of willingness of the Bank of 
Japan to cooperate with the Japanese Ministry of Finance and their 
inclination to stress their independence as a political posturing. To the eyes’ 
of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan did not care about 
so much sending the coordinated messages to the market as a political 
posturing to refuse the interference from the Japanese government. The 
inconsistency of macroeconomic policies and the perceived lack of 
communications between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Bank of 
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Japan increased the doubts among the market participants as to whether the 
Japanese government and the central bank really took the still weak 
economic recovery seriously enough. The Japanese Ministry of Finance 
considered that this uncooperativeness of the Bank of Japan contributed to 
much less effects of various fiscal stimulus measures on the Japanese 
economic recovery than expected and resulted in sharp deterioration of 
fiscal imbalance in the late 1990s and early 2000s.                                                 
 
Although the zero-interest rate policy was lifted in August 2000, the Bank 
of Japan was forced to return to essentially zero-interest rate policy by 
adopting aggressive monetary easing in March 2001, as they were faced 
with the burst of the IT bubble in the US economy.
87
 Then the Bank of 
Japan was severely criticised for its misjudgement about the timing of 
lifting the zero-interest rate policy in August 2000 in spite of there being no 
clear sign of the Japanese economy getting back to on the path of 
self-sustainable recovery.
88
 The Bank of Japan attributed the weaker 
recovery of the Japanese economy than expected to the burst of the IT 
bubble in the US economy. However, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was 
critical about the Bank of Japan using such an excuse saying that such a 
risk was already argued well before the lifting the zero-interest rate policy 
in August 2000.               
 
In March 2001, the Bank of Japan introduced the quantitative easing policy. 
This marked the shift of the central bank’s policy target from interest rate to 
current accounts at the Bank of Japan. The press release titled “New 
Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing”, issued 
right after the Monetary Policy Meeting on 19 March 2001 stated as 
follows;
89
 
 
1. 
 
Japan's economic recovery has recently come to a pause after it 
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slowed in late 2000 under the influence of a sharp downturn of 
the global economy. Prices have been showing weak 
developments and there is concern about increase in downward 
pressures on prices stemming from weak demand. 
 
2. In retrospect, both monetary and fiscal policies have taken 
considerably strong actions during the past decade in Japan. 
Whereas fiscal policy has repeatedly implemented expansionary 
measures, the Bank of Japan has adopted a policy of maintaining 
interest rates at levels unprecedentedly low during the history of 
central banking at home and abroad, thereby providing ample 
liquidity. All this notwithstanding, Japan's economy has failed to 
return to a sustainable growth path, and is now faced again with 
a threat of deterioration. 
 
3. In light of this, the Bank has come to a conclusion that the 
economic conditions warrant monetary easing as drastic as is 
unlikely to be taken under ordinary circumstances. Accordingly, 
the Bank decided at its Monetary Policy Meeting of today to take 
the following policy actions. 
a) Change in the operating target for money market operations 
The main operating target for money market operations be 
changed from the current uncollateralized overnight call rate 
to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank 
of Japan. Under the new procedures, the Bank provides ample 
liquidity, and the uncollateralized overnight call rate will be 
determined in the market at a certain level below the ceiling 
set by the Lombard-type lending facility. 
b) CPI guideline for the duration of the new procedures 
The new procedures for money market operations continue to 
be in place until the consumer price index (excluding 
perishables, on a nationwide statistics) registers stably a zero 
percent or an increase year on year. 
c) Increase in the current-account balance at the Bank of Japan 
and declines in interest rates 
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For the time being, the balance outstanding at the Bank's 
current accounts be increased to around 5 trillion yen, or 1 
trillion yen increase from the average outstanding of 4 trillion 
yen in February 2001. As a consequence, it is anticipated that 
the uncollateralized overnight call rate will significantly 
decline from the current target level of 0.15 percent and stay 
close to zero percent under normal circumstances. 
d) Increase in outright purchase of long-term government bonds 
The Bank will increase the amount of its outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds from the current 400 billion yen 
per month, in case it considers that increase to be necessary 
for providing liquidity smoothly. The outright purchase is, on 
the other hand, subject to the limitation that the outstanding 
amount of long-term government bonds effectively held by the 
Bank, i.e., after taking account of the government bond sales 
under gensaki repurchase agreements, be kept below the 
outstanding balance of banknotes issued. 
 
4. The Bank of Japan has decided to implement these policy 
measures with firm determination with a view to preventing prices 
from declining continuously as well as preparing a basis for 
sustainable economic growth. 
 
5. In order to make this monetary easing fully effective in restoring 
Japan's economy on a sustainable growth path, progress in 
structural reforms with respect to the financial system, e.g., 
resolution of the non-performing asset problem, as well as in the 
area of economy and industry is essential. Structural reform may 
be accompanied by painful adjustments. Without such 
adjustments, however, neither improvement in productivity nor 
sustainable economic growth can be obtained. The Bank of Japan 
strongly hopes that decisive actions be taken to address 
fundamental problems both with a clear support of the nation for 
structural reform and under a strong leadership of the 
government of Japan (underlined by author). 
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The quantitative easing measures was further strengthened by the press 
release titled “Enhancement of Monetary Policy Transparency” in October 
2003, where it was articulated that (1) this commitment requires not only 
that the most recently published core CPI should register a zero percent or 
above, but also that such tendency should be confirmed over a few months, 
and (2) the Bank needs to be convinced that the prospective core CPI will 
not be expected to register below a zero percent.
90
   
 
The target level for current account balances at the BOJ was frequently 
revised. After the initial level was set at 5 trillion yen, the target level was 
raised to 6 trillion yen less than a half a year later, in August 2001, followed 
by further increase to a range of 10-15 trillion yen and then to 30-35 trillion 
yen in January 2004. Toshihiko Fukui, who succeeded Masaru Hayami 
March 2003 as the governor of the BOJ, attempted to demonstrate his 
willingness to tackle deflationary spiral.    
 
A great number of US economists were also critical about the Bank of 
Japan monetary policy, claiming that the Bank of Japan had not done 
enough to address the deflation problem.
91
 For example, Ben Bernanke 
condemned that the Japanese monetary policy’s paralysis was largely 
self-induced due to the unwillingness of the Bank of Japan to experiment 
anything that is not absolutely guaranteed to work.
92
 In his later speech in 
Tokyo, Ben Bernanke called for the Bank of Japan to announce a 
quantitative objective for prices, as well as how such an objective might 
best be structured and to consider adopting a price-level target, which 
would imply a period of reflation to offset the effects on prices of the recent 
period of deflation. Second, he called for the Bank of Japan to consider 
taking more proactive approach on the relationship between the Bank of 
Japan's balance sheet and its ability to undertake more aggressive monetary 
                                                 
90 “Enhancement of Monetary Policy Transparency”, Press release, Bank of Japan, 10 October, 
2003. https://www.boj.or.jp/announcements/release_2003/k031010.htm/
 
91 Bernanke, Ben S., “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?”, presentation 
at the ASSA meeting, 9 January, 2000; Krugman, Paul., “Japan’s Monetary Policy (Wonkish)”, paper 
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/japanese-monetary-policy-wonkish/ 
92 Bernanke, Ben. S. , “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?”, 
presentation at the ASSA meeting, 9 January, 2000 
 111 
policies.
93
 In the view of Ben Bernanke, the Bank of Japan was too much 
preoccupied by the idea of being independent from the pressure of the 
government. He stated that with protracted deflation, however, excessive 
money creation is unlikely to be the problem, and a more cooperative 
stance on the part of the central bank may be called for and that under the 
current circumstances, greater cooperation for a time between the Bank of 
Japan and the fiscal authorities is in no way inconsistent with the 
independence of the central bank, any more than cooperation between two 
independent nations in pursuit of a common objective is inconsistent with 
the principle of national sovereignty.
94
   
 
Not only many US economists but also international organisations such as 
the IMF called for the Bank of Japan to take more pro-active monetary 
policy. The IMF World Economic Outlook in October 2000 pointed out that 
in Japan, where consumer confidence remains weak and deflationary 
pressures persist, monetary policy should be highly accommodative until 
clear signs that the recovery has become self-supporting emerge. However, 
the Bank of Japan was rather defiant about the domestic pressures from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance and the political circle to make monetary 
policy more accommodative.          
 
In the period of time when Masaru Hayami was the Governor of the Bank 
of Japan between 1998-2003, the Bank of Japan was far from taking a 
proactive approach about monetary policy. The Bank of Japan did not 
admit that the Japanese economy was trapped by deflationary spiral. The 
then Governor Hayami referred to the progress of technological innovation 
and the revolution in distribution networks as a key element of price 
reduction. In his view, the IT and distribution network revolutions continue 
under the current situation of zero inflation, the Bank of Japan cannot rule 
out the possibility that the economy could recover while the inflation rate is 
negative in terms of the existing price indexes, even though they may not 
sufficiently incorporate these revolutionary changes. And, in the case where 
cost reductions continue thanks to technological innovation, even if the 
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inflation rate is statistically negative it would not be appropriate to judge 
the economy as being deflationary as long as it is recovering steadily.
95
      
 
Masaru Hayami further stated that if the Bank of Japan took more 
aggressive monetary policies such as the purchase of government bonds, it 
would undermine the credibility of fiscal stability, and lead to the rise of 
long-term interest rates because of a higher risk premium occasioned by 
deterioration in the creditworthiness of the Japanese government. Adoption 
of such a drastic policy would run the high risk of eroding not only fiscal 
discipline and the smooth functioning of financial markets but also the 
credibility of Japan itself.
96
 But from the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s 
point of view, this argument was off the mark at all in terms of the role 
which monetary policy was supposed to play in the self-sustainable 
recovery of the Japanese economy.       
 
In the assessment by the Bank of Japan, since the early 1980s when the 
effects of the Second Oil Shock waned in Japan until 2000, the average rate 
of CPI increase was very low at around 1%, and was only 3% at the peak of 
the bubble period when the economy was overheated. The Bank of Japan 
was of the view that in the case of Japan, prices have been extremely stable 
for nearly twenty years, and therefore Japan was not in a situation where 
they need to set any inflation target to maintain price stability even if we 
have not solved such difficult problems as defining and measuring price 
stability.
97
 The Bank of Japan was inherently less sensitive about the risk 
of deflation, as deflation meant for them a sort of state of price stability. 
The Bank of Japan did not care about so much misalignment between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy as the perceived independence of the 
Bank of Japan as a central bank.  
 
The key issue facing the Japanese economy then was the non-performing 
loans by Japanese financial institutions, as was explicitly referred to in the 
BOJ statement. The Bank of Japan repeatedly pointed out the need to 
resolve the non-performing loan problem as early as possible. The Japanese 
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Ministry of Finance considered that accommodative monetary policy 
needed to be maintained to alleviate the pains incurred in the process of 
resolving non-performing loans. The Japanese Ministry of Finance was 
well aware of the negative impacts of non-performing loans on the overall 
economy and believed that monetary policy needed to be sufficiently 
accommodative. On the other hand, Masaru Hayami considered that the 
deflation problem facing the Japanese economy was the inevitable result of 
the burst of the bubble economy in the late 1980s and the deflation problem 
itself was not the issue which the Bank of Japan needed to address. Masaru 
Hayami encouraged the Japanese financial institutions to increase the 
buffer of their capital to improve their resilience and to write off 
non-performing loans from their balance sheet. However, the Bank of 
Japan considered that the non-performing problem was in principle the 
problem solved by financial institutions themselves without easing 
monetary policy.           
 
The non-performing asset problem plagued the Japanese financial system 
as of March 2001. The US Bush administration, which came to the office 
January 2001, pressed Japan to address the issues of non-performing loan 
and financial system as priority agenda. In response to the US demand, 
Japan reiterated its determination to accelerate the pace of addressing these 
issues. The joint statement after the meeting with Prime Minister Yoshihiro 
Mori stated that:      
 
The two leaders, noting that the United States and Japan together account 
for roughly 40 percent of the world economy, reaffirmed the importance of 
working together to promote prosperity in their two countries and around 
the world. The leaders recognized the need to address the challenges facing 
their two economies. The Prime Minister reiterated his determination to 
continue pursuing appropriate economic policies and to promote 
vigorously structural and regulatory reform to revitalize the Japanese 
economy and strengthen the financial system, including through effectively 
addressing the issue of corporate debts and non-performing loans 
(underlined by author).
98
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The next Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who came to the office and 
asserted himself as a reform-minded leader, stepped up the government 
measures to dispose non-performing loan problem and strengthen financial 
system. At the first bilateral meeting with US President George Bush, 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reaffirmed his determination to 
implement structural and regulatory reform including effectively 
addressing corporate debt and non-performing loan problems.            
 
The President and Prime Minister affirmed their belief that open markets 
and sound macroeconomic and regulatory policy are vital for sustained 
prosperity. The Prime Minister expressed his determination to vigorously 
and comprehensively implement structural and regulatory reform to 
revitalize the Japanese economy, including through effectively addressing 
corporate debt and non-performing loans. The President expressed his 
appreciation for the Prime Minister's plan, "Structural Reform in the 
Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management." The 
Prime Minister welcomed the President's strong intention to support 
sustained economic growth in the United States through tax cuts and other 
measures. They noted with satisfaction the completion of the Fourth Joint 
Status Report on Deregulation and Competition Policy, and called for 
increased collaborative efforts to improve their nations' climates for 
foreign direct investment (underlined by author).  
 
The two leaders announced the launch of a new bilateral economic 
initiative called the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth (detailed 
in Annex). This initiative establishes a structure for cooperation and 
engagement on bilateral, regional and global economic and trade issues 
(underlined by author).
99
  
 
In October 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi announced that the Japanese 
government would substantially accelerate the disposal of non-performing 
loans and conclude the issue of non-performing loans during 2004.
100
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Amid the growing concern about the non-performing loan problem and 
worsening deflation spiral as a result of deleveraging of bank and corporate 
portfolios, the US Government was of the view that more aggressive 
monetary policy to increase monetary base was necessary to soften the 
shocks caused by the disposal of non-performing loan.   
 
The US Treasury saw the Great Intervention as a part of monetary policy 
by unsterilising the part of the monetary base as a result of intervention. 
John Taylor, then Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, recalls 
that the US policy towards the Great intervention was a part of a strategy to 
support Japanese efforts to increase money growth.         
 
In his blog, he stated that ‘The U.S policy toward the Great Intervention by 
Japan was part of a strategy to support Japanese efforts to increase money 
growth to levels achieved before the start of their deflation. So it did relate 
to quantitative easing. By not registering objections to the intervention, the 
U.S. made it easier for Japan to increase money growth. The strategy 
worked this way: When the Bank of Japan intervenes and buys dollars in 
the currency markets at the instruction of the Finance Ministry, it pays for 
the dollars with yen. Unless the Bank of Japan offsets—sterilizes—this 
increase in yen by selling (rather than buying) other assets, such as 
Japanese government bonds, the Japanese money supply increases. In the 
past, U.S. Administrations had leaned heavily against the Japanese 
intervening in the markets to drive down the yen. By adopting a more 
tolerant position toward the intervention—especially if it went 
unsterilized—we could help to increase the money supply in Japan. So 
when Zembei Mizoguchi, the vice Minister at the Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance, discussed the possibility in late 2002 that currency intervention 
was going to increase, I did not object, as the U.S. Treasury usually does. 
(underlined by author)’ 
 
As is shown above, the US Treasury understood that Great Intervention 
was at least partly unsterilised and helped to increase the money supply in 
Japan. In his book, Jon Taylor recalled that Japan originally proposed that 
intervention would occur to support the certain level of band as reference 
rates, but neither the US nor the EU agreed to such an arrangement. This 
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shows that the US Treasury was opposed to straightforward intervention to 
support the certain level of Yen-Dollar exchange rates, but merely 
acquiesced in the Japan’s intervention as a part of monetary policy.  
 
This was also clearly described in the US Treasury Semi-annual Report to 
the Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies in 
April 2004, which stated that:      
     
The Japanese foreign exchange intervention came at the same time as a 
shift in monetary policy toward more rapid growth in base money in order 
to overcome persistent Japanese deflation. The provision of yen in the 
course of foreign exchange intervention has been an important component 
of monetary base growth, as it has been only partially absorbed 
(“sterilized”) by the sale of government securities. This shift in monetary 
policy has had some success, with yearly average consumer price deflation 
moderating to -0.3% in 2003 from -0.9% in 2002. Even though the dollar- 
yen foreign exchange market is huge, with transactions estimated at $230 
billion per day, the scale of Japanese intervention has been extremely large. 
Japanese authorities have stated that their “intervention is carried out 
when excess volatility or over-shooting is observed in the markets,” and 
that they do not target particular values of the exchange rate. The Treasury 
is actively engaged in discussions with Japanese authorities on these issues, 
both bilaterally and through the meetings of the G-7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors. At the G-7 meetings in Dubai and more recently in 
Boca Raton, the Treasury worked with the G-7 to promote a strong 
consensus in support of flexible exchange rates. Japan joined the United 
States and other G-7 nations in these declarations (underlined by the  
author).  
 
The US government’s policy towards the Great Intervention was 
characterised by two elements: 
 
(1) The US government supported the Great Intervention on the basis of 
their understanding that it was a part of monetary policies to increase 
monetary base; 
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(2) The US government supported the Great Intervention on the premise 
that it did not target particular values of the exchange rate.  
 
The conventional wisdom argues that there are two types of intervention of 
sterilised intervention and unsterilized intervention in terms of the impacts 
on monetary base. In that view, sterilised foreign exchange interventions 
tend to be less effective at moving exchange rates than unsterilized 
interventions, because sterilized intervention would have no impact on the 
domestic money supply by requiring the central bank to buy dollar assets 
with yen-denominated currency, with a countervailing sale of yen assets to 
mop up the extra yen that that would otherwise be injected into the 
economy. Conversely, unsterilized intervention would leave at least some 
part of increased money base intact.              
        
However, there is a strong disagreement against this conventional wisdom. 
It claims that it would be difficult to identify such a one-to-one 
correspondence between intervention activity and movements in the Bank 
of Japan current account balance. According to this argument, the Bank of 
Japan would incorporates the foreign exchange intervention it conducts on 
behalf of the Japanese Ministry of Finance into its overall portfolio of daily 
money market transactions, and achieve its domestic money supply targets 
by adjusting its other transactions accordingly.
101
 In this view, foreign 
exchange intervention would never be a part of monetary policy. 
 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to examine whether foreign 
exchange intervention should or could be considered as a part of monetary 
policy from the viewpoint of economic theory. But, rather it is interesting 
to examine why Japan could pursue such a great amount of unilateral 
foreign exchange intervention for such a long period of time, whereas other 
G2 (the US and EU) have almost abandoned foreign exchange intervention 
except a very occasional coordinated foreign exchange intervention. In 
retrospect, the Japan’s so-called Great Intervention stood out in terms of its 
scale and length of period conducted.   
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Why the exchange rate policy tends to be under so heated discussion in 
Japan is rather interesting question. For example, the late 1980s after the 
Plaza Accord, how to prevent Japanese yen from appreciating radically 
against US dollar was the primary concern for the then finance ministers in 
Japan. In the Great Intervention between May 2003 and March 2004, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance considered that the premature yen’s excessive 
appreciation would hamper the self-sustainable recovery of the Japanese 
economy from deflation. This assessment was based on the view that the 
premature yen’s excessive appreciate would result in reduced corporate 
profit of Japanese industries and retard the breakaway from deflation.  
The preoccupation of the negative side of Japanese yen’s appreciation 
remains deeply in the minds of business leaders of the Japanese industries.  
 
The US Treasury reacted to the request from the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance to acquiesce in the Japanese Great Intervention in the foreign 
exchange market rather differently from what they did in the late 1980s. 
The biggest reason for the different reaction of the US Treasury was that 
the US Treasury was much more confident about their domestic economy 
and they did not need to worry much about the political pressure from the 
Washington’s political circle including the US Parliament to oppose to the 
Japanese intervention.
102
 The concerns about the Japanese Yen’s 
appreciation deterioration among Japanese business leaders have persisted 
because the terms of trade of Japan deteriorated constantly since the late 
1990s. This indicated that Japanese industries were gradually losing the 
ability to sell more value-added goods to the markets and they were 
working hard to reduce the costs and sell their products at lower price 
through their rationalisation efforts. Japanese companies have been losing 
the power to control products’ prices. This makes their Japanese business 
leaders even more sensitive about Japanese yen’s appreciation.
103
     
 
Unlike the former governor of the Bank of Japan Masaru Hayami, his 
successor Toshihiko Fukui took more accommodative policy stance on 
monetary policy. Since he undertook the position of the Bank of Japan 
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Governor in March 2003, the Bank of Japan was considered to change their 
policy stance on monetary policy and make better efforts to work 
cooperative way with the Japanese Ministry of Finance. The newly 
appointed Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan Toshiro Muto was the 
former Vice Minister of the Japanese Ministry of Finance. He was 
considered to play a key role in better communication between the Bank of 
Japan and the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Under the new Bank of Japan 
Governor Toshihiko Fukui, the Bank of Japan increased the target for the 
outstanding balance of current account held at the Bank of Japan steadily 
up to JPY 35 trillion from the level of JYP 15-20 trillion. This change of 
course of monetary policy was welcomed by the financial market as a more 
proactive policy stance by the Bank of Japan. This accommodative 
monetary policy stance of the Bank of Japan was a necessary condition for 
the US Treasury to accept the Great Intervention.  
      
The idea of seeing foreign exchange rate policy as part of monetary policy 
was an elaborated way to place exchange rate policy as a tool of achieving 
a broader objective of a breakaway from deflation. In the late 1980s after 
the Plaza Accord, foreign exchange policy was the primary goal for 
international policy coordination. In the Plaza Accord, exchange rate policy 
was at the heart of the policy coordination. In the Plaza Accord, the 
statement read that:  
 
The Ministers and Governors agreed that exchange rates should play a role 
in adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange rates should 
better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the case. 
They believe that agreed policy actions must be implemented and 
reinforced or improve the fundamentals further, and that in view of the 
present and prospective changes in fundamentals, some further orderly 
appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is 
desirable. They stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this 
when to do so would be helpful.  
 
In the late 1980s, foreign exchange policy was the primary target of 
international policy coordination. The then US Treasury secretary James 
Baker talked down the dollar a number of occasions. For the Japanese 
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Ministry of Finance, who wanted to avoid fiscal stimulus measures to the 
extent possible, foreign exchange policy was essentially the only direct 
measure to address the trade imbalance between the US and Japan. 
However, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was faced with the situation 
when they need to correct the excessive force of the foreign exchange 
markets towards yen’s appreciation beyond the target range which they 
considered in line with the fundamental economic conditions. The Japanese 
Ministry of Finance worked with the US Treasury in an attempt to send a 
coordinated message to the market that both Japan and the US did not want 
yen’s appreciation and reverse the trend of yen’s appreciation. In that 
process, the US Treasury pressed the Japanese Ministry of Finance to make 
fiscal and monetary policy more accommodative.
104
  
 
What was common between the Great Intervention in the early 2000s and 
yen’s appreciation in the late 1980s was that it was the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance who wanted to prevent the Japanese yen’s appreciation from 
soaring and the Japanese side was eager to obtain the US Treasury 
cooperation and send a coordinated message to the market in the sense that 
the US Treasury share the view or at least acquiesce in the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance’s attempt to prevent further appreciation. While it was 
a part of the G7 Finance Ministers framework within the multilateral 
system, the Japanese Ministry of Finance saw the relationship with the US 
as pivotal in their financial diplomacy. From the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance’s point of view, the cooperation with the US Treasury has been a 
key element of their financial diplomacy based on the strengthening of the 
G2 relationship in the international financial system. In other words, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance used the special relationship with the US as 
the source of credibility of their presence in the international financial 
diplomacy. This sense of the special relationship has been further 
reinforced by the surge of China as the regional powerhouse overtaking 
Japan in the international economic and financial system.  
 
However, as emerging economies, notably China’s economic presence was 
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growing in the 2000s and the US was increasingly concerned about their 
interventions in their foreign exchange markets to hold down the currency. 
From the US and Japanese perspectives, the intervention in the foreign 
exchange markets would keep China locked into an export-led growth 
model that could result in discontent about unfair competition around the 
world especially in the markets of developed countries such as the US and 
Japan. In September 2003, the then US Treasury Secretary John Snow 
openly commented that the establishment of a flexible exchange rate 
regime for the Chinese yuan would benefit both the United States and 
China, as well as their regional and global trading partners. He stated that 
market-determined floating currencies were really the key to a well- 
functioning international financial system. While he tried to disseminate a 
positive tone indicated by the Chinese counterparts, it was apparent that the 
US Treasury was frustrated about underestimated value of the Chinese 
currency and called on China to increase their currency flexibility and take 
concrete steps and make progress towards more currency flexibility.
105
 
 
In the G7 Finance Ministers and central bank governors’ statement in 
February 2004, the statement read that in the paragraph regarding foreign 
exchange rate:     
 
We reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. 
Excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates are 
undesirable for economic growth. We continue to monitor exchange 
markets closely and cooperate as appropriate. In this context, we 
emphasize that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major 
countries or economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote smooth 
and widespread adjustments in the international financial system, based on 
market mechanisms.   
 
The US Treasury Secretary John Snow suggested to John Taylor that 
“economic areas that lack such flexibility” after “major countries” with a 
view to stressing that the G7 kept a close eye on flexibility in exchange 
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rates in China.
106
 John Snow urged China to stop persistent intervention in 
the foreign exchange market. This was based on the increasing concern of 
the US about the trade imbalance between the US and China. This 
eventually led to the creation of a formal dialogue of the US-China 
Strategic Economic Dialogue, which started in December 2006. The press 
release issued by the US Treasury stated that “During one and a half days 
of productive and in-depth discussions on overarching and long-term 
strategic economic issues, we reaffirmed our commitment to pursuing 
macroeconomic policies, such as China's exchange rate regime reform and 
increasing the U.S. savings rate, to promote balanced and strong growth 
and prosperity in our two nations.”   
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance was increasingly aware of the dilemma 
between the need to prevent premature Japanese yen’s appreciation and the 
need to distinguish itself from China. Domestically the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance was faced with the call from the business sector to prevent 
Japanese yen’s appreciation from deviating from economic fundamentals to 
an unreasonable extent. As the Economic White Paper 2004 pointed out, 
the Japanese export sectors became increasingly resilient against the 
pressure from the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates. For example, the 
Japanese automobile companies reduced the portion of domestic 
production, and instead increased that of overseas production. The Japanese 
electronic machinery companies increasingly shifted the production of 
products to overseas, notably Asian countries, and made efforts to use the 
factories in Asia as the base for exports to all over the world. In a sense, the 
Japanese companies increased its resilience against the pressure derived 
from the fluctuation of the foreign exchange rates. On the other hand, the 
Japanese export companies were increasing choosing to avoid raising the 
price to the as much extent as the foreign exchange moved to Japanese 
yen’s appreciation. While Japanese companies were increasingly resilient 
against the Japanese yen’s appreciation, they were increasingly faced with 
the difficulty at the same time of gaining as much profit margins as they did 
in the 1980s.
107
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Since the financial crisis in 1997 in Japan entailing a series of collapses of 
Japanese financial institutions, the US administration was not increasingly 
seeing Japan as a threat to the US economy, but rather urging Japan to take 
effective measures to recover its economic recession and deflation. 
Especially, under the Bush administration, the US Treasury took the 
attitude of permissiveness. The Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
established a close personal relationship with the US President George 
Bush by giving him a diplomatic support to his attempt to contain the axis 
of evil and start a war against Iraq. Faced with the severe diplomatic 
tension against Germany led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and France 
led by President Jacques Chirac, the US needed the diplomatic support 
from Japan and welcomed the support explicitly given by the Japanese 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Iraq War. The Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi was well aware of the importance of the 
US-Japan strategic alliance underpinned by the Japan-US Security Treaty 
as the basis of the post-war economic prosperity in Japan.                                         
 
Under the Bush administration, the financial and economic diplomacy 
between Japan and the US was intrinsically linked with diplomatic policy. 
In general, there was a tendency that the more the US administration 
needed the diplomatic support from the Japan, the more cooperative the US 
Treasury became with the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Under the Bush 
administration, the Japanese government considered that the cooperation 
with the US would give Japan more influence in the financial and 
economic diplomacy especially in relation to China. Until the financial 
crisis in 2008, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers meetings and G7 
Summit meetings was essentially the only forum which decided the 
direction of the discussion on a wide variety of economic and financial 
issues ranging from macroeconomic policies to financial regulations. While 
the share of G7 in the international economy decreased as emerging 
economies grew, the G7 played a pivotal role in the financial and economic 
diplomacy. While the Japanese Ministry of Finance has continuously made 
the cooperation with the US the cornerstone of its economic and financial 
diplomacy, the emergence of China as a global economic giant made the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance even more aware of the need to maintain this 
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policy.          
 
 
2-4   Political economy of foreign exchange policy and the increasing 
tension against China    
 
In the mid-1980s after the Plaza Accord, exchange rate policy was placed 
as a major macroeconomic policy in the international macroeconomic 
policy coordination at the G7. In the 1980s, there was an internationally 
widely shared view that Japan was an international ‘free-rider’ that fails to 
pay its contribution and undertake leadership responsibility corresponding 
to economic power, but instead depends on others (notably the US) for the 
defence of its strategic interests and for the maintenance of the open 
international economic system that is crucial to its economy. From the US 
perspective, at least under the cold-war era, Japan was considered as a 
strategically crucially important ally of the US influence in the Asian 
Pacific regions against the USSR and China. However, the end of Cold War 
removed at least a part of the security blanket that required previous leaders 
in both countries, in the interests of maintaining their anti-communist 
alliance.   
 
The sharp rise of the US dollar as a result of tight monetary policy in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s eventually led to the growing call for active 
government intervention in foreign exchange markets. At this time, the 
American business leaders, especially in manufacturing sector, was in 
favour of the dollar weakening because they recognised that the strong 
dollar was damaging to international competitiveness. While there is a 
debate concerning to what extent the G5 Plaza agreement and subsequent 
coordinated exchange rate intervention had an impact on the US dollar 
decline
108
, the G5 Plaza agreement clearly gave a signal that the dollar was 
overvalued.    
            
In the late 1980s, there remained a strong momentum for seeking 
establishing narrow bands within which the industrial countries would 
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agree to reinstitute a fixed rate system to reduce the volatility of exchange 
rates. The EEC briefly succeeded in fixing bilateral rates within Europe, 
while fixed rates within the EMS was maintained only through frequently 
parity adjustments and through the imposition of extensive capital 
controls.
109
 While accepting some degree of the Japanese yen’s 
appreciation, Japan also tried to make the pace of the yen’s appreciation 
orderly and control the yen-dollar exchange rate within narrow bands. But, 
in retrospect, the agreement was sustained just a brief period of time. At the 
Louvre accord in February 1987, the finance ministers and the central bank 
governors of the G5 and Canada reached a major agreement to stabilise 
exchange rates around current levels, and the substantial exchange rate 
changes since the Plaza Accord in September 1985 agreement to depress 
the dollar “brought their currencies within ranges broadly consistent with 
underlying economic fundamentals”.  
 
Since the late 2000s, in particular, China has been increasingly criticised by 
the US and other trading partners for alleged currency manipulation which 
they claim that caused China’s accumulating trade surplus in relation to 
trading partners. In policy circle, a key question is whether China should 
allow its currency to appreciate to encourage global rebalancing by moving 
towards more flexible exchange rate regime reflecting market 
demand-supply.      
 
China’s trade expansion reflects the increasingly distinctive role of China 
serving as the final processing and assembly platform for a large quantity 
of imports going from other Asian countries notably Japan to Western 
countries through China. These changes have had a great effect on China’s 
bilateral trade balances, with its increasing trade surpluses with Western 
industrial countries being offset by rising trade deficits with many Asian 
countries. Reflecting its growing prominence and rising appetite for 
imports including for meeting domestic demand, China has been an 
important source of growth for the world economy during the recent global 
slowdown. China has even contributed to the recent strength in world 
commodity prices; it is now the world’s largest importer of copper and steel, 
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and among the largest importers of other raw materials, including iron ore 
and aluminium.
110
            
 
China’s export base has become diversified from an initial heavy reliance 
on textiles and other light manufacturing. In the early 1990s, light 
manufacturing accounted for more than 40 per cent of China’s exports. 
These products largely consisted of footwear, clothing, toys, and other 
miscellaneous manufactured articles. A large part of the remaining exports 
was accounted for by manufactured goods (mostly textiles) and machinery 
and transport (small electronics). In recent years, China has made 
substantial gains in other export categories, including more sophisticated 
electronics (office machines and automated data processing equipment, 
telecommunications and sound equipment, and electrical machinery), 
furniture, travel goods, and industrial supplies. For example, the proportion 
of China’s exports represented by machinery and transport (which includes 
electronics) increased from 17 per cent in 1993 to 41 per cent in 2003, 
while the share of miscellaneous manufacturing declined from 42 per cent 
to 28 per cent.
111
  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese authority’s cautious approach derives from 
particularly the concerns that too rapid relaxation of capital control and 
increased flexibility of exchange rates would lead to exposing domestic 
financial system to currency risks and getting inflation rate out of control of 
the domestic macroeconomic authorities, as well as losing comparative 
competitiveness in international trade.    
 
It has been said that China has regularly intervened in its foreign exchange 
markets. Prior to 1994, China employed a dual exchange rate system that 
consisted of an official fixed exchange rate system used by the government 
and a semi market-based system used by importers and exporters. A semi 
market-based system was swap market rate established in 1988 as an 
expansion and centralisation of the fragmented markets that had emerged 
since the early 1980s.
112
 In 1994, the Chinese government combined the 
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two exchange rate systems and pegged the renminbi at 8.70 yuan to the 
dollar, which increased to 8.28 yuan to the dollar by 1997 and remained 
relatively constant until mid-2005. In 1994, the official rate was devalued 
and unified with the exchange rate at the swap centres (which accounted 
for an estimated 80 percent of current account foreign exchange 
transactions at the time), and the exchange rate system was officially 
changed into a managed float system. Since then, China officially had a 
managed floating exchange rate system although the currency was de facto 
fixed to the US dollar until 2005.
113
 
 
In 2005, the Chinese government reformed its exchange rate system 
policies. It announced that the RMB would no longer be pegged, and that 
the renminbi exchange rate would become “adjustable based on market 
supply and demand with reference to exchange rate movements of 
currencies in a basket” containing various currencies of major developed 
countries. While the renminbi would be allowed to fluctuate in relations to 
the basket on a daily basis, China only allowed the renminbi to appreciate 
at a very slow and steady pace. From mid-2005 to mid-2008, the USD 
dollar-renminbi exchange rate appreciated from 8.11 to 6.83, an 
appreciation of 20.8 per cent (if the initial adjustment from 8.28 to 8.11 
yuan is included). In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Chinese 
government suspended its exchange rate regime in mid-2008 and the 
exchange rate was held relatively constant at 6.83 until mid-2010. In 
mid-2010, against the background of increasing call for China to move 
towards a more flexible exchange rate regime, the People’s Bank of China 
decided to resume its renminbi reform to enhance the renminbi exchange 
rate flexibility. The pace at which renminbi appreciated against the US 
dollar and other major currencies has been rather incremental.  
 
When the Chinese government announced a more flexibility of foreign 
exchange rate of their own currency in 2005, the US government welcomed 
its move to a more flexible exchange rate. The then US Treasury John 
Snow welcomed it saying that “the reform of China’s currency regime is 
important for China and the international financial system.” The US 
Treasury considered that a flexible system would help China achieve price 
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stability and improve its ability to adjust to shocks, and it will, when 
combined with more flexible currency exchange systems in other Asian 
countries, contribute to the orderly unwinding of global current account 
imbalances.
114
 The US Treasury’s view about global current account 
imbalances was well described in the US proposal, which the then US 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote to his G20 colleagues 
suggesting that they should adopt a new approach to managing external 
trade imbalances in October 2010. In that letter, specifically, he wanted the 
G20 to agree to a limit on their current account surpluses and deficits over 
a period of years, and also to correct these imbalances if they seem likely to 
drift away from the agreed targets.
115
 The US Treasury has considered that 
increased flexibility in the exchange rate would be necessary to address the 
current account imbalances between China and the US since the Bush 
administration.  
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) accession was crucial in promoting 
China’s integration with the global trading system and gave a huge 
opportunity to increase their exports. The China’s accession to the WTO 
increased the market access of Chinese goods and services to overseas 
markets. Increased market access overseas is the most immediate benefit 
from WTO accession to China. As an immediate effect on its membership, 
China was permanently granted most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment by 
other WTO members. Upon accession, trading partners eliminated 
discriminatory restrictive measures against the Chinese goods and services. 
Over time, easier access to foreign market is expected to boost China’s 
exports in a number of sectors. In the early 1990s, nearly half of the 
China’s exports were dominated by light manufacturing such as footwear, 
clothing, toys, and other miscellaneous manufactured articles. In recent 
years, China has made substantial gains in other export categories, 
including more sophisticated electronics such as telecommunications and 
electrical machinery).
116
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Under the Clinton administration in the 1990s, the US administration did 
not consider the emergence of China as much threat as the Bush 
administration did in early 2000s, but rather did as a land of new 
opportunity. Robert Rubin, then US Treasury Secretary, described that 
China contributed to stability of the Asian economy as a whole, which 
contrasted with Japan’s weakness in the late 1980s during the Asian 
financial crisis. Robert Rubin commended China for the firmness of their 
commitment not to devalue the Chinese currency during the Asian financial 
crisis. But, at least the Clinton administration did not urge China to revalue 
the renminbi, but took a rather soft approach based on the view that it 
would be more effective and practical to have a strategy of engaging China 
in the international economy through trade policy. The Clinton 
administration urged China to lower its trade barriers. Based on the 
expectation that China would in any case be formidable and staunchly 
independent force, the Clinton administration considered that it would be 
greatly to the benefit of both two countries to have an effective 
relationship.   
 
On the other hand, in the early 2000s, the US business sector was 
increasingly concerned about the increased Chinese competitiveness, 
rampant piracy, counterfeiting, and currency manipulation. Even larger US 
business were concerned that mercantilist Chinese policies would try to 
direct controlled markets instead of opening competitive markets.
117
 The 
increasing bilateral trade deficit against China led to growing protectionist 
pressure in the US, and the China’s growing global current account surplus 
led to the growing call for more flexibility of the China’s exchange rate 
policy to adjust to imbalances.
118
 This gradual shift of perception of China 
by the US business sectors was reflected in a tougher approach taken by the 
Bush administration against China in economic and financial diplomacy.          
 
In addition to its economic footprint, China’s rapid military modernisation 
and increased in capabilities has raised questions about the purposes of this 
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build-up and Chinas lack of transparency. There was a growing sense that if 
China seeks to maneuverer towards a predominance of power, the US 
should work together with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and others for 
regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum and 
the APEC forum.
119
            
 
Beginning in 2003, a series of currency exchange rate bills targeted on 
China’s “currency manipulation” have been introduced to Congress. On 
October 11, 2011, the U.S. Senate passed The Currency Exchange Rate 
Oversight Reform Act of 2011. The Act would allow the US government to 
impose countervailing duties on Chinese goods if it deems that China is 
undervaluing its currency. Its proponents claimed that China’s policies 
interfered with the appreciation of its currency, along with its subsidies in 
certain industries, and provided its domestic export industries with an 
unfair competitive advantage. They further claimed that it made US firms 
forced to choose between outsourcing jobs and going out of business. On 
the other hand, critics call the Act economic protectionism and s the last 
thing the United States wants during its financial crisis.
120
  
 
In contrast with the US, Japan did not show a clear approach on the China’s 
de facto fixed exchange rate system to the US dollar taken by the Chinese 
government since 1995. In 2002, Haruhiko Kuroda (then Vice Minister for 
International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance of Japan) and Masahiro 
Kawai (Deputy Vice Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of 
Finance of Japan) accused China of exporting deflation because China had 
pegged the renminbi to the US dollar and was experiencing deflation in the 
1998-2002 period.
121
 They recommended that the renminbi be appreciated 
in order to end China’s negative impact on its neighbour countries. The 
Economic White Paper 2003 examined to what extent the increase in 
Chinese goods in the Japanese consumption markets contributed to the 
continued deflation in Japan. It found that the penetration of Chinese goods 
had a certain degree of impact as much as around 0.4% on the deflation in 
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the Japanese economy. But, it concluded that the increase in the imported 
Chinese goods in the Japanese consumption markets was not a major cause 
of continued deflation of the Japanese economy. The Economic White 
Paper 2003 did not call on the Chinese government to increase the 
flexibility of the renminbi in the foreign exchange markets.   
 
Furthermore, the Economic White Paper 2005 pointed out that the de facto 
fixed exchange rate system of the renminbi to the US dollar made certain 
contribution to steady economic growth of the Chinese economy, which 
they considered had still vulnerability in the financial sectors. The Japanese 
government saw the Chinese banking sector being dominated by 
state-owned banks and burdened by a large stock of non-performing loans 
problem.
122
 As the IMF analysed, financial intermediation in China was 
mainly channelled through the banking system. Banks had a crucial role in 
intermediating the substantial amount of private savings in China, which 
was estimated to be around one-third of total household income. Bank 
lending underpinned the high level of investment growth, which made an 
important contribution to China’s growth. Therefore, the stability of the 
banking system was crucial for promoting sustained growth. The Japanese 
government and the IMF shared the concern about the stability of the 
banking sector that the main challenges for the banks would be to improve 
their commercial orientation and strengthen their financial position. In their 
views, these challenges were interrelated, as improving the commercial 
orientation of the bank was a key step towards improving their financial 
health, both by reducing future accumulation of non-performing loans and 
boosting profitability, thereby helping to redress the balance sheet 
weaknesses of the banks.
123
                  
 
As the Economic White Paper 2002 demonstrated, the Japanese 
government did not take the rise of China as much threat as the US 
administration did in terms of the current account imbalances. The 
Economic White Paper 2002 stated that while some sectors which were 
faced with the increased competition directly from the Chinese counterparts, 
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other sectors such as automobiles and other high value-added products did 
not see China a real threat. It also pointed out that many Japanese industries 
already consider investing in China to establish a base for exports to the 
rest of the world there. In the 2002 Economic White Paper, it concluded 
that most of the exports from China depended heavily on the foreign 
companies rather than domestic Chinese companies, and that the exports 
from China were still limited to less high value-added products.
124
                  
 
The 2005 Economic White Paper examined the foreign exchange regime in 
China and concluded that China itself needed the reform of the renminbi 
regime, which was essentially pegged to the US dollar, to address their 
domestic economic problems such as the risk of inflation. The Economic 
White Paper 2005 did not draw a concrete conclusion that the renminbi was 
undervalued. While the US administration demanded the increased 
flexibility of the renminbi as a means of redressing the current account 
imbalance between the US and China, the 2005 Economic White Paper 
examined the increased flexibility of renminbi as something China itself 
needed. In the report, the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy was 
considered as crucially important to Japan, which has been strengthening 
its economic ties with China. The report especially recognised that most of 
the Japanese companies had already established or were planning to shift 
their production bases to China. In fact, the FDI from Japan increased 
between 2000 and 2005 by 2.5 times.  
 
The 2005 Economic White Paper pointed out that China was increasingly 
faced with the Mundell’s incompatibility triangle or so-called Open 
Economy Trilemma. According to this theory, a government would not be 
able to seek three objectives simultaneously, i.e. (1) stable foreign 
exchange rate, (2) free capital movement, and (3) an independent monetary 
policy. The paper pointed out that given a sheer size of the Chinese market, 
the Chinese economy should expand the flexibility of the Chinese currency 
in the foreign exchange market, also recognising that the Chinese economy 
was faced with the risk of inflation partly due to the increased prices of 
natural resources such as oil and that the increased flexibility of the 
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Chinese currency in the foreign exchange markets would contribute to 
absorbing the pressure deriving from the increased prices of imported 
goods and preventing the pressure from giving rise to the inflation in the 
Chinese economy.  
 
The 2005 Economic White Paper gave a comprehensive review on the 
challenges facing the Chinese economy. It identified five key challenges: 
(1) the underdevelopment of the banking sector in China; (2) the need to 
reform state-owned companies; (3) the accession of China to the WTO and 
the need to develop market structures; (4) the need to address the economic 
disparity between cities and rural areas; and (5) the underdevelopment of 
infrastructure including electricity and water, in particular.   
 
First, in terms of the underdevelopment of the banking sector in China, the 
report identified that the main features of the banking system in China were 
that it was predominantly state-owned, was very large, and was faced with 
non-performing loans and low capital adequacy ratios and 
under-provisioning. The report estimated that the ratio of non-performing 
loans was more than 15%. An IMF report in 2004
125
 also pointed out that 
the bank’s balance sheet shortcomings were manifested, to varying degrees, 
in a combination of high non-performing loans, low capital adequacy ratios, 
and under-provisioning. The IMF report found out that while there were 
some reforms including the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) in April 2003, the on-going opening of the market to 
foreign financial institutions, the measures aimed at strengthening and 
modernising state commercial banks, and the capital injection to two of 
state commercial banks.           
 
Second, in terms of the need to reform state-owned enterprises, the 
Economic White Paper 2005 pointed out most state-owned enterprises were 
faced with the slow progress of improvement of efficiency of management 
and remaining low profitability, in spite of the gradual process of giving 
more incentives and increased autonomy to individual enterprises. As the 
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report stated, the pressure on reform of state-owned enterprises came from 
the Chinese government policy stance known as “Socialist Market 
Economy”. In 1992, this new initiative was formally established as the 
Chinese governing principle for the new Chinese economy. The Chinese 
government sought to transform state-owned enterprises into economic 
entities suitable for such a market economy rather than remaining as de 
facto state production units.
126127
  
 
Third, in terms of the accession of China to the WTO, the Economic White 
Paper 2005 recognised that the increased market access overseas was the 
most immediate benefit from the WTO for China, but at the same time 
pointed out that there were a great number of non-tariff barriers including 
the lack of administrative capacity to implement rules and regulations and 
the lack of transparency of implementation by the authorities. As the US 
Trade Representative (USTR) pointed out, the China’s compliance 
problems were occasionally generated by a lack of coordination among 
relevant ministries in the Chinese government. Another source of 
compliance problems has been a lack of effective or uniform application of 
China’s WTO commitments at local and provincial levels. In spite of 
China’s efforts to take steps to address both of these concerns, through 
more effective inter-ministerial mechanisms at the national level, and 
through a more concerted effort to reinforce the importance of 
WTO-consistency with sub-national authorities, compliance problems 
involved entrenched domestic Chinese interests that may be seeking to 
minimise their exposure to foreign competition.
128
 The Economic White 
Paper 2005 foresaw that while easier access to foreign markets was likely 
to boost China’s exports in a number of sectors, it also pointed out the risk 
of increased bilateral trade conflicts and safe guard measures taken against 
the imports from China by other countries.                                        
   
Fourth, in terms of the economic disparity between cities and rural areas, 
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the Economic White Paper 2005 pointed out that there was a great disparity 
between cities and rural areas mainly caused by low labour productivity of 
agricultural sectors in rural areas in China. In the report, the income level in 
rural areas in China was estimated to be only one-third of that of cities. As 
the report stated, the China was lowering trade barriers as a result of its 
accession to the WTO, it was expected that the agricultural sectors in China 
would be exposed to more intense competition. On the other hand, there 
was surplus workforce which could not be absorbed in the agricultural 
sectors. It was exacerbated by the impediments of the free movement of 
labour from rural areas to cities partly due to the family registration system 
in China.    
 
Last but not least, in terms of the underdevelopment of infrastructure, the 
Economic White Paper 2005 raised the two examples of electricity and 
water as the bottleneck of sustainable economic growth of the Chinese 
economy. In the report, it was estimated that there was the shortage of 
electricity as much as 250 billion kW in 2005 due to the slower pace of 
construction of electronic power plants than the increase in the demand of 
electricity. The increase in the demand of electricity mainly came from the 
sharp rise of demand especially in the steel and other basic materials 
industry such as aluminium requiring a great deal of electricity. Also the 
report pointed out the worsening problem of water shortage due to the 
increased demand in water mainly for the industrial use. In addition, there 
is a geographical discrepancy in terms of water resources between the north 
and south in China. While there is abundant water sources in the south 
regions in China, many cities in the north are chronically faced with the 
water shortages partly due to geographical constraints.    
 
Overall, the Economic White Paper 2005 was rather cautious about the 
potential of the Chinese economy to continue to develop. This was based 
on the assessment that the Chinese economy developed mainly based on 
the export-led growth and that their exports was basically dependent on the 
imports of most components from other countries and the role of Chinese 
factories was only to assemble them into final products for exportation. For 
example, in the case of automobiles, the Economic White Paper 2005 
stated that the Chinese automobile industries were still limited to imitating 
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other foreign products and did not reach yet the stage of developing their 
own industrial technologies.  
 
In the Economic White Paper 2006, the report stated that while there could 
be an argument that China’s emergence was considered as the threat to the 
Japanese economy, it could provide more opportunity to neighbouring 
countries including Japan and ASEAN countries through exporting 
intermediary goods. According to the Economic White Paper 2006, the 
exports by Japan to China increased by 2.6 times between 2000 and 2005, 
with Korea by 3.4 times, Chinese Taipei by 9.7 times, and the ASEAN 
countries by 3.3 times. It pointed out that the Chinese exports were 
gradually shifting its focus from textile and other light industries to electric 
mechanical industries. Between 2000 and 2005, more than half of the 
increase in exports was attributed to the increase in exported electric 
mechanical products. In 2005, In terms of the reasons of increased 
investment, the accession of China to the WTO and the development of 
domestic infrastructure improved the business sentiments for investment. In 
terms of financing of investments, the report pointed out that the 
investments in China were upheld by the high rate of domestic saving in 
China and the inflow of foreign direct investments. In the report, foreign 
capitals were estimated to account for as much as 58% in the Chinese 
exports.                           
 
The 2006 Economic White Paper stressed that the reform on the Chinese 
currency needed to be considered in terms of how to address their own 
domestic problems in their economy rather than how to respond to that 
increasing pressure from other countries. In the report, it pointed out 
undervalued Chinese currency resulted in extraordinary expansion of 
exports and the resulting increase of trade surpluses entailing the increased 
foreign reserves, which gave rise to excessive monetary fluidity and 
investment. The 2006 Economic White Paper took more flexibility of the 
Chinese currency as a means of preventing inflation from damaging the 
Chinese domestic economy. The report raised the risk of increased inflow 
of speculative money fuelling the domestic inflation in the Chinese 
economy.  
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The 2006 Economic White Paper pointed out the three risks associated with 
the rapid development of the Chinese economy. The first risk was 
concerned with the excessive investment. The report stated that excessive 
investment could lead to excessive capacity to provide goods if the world 
economy fell into the recession and the demand declined. The excessive 
capacity was evident in some sectors such as steels and aluminium partly 
due to the lack of coordinated programmes of outputs associated with the 
personnel evaluation based on whether to meet a numerical target. The 
second risk was concerned with the excessive liquidity. In China, the rapid 
increase in the current account surpluses and the inbound direct investment 
with capital account surpluses resulted in the excessive liquidity. The 
amount of foreign exchange reserves in China surpassed that of Japan in 
2006, amounting at USD 987 billion. The 2006 Economic White Paper 
considered the increased flexibility of the Chinese currency would help to 
address the misalignment of rapid increase of trade surplus and excessive 
investment. While the report recognised the recent steps taken by the 
Chinese authority such as the shift of the foreign exchange system from de 
facto dollar peg to currency basket system in July 2005, it underscored the 
further steps to increase the flexibility of the Chinese currency. The third 
risk was concerned with the excessive saving, which the 2006 Economic 
White Paper considered that would lead to excessive investment channelled 
through the deposits of savings in the financial institutions in China. The 
2006 Economic White Paper pointed out that the Chinese economy needed 
to be shifted from investment-driven growth to consumption-driven growth. 
The report stated that the more efficient use of excessive savings to 
personal consumption would help to change the Chinese economic growth 
model to consumption-driven growth, also highlighting that the 
development of social security system would help the Chinese consumers 
to spend more savings to buy goods and services without setting aside a 
great deal of savings. 
 
The 2006 Economic White Paper further stated that the increase in the 
productivity would be a key to achieving more balanced growth of the 
Chinese economy. The report stated that as the population between 15-64 
ages would peak in 2015 and the Chinese economy would move into 
ageing society faster than Japan in terms of the cycle of economic 
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development, the shift from the labour intensive growth model to the 
growth model based on knowledge and technology would be crucially 
important to make it possible for the Chinese economy to compensate the 
decline of the labour resources available in the future. The 2006 Economic 
White Paper concluded that the rate of economic growth in China would be 
expected to slow down as the amount of new capital available would 
decrease gradually and the steady growth of the Chinese economy should 
be considered as the opportunity for the enterprises of neighbouring 
countries including Japan and the ASEAN countries, in particular, to sell 
goods and services in the Chinese market rather than the threat to them.  
 
In terms of the foreign exchange rate system, the 2006 Economic White 
Paper called on China to increase the flexibility of the Chinese currency to 
address their own domestic problem associated with excessive liquidity 
deriving from accumulating trade surpluses and foreign investments 
towards China and the increased risk of inflation. However, compared with 
the US approach to call on China to increase the flexibility of the Chinese 
currency to address their trade imbalance, the Japan’s approach was softer 
and more indirect in the sense that Japan encouraged China to increase 
flexibility as a means of helping to cope with their domestic economic 
imbalance.       
          
Dating back to the 1980s, the Plaza Accord marked the watershed in the 
foreign exchange market policies among the G7. When comparing the 
Japan’s experience after the Plaza Accord, the Chinese responses to the 
increasing international pressure to accept the currency appreciation were 
much more incremental. In the late 1990s in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Finance worked to engage China 
when they promoted the regional financial cooperation. Then the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance’s attempt to engage China was based on the 
assumption that Japan would be still in the position to take the initiative in 
promoting the regional financial cooperation.             
           
Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro Kawai described the Plaza Accord and the 
subsequent international macroeconomic policy coordination as the attempt 
of the G3 (US, Japan and Germany) to coordinate the foreign exchange 
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market intervention and macroeconomic policies in order to guide the US 
dollar downward, thereby containing the protectionist pressure the US and, 
once the US dollar began to decline rapidly, prevent the free fall of the US 
dollar so as to avoid a hard landing of the US economy. The European 
economies coordinated their monetary policies at least since 1979 under the 
European Monetary System (EMS). But, as they pointed out, these attempts 
were the approach taken by industrialised countries, and it was still 
questionable to what extent this approach could be a useful guide to 
emerging market economies.
129
  
 
Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro Kawai saw regional exchange rate 
arrangements as one of the possible forms of regime setting in the 
long-term. In their view, regime setting is a joint exercise to agree on a set 
of rules within their own economic interests. This type of policy 
cooperation includes arrangements on such issues as regional trade and FDI 
arrangements, regional exchange rate regimes, regional financing 
arrangements, other regional frameworks for action at the time of a crisis, 
and initiatives for regional bond market development. An example is a joint 
setting of exchange rate policies for intra-regional exchange rate 
stabilisation, which can prevent competitive depreciation at the regional 
level. Another example is the creation of a regional financing facility, 
which can contain regional currency attacks and contagion quickly, 
supplement IMF roles and resources, and economise on resources through 
reserve pooling at the regional level. There is also a potential initiative for 
regional bond market development, which encourages the economies in the 
region to make concerted efforts to develop national bond markets as well 
as regional infrastructure, including clearance, settlements, and rating 
agencies.
130
    
 
However, as they pointed out, not much progress has been made in the area 
of exchange rate coordination or stabilisation in the region. One of the 
reasons for the lack of progress is the fact that there was no international 
rule or best practice with regard to exchange rate regimes. In their view, for 
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emerging market economies in East Asia, a pure floating system is not 
desirable because of a potential for excessive volatility and misalignment. 
Nor is a hard peg desirable except in small open economies like Hong 
Kong and Brunei. They sought a sort of third way approach of coordinating 
intra-regional exchange rate policies, underscoring that for the emerging 
East Asian economies that depend heavily depend on trade and investment, 
exchange rate stability is desirable for the promotion of trade and 
investment and economic development, and that intra-regional exchange 
rate stability is a public good for the East Asian economies that have 
increasingly integrated with one another. They concluded that in the 
pre-crisis period, the de facto US dollar pegged exchange rate regimes 
ensured extra-regional as well as intra-regional exchange rate stability on 
an informal basis, but a US dollar based regime was susceptible to 
fluctuations in effective exchange rates when the US dollar-Japanese yen 
rate became volatile in 1995-1998.
131
      
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance’s view about the relationship between 
the US dollar pegged exchange rate systems and the Asian Financial Crisis 
was well laid out in the discussion paper prepared by the French and 
Japanese Ministry of Finance staff, for the ASEM meeting in Kobe in 
January 2001 titled “Exchange Rate Regime for Emerging Market 
Economies”. In this paper, the choice of US dollar as an anchor for a 
pegged exchange regime are for two reasons, i.e. first, to ensure price 
stability, and second, to make foreign finance available at a cheaper rate by 
means of bank loans, portfolio and foreign direct investment with reduced 
interest rate spreads. The choice of the US dollar as the anchor for a pegged 
exchange rate regime could be appropriate for a small open economy when 
at least the following conditions are satisfied: 1) its trade and investment 
structure is aimed primarily at the dollar area, and 2) its export competitors 
are also located in the dollar area. In this case, the country's 
competitiveness would tend to be stable irrespective of any fluctuation in 
the dollar. The paper considered that dollar-pegged strategies would be 
more appropriate, for instance, for some smaller Latin American countries 
than for the emerging East Asian countries. From January 1995 to April 
1997, the dollar's nominal exchange rate appreciated by 25% against the 
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yen and by 17% against the then euro-equivalent. This appreciation 
affected in particular the emerging East Asian countries, whose export 
markets and export competitors are diverse in terms of currency. The 
increasing overvaluation of the East Asian currencies in effective terms 
provoked growing current account imbalances.
132
 
 
The discussion paper prepared by the French and Japanese Finance 
Ministries staffs also stated that fixed exchange rate strategies increased 
systemic risks by providing an implicit guarantee to domestic companies and 
international investors, thereby giving them a strong but misleading signal of 
confidence. Pegging against the dollar lent great credibility to the central 
bank's commitment to maintain the currency's external stability. On the one 
hand, in the context of underdeveloped domestic financial sectors, it 
encouraged domestic companies to take full advantage of the efficiency gap 
between foreign and domestic financial operators and to borrow directly 
from foreign banks in US dollars without hedging their liabilities. On the 
other hand, it prompted foreign banks to lend massively, especially at shorter 
maturities, without sufficiently checking country risk and debtor 
creditworthiness.
133
  
 
As a policy recommendation regarding foreign exchange regimes, the 
discussion paper prepared by the French and Japanese Finance Ministries 
staffs called on East Asian countries to consider the adoption of managed 
exchange rate strategies underpinned by basket currency regimes including 
the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the euro stating that it would better suit 
the geographical structure of the balance of payments and would foster 
stability. In the managed exchange rate regimes, the currency moves within 
a given implicit or explicit band with its centre targeted to a basket of 
currencies. It argued that when suitably defined, managed exchange rate 
regimes reconcile lower exchange rate volatility and stable inflation 
expectations with flexibility in reacting to external shocks. The most 
important issue in the definition of such strategies is the choice of an 
appropriate reference currency. This choice depends on several important 
                                                 
132 Exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies (2001), Discussion Paper, Jointly 
Prepared by French and Japanese Staff, the 3
rd
 ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Kobe (13-14 
January, 2001)   
133 Ibid. 
 142 
factors, including the geographical structure of trade in goods and services 
and of income and current transfers as well as the geographical structure of 
foreign capital flows and external debt. The paper argued that the Asian 
financial crisis showed that it would be unsuitable to choose the US dollar 
as the sole reference currency. Instead, the paper argued that basket 
currency regimes including the US dollar, the yen, and the euro would 
better suit the geographical structure of the balance of payments and would 
foster stability. It also called on the groups of countries with close trade and 
financial links to adopt a mechanism that automatically moves the regions’ 
exchange rates in the same direction by similar percentages in order to 
minimise the risk of non-cooperation.
134
            
 
The discussion paper saw the European Monetary Union as the process 
which showed a useful example of how further integration cab be achieved. 
It saw the Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000 as an important step to 
establish a regional financing arrangement to supplement existing 
international facilities. In the Chiang Mai Initiative, the finance ministers of 
the ASEAN plus 3 countries agreed to establish a network of bilateral swap 
arrangements and repurchase agreements among the ASEAN countries, 
Japan, China, and the South Korea. In addition, to strengthen financial 
stability in the East Asian region, they also agreed to close cooperation on 
monitoring capital flows and the development of a regional supervisory 
mechanism. The discussion paper stated that regional cooperation 
frameworks should be fully integrated into the overall monetary and 
financial system.
135
            
 
In its assessment, the need for regional exchange rate cooperation often 
arose from more acute awareness of the situation due to increased regional 
trade integration. This awareness was made more acute during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 by the experience of regional contagion. It 
further stated that there is no compulsory sequencing between the two 
processes of regional exchange rate cooperation and trade integration. And 
it also argued that regional cooperation can go hand in hand with increased 
cooperation in orderly capital movement liberalisation.     
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The paper argued that the free-floating regimes without appropriate 
arrangements may also make regional cooperation more difficult by 
fostering free riding behaviour. To gain a competitive advantage over its 
regional competitors each country could be tempted to use the system for 
its own purposes and implicitly manage its parity, indulging in “dirty 
floating”. Such behaviour could result in undesirable equilibrium via 
collective devaluation and/or regional trade tensions, ultimately impacting 
negatively on other regions in the world. Also, it argued that exchange rate 
and external financial strategies should be determined consistently to 
optimise growth and development opportunities while minimising risks. It 
is clear that countries should choose their level of financial openness 
together with their exchange rate regime. It further stated that the 
free-floating regimes may entail the need for temporary regulatory 
measures for inflows whereas pegs may require more stringent financial 
supervision.  
 
Based on the experience of the Asian financial crisis, the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance had a rather cautious approach about the capital liberalisation 
and free-floating exchange regimes, and even considered that a temporary 
introduction of capital controls would be sometimes more beneficial. In 
general, the trends toward liberalisation of capital movements reflected a 
variety of motivations, including the benefits from increased access to, and 
a lower cost of, investable funds. The liberalisation of controls on capital 
outflows was in part been a response to stronger net capital inflows. 
Liberalisation also reflected a wish to avoid the potential distortionary 
effects of the controls and concerns about their overall effectiveness.
136
         
       
The IMF emphasised the negative effects of capital control, stating that the 
effectiveness of capital controls may have some effectiveness in the short 
run but that it can be eroded quite quickly. It stated that the channelling of 
capital to avoid the controls can result in less-developed financial markets 
and can distort financial intermediation and even damage financial sector 
by encouraging the use of channels and instruments that are less well 
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managed and supervised. In the IMF’s view, the circumvention of capital 
controls also distorts the balance of payments statistics, which, therefore, 
become a less reliable guide for policy formulation and informed market 
decision making. The inevitable investment in circumvention techniques by 
market participants was private profitable, but represented a socially 
inefficient allocation of resources.   
 
In the IMF’s approach, they attempted to integrate advice on capital 
account liberalisation with financial sector reform. The reform was 
intended to cover both external transactions in capital account issues and 
the development of domestic financial markets and institutions. This 
integrated approach has reflected a number of considerations. In particular:   
 
 the stage of development and the stability of domestic financial 
systems are critical in the approach to opening the capital account. 
Countries with developed financial markets and institutions have 
been better able to attract portfolio capital flows and to withstand the 
consequences of reversals in capital inflows than countries where 
such markets were just emerging;  
 the opening of the capital account can have important implications 
for the development and stability of financial markets and 
institutions. In many cases, the implications are positive in that the 
liberalisation help develop deeper, more competitive, and more 
diversified financial markets. However, capital account liberalisation 
can also increase financial sector risks if it accelerates the 
deregulation of the financial system without critical supporting 
reforms; 
 the extent to which capital flows contribute to sustained 
improvements in economic performance depends on the stage of 
development and the efficiency of the domestic financial system. The 
central role of banking systems in allocating financial resources 
points to the importance of focusing attention on the incentives under 
which those institutions operate, including those associated with 
connected or politically motivated lending developing a psychology 
attuned to the need for active management and hedging of currency 
and related risks; avoiding expectations of government support; 
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supervising banks effectively, including their liquidity management; 
and disposing of an efficient legal framework to enforce financial 
contracts, debt recovery, bankruptcies, and the like; and 
 inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies can create 
incentives for significant short-term capital flows, hence, increasing 
the vulnerability of the economy to reversals in capital inflows when 
policies or circumstance change. Moreover, high capital mobility 
alters the effectiveness of different monetary instruments in 
achieving the objectives of monetary policy. Instruments that impose 
a high cost or administrative constraint on the banks become less 
effective than indirect monetary instruments, which operate on the 
overall costs of money or credit in financial markets. The opening of 
the capital account, therefore, needs to be accompanied by the 
adoption of indirect methods of monetary control.     
   
In the IMF approach, a key issue was how to maximise the benefits and 
minimise the risks of capital account liberalisation. While it admitted that 
issues of the pacing and sequencing are central to this objective, it 
concluded that the structural benefits of liberalisations would be 
emphasised, including those that (1) help diversify financial systems and 
make them more efficient by introducing new technologies and instruments 
and by promoting competition for financial products; (2) improve financial 
discipline by facilitating market oversight through transparency and 
competition while avoiding moral hazard – for example, by providing a 
catalyst for introducing new accounting and disclosure requirements; (3) 
help revise out-of-date regulatory structures and weak or ineffective 
supervisory arrangements; (4) introduce new instruments for hedging and 
managing risks that provide scope for greater diversification; and (5) 
favour the channels where regulatory systems are more developed and 
governance can be stronger. In a nutshell, the IMF’s approach was based on 
the assumption that capital account liberalisation was beneficial to the 
economy on its own, and any disruptive short-term flows could be avoided 
by better coordination with domestic financial sector liberalisation and 
reforms, and a minimum set of rules.   
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance had a rather different view from the IMF 
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on the effectiveness of capital controls. Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro 
Kawai, the then Vice Minister for International Affairs and then Deputy 
Vice Minister for International Affairs respectively, had a rather positive 
stance on the effectiveness of capital controls. For example, Mr. Kuroda’s 
view is well summarised below:            
 
On capital controls, in the past currency crises involving emerging 
economies, there was some contagion between those economies. In contrast, 
in the recent financial crisis, stress that arose in the United States and the 
euro area was transmitted at once to many emerging countries, including 
those in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. One of the causes 
of such international transmission of the crisis is deemed to be financial 
globalisation and the accompanying global upsurge of gross capital flows, 
which has led to increasing attention over prudential capital controls. 
Moreover, in recent years, the International Monetary Fund, which has 
long emphasized the benefits of capital mobility, has, at least partially, 
accepted the necessity of capital controls as a macro-prudential policy 
tool.
137
  
 
At that time, the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the World Bank took the 
similar view on the effectiveness of capital controls in that both had 
broadly shared the view that controls on short-term capital flows may be 
useful as instrument for managing the transition process of financial market 
integration. Capital controls may have the additional benefits of (1) 
providing a degree of monetary policy autonomy under fixed exchange 
rates, (2) reducing the wedge between the private and social returns of 
capital inflow when systematic failure of speculators to evaluate the 
fundamentals causes private capital flow to be destabilising, and (3) 
curtailing rapid capital outflows in a “second generation” environment – 
where self-fulfilling expectations lead to multiple equilibria – so as to 
prevent the economy from slipping out of a “good equilibrium”.138       
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In their view, in order to reduce their risks of crisis, developing countries 
need to pursue financial safeguards that they can implement in the 
short-term alongside their longer-term development initiatives. 
Internationally triggered financial crises became more frequent and more 
severe in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the susceptibility to crisis varies 
from country to country, there are studies suggesting about a 10% average 
likelihood of crisis in any given year.
139
  
 
In the World Bank’s view, volatile international capital flows was also 
associated with a greater number of costly domestic banking crises. 
Reforms of the international financial architecture, together with continued 
improvements in countries’ macroeconomic policies and their banking 
systems, were the best protection against crises. Such reforms would also 
provide developing countries the foundation to benefit from international 
capital flows. But, in most countries, these international and domestic 
reforms took time to become effective. Until then, banking and financial 
systems would likely remain susceptible to externally induced shocks and 
liquidity crisis. Thus short-term safeguards were needed.  
 
The proposed measures for domestically initiated near-term financial 
safeguards were of two types: controls on capital flows and measures that 
would improve countries’ access to international liquidity. The former were 
designed to dampen the volatility of capital flows and hence keep crises 
from occurring; the latter could help contain crises when they do occur. The 
proposed safeguards would impose costs on the domestic economy either 
by restricting the quantity of foreign borrowing or by raising its price. It 
concluded that the costs, however, were likely to be less than the cost of a 
full-fledged financial crisis. Safeguards measures are valuable also because 
they would help insulate the poor by reducing the likelihood of a deep 
recession and instead shift the burden of crisis on to those who benefit 
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more directly from foreign borrowing.
140
        
 
Capital controls were motivated in the 1990s by concerns that rapid inflow 
lead to loss of autonomy in macroeconomic policy and that their reversals 
have significant follow-on effects throughout the economy. In the early and 
mid-1990s, the major concern with rapid capital inflows was inflationary 
pressure, generated by the creation of high-powered money through the 
direct or indirect transfer of foreign currency reserves into the banking 
systems. However, since the Mexican crisis of December 1994, a more 
overriding concern has been the rapid outflow of capital and the inability to 
access new capital inflows. The reversibility of capital flows – and the 
“sudden stop” in new flows – has led to the consideration of policies that 
slow down inflows during boom times and restrict outflows during a 
crisis.
141
  
 
The World Bank drew a positive set of conclusions on the effectiveness of 
the capital controls including:  
 
 Capital inflow controls do not seem to affect the level of flows: 
aggregate capital inflow fell immediately following the imposition of 
controls, but rose soon thereafter. 
 Inflow controls do seem to affect the composition of flows by 
extending their maturity structure. Short-term inflows declined 
sharply in the year controls were imposed – the negative sign implies 
that the stock of short-term debt fell in the majority of the cases after 
the imposition of controls – and tended to rise much more slowly 
thereafter compared with other flows.  
 Protection against liquidity crises is likely to be stronger where 
capital controls are combined with measures to increase reserves 
relative to short-term debt.  
 In Malaysia, which introduced capital outflow controls, it is evident 
that the fall in Malaysian output was less than in the other crisis 
countries, and moreover, Malaysia’s recovery has occurred at a more 
rapid pace than in similar inflicted countries.       
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With regard to the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s stance on capital controls 
as an instrument for managing financial market integration and financial 
crisis, it was generally based on the following views: 
 
 Sound macroeconomic and exchange policies: In order to enjoy the 
benefits of global financial integration, emerging market economies 
mist minimise the risk of crisis first and foremost by pursuing sound 
policies designed to maintain macroeconomic stability, prevent an 
overvaluation of the currency, and avoid un unsustainable 
accumulation of short-term eternal debt.  
 Information disclosure: Much of the over-lending typically found 
prior to currency crisis might be avoided if international investors 
correctly appraise the macroeconomic and structural conditions of 
the host economy. Harmful heard behaviours can be mitigated to 
some extent by better information disclosure.  
 Sequencing of capital account liberalisation: While capital account 
liberalisation provides emerging market economies with substantial 
benefits, it can be costly if the macroeconomic supervisory policy 
framework is weak or if the domestic financial corporate sectors are 
not able to manage risks prudently. For the right “sequencing” of 
capital account liberalisation, the country in question must first 
establish a resilient and robust domestic financial system, by 
ensuring adequate capitalisation, loan-loss provisions, risk 
management practices, and disclosure and accounting standards.  
 International support with private sector involvement: If a currency 
crisis results from illiquidity, and not insolvency, internationally 
coordinated liquidity support to the crisis country can be justified in 
order both to prevent the crisis from becoming unnecessarily severe 
and to limit the contagion to other countries. When support is 
provided by international financial institutions, it is essential to “bail 
in” private foreign creditors through debt restricting, including 
standstills, rollover agreements, maturity extensions, and possibly 
interest or debt reductions.  
 Regional financial corporation: Because a capital account crisis is 
often regional in character, simultaneously affecting several 
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economies in the same regions, a cooperative framework for regional 
financial management can become useful. First, regional surveillance 
places peer pressure on each country to pursue macroeconomic and 
structural policies that reduce the risk of crisis and contagion. Second, 
a regional financial facility can supplement global sources of 
international liquidity. Third, choosing mutually consistent exchange 
rate arrangements is desirable, when the economies are 
interdependent. This process may entail coordinated efforts to ensure 
intra-regional exchange rate stability. Forth, while mobilising fiscal 
resources is essential to quickly resolving the crisis, the resources 
may be limited by the lack of fiscal headroom or constraints on 
external financing on market terms. Regionally concerted action to 
mobilise such resources, particularly from the core countries in the 
region, would contribute greatly to crisis resolution.
142
       
 
In the late 1990s, the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s view on the 
effectiveness of the capital control was influenced by the experience of 
Malaysia. The Malaysian capital controls were introduced in September 
1998 at the height of the crisis aimed at restricting portfolio capital 
outflows and eliminating offshore ringgit activities. Portfolio investors 
were restricted from repatriating funds invested in Malaysia for at least one 
year, and the offshore trading of ringgit was prohibited. As the economy 
began to stabilise, however, controls on portfolio outflows were eased and 
eventually removed. The 12 month holding period restriction on portfolio 
capital was replaced by a two-tier. Price-based exist system in February 
1999, which was further eased and simplified in September 1999 and 
February 2001, and finally eliminated in May 2001. In short, the Malaysian 
authorities introduced a set of complex but selective capital controls and a 
pegged exchange rate regime in September 1998. The purpose was to 
eliminate any room for private investors to take speculative positions 
against the ringgit through restrictions on all international financial 
transactions unrelated to trade and foreign direct investments. They 
effectively closed the offshore market, cut off ringgit credit to foreigners 
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and put a 12 month moratorium on the repatriation of portfolio capital.
143
  
 
The elements of the controls can be summarised as follows:
144
       
 
 Imposition of a 12 month holding period restriction on repatriation of 
the proceeds from sale of Malaysian securities held in external 
accounts; 
 Mandatory repatriation of all ringgit held abroad; 
 Restriction on transfers of funds between external accounts; 
 Limits on transport of ringgit by travellers;  
 Prohibition of resident-to-nonresident credit arrangements; 
 Prohibition of trade settlement in ringgit; 
 Prohibition of resident-to-nonresident offer side swaps and similar 
hedge transactions; and  
 Freezing of transactions in Malaysian shares traded at Singapore’s 
Central Limit Order Book over-the-counter market.  
  
The primary objectives of the controls, especially the suspension of 
repatriation non-resident investments in ringgit-denominated financial 
assets for a 12 month period and prohibition of ringgit trading in offshore 
markets, together with the pegging of exchange rate, were, to enhance 
monetary autonomy, thereby facilitating economic recovery and providing 
breathing space for the implementation of structural reforms. By de-linking 
monetary policy from exchange rate movements, the authorities allowed 
interest rates to decline without inducing further capital flight and a sharp 
depreciation of the ringgit. They maintained that the controls would be 
removed once stability returned to financial markets and an appropriate 
global regulatory framework governing international capital flows was in 
place.       
 
The imposition of outflow controls put an immediate and virtually 
complete stop to offshore ringgit trading, curtailed speculative capital 
outflows, and allowed interest rates to be reduced substantially. At the same 
time, under the umbrella of the capital controls, the authorities pursued 
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bank and corporate restricting and achieved strong economic recovery in 
1999 and 2000. With the restoration of economic and financial stability, 
administrative controls on portfolio outflows were replaced by a two-tier, 
price-based exit system in February 1999, which was finally eliminated in 
May 2001.  
 
In terms of the benefits of capital controls, two benefits of controls on 
capital outflows in Malaysia were identified. First, they represented a 
national safeguard against further turbulence in international financial 
markets and ensured greater policy autonomy – in lowering interest rates. 
At the time the controls were introduced, the Malaysian currency and 
equity markets were highly volatile, and it was uncertain whether financial 
instability in the region was likely to intensify or abate. In this sense, the 
controls together with the pegging of the ringgit contained currency 
speculation and provided a degree of certainty to market participants. 
Second, the capital controls provided breathing space to pursue economic 
adjustment and to accelerate the structural reforms necessary for sustained 
economic recovery. Arguably the controls provided a margin of safety by 
insulating the economy from further potential shocks and allowed these 
critical programmes to be launched with greater confidence.
145
   
 
On the negative side, the imposition of controls did have cots created 
uncertainty for foreign investors and eroded their confidence. First, 
international rating agencies downgraded Malaysia’s sovereign risk and 
credit ratings, immediately and substantially widening the spreads on 
sovereign debt in September 1998. While the spreads rose for almost all 
emerging economies following the Russian default in August 1998, the 
widening of the Malaysian spreads – about 300 basis points – was much 
larger than those for Thailand, Korea and the Philippines. Following the 
February 1999 shift to a system of exit levies, the spreads declined 
significantly, though lagging behind those of the other countries by about 
two months. Hence, the controls had only a transitory adverse effect on 
Malaysia’s access to international capital markets. Second, despite the 
explicit exemption of FDI from controls and the institution of a more 
liberal regime in July 1998, FDI declined during 1999-2000 to less than 
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half the pre-crisis level.
146
  
 
In the overall assessment by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the 
Malaysian capital controls had a generally positive effect. First, they 
provided a safeguard against possible further disturbance for a country that 
opted not to seek IMF assistance and created breathing space for pursuing 
necessary structural reforms. The authorities made significant progress in 
financial and corporate sector restructuring through pushing ahead with the 
regulatory and supervisory reforms needed for a stronger financial sector 
and a resilient capital market. Essentially, the authorities did not use the 
capital controls as a substitute for the needed restructuring and reform 
measures. Second, it was clear that the authorities exerted the strongest 
possible effort to make the capital controls a temporary measure, to 
disseminate information about the controls and their subsequent revisions, 
and to clarify misunderstandings. A clear signal of what was to be expected 
was provided to market participants by the announcement, made well ahead 
of time, to make a shift in the control regime to a system of exit levies and 
to terminate much of the controls. The perception that the controls were 
temporary helped to maintain market confidence, thus preventing large 
capital outflows from taking place. To be sure, not all the subsequent 
recovery of the Malaysian economy can be attributed to the capital control 
regimes. However, the Malaysian experience does suggest that the use of 
capital controls has its place in the policy instruments, to be used within the 
context of a policy framework and circumstances specific to the country in 
question. It appears that the costs of the controls were kept modest by 
careful and comprehensive design and execution, although the benefits may 
also have been equally modest.
147
  
       
In the IMF’s analysis in 2000, they concluded that the while capital 
controls appeared to have provided a breathing space in which to 
implement more fundamental policy reforms such as prudent 
macroeconomic policies, rapid progress in financial sector reform, the 
results of capital controls achieved so far do not seem to have come without 
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costs. In their findings: 
  
 Although domestic business viewed positively the relatively 
greater stability of the ringgit and faster cuts in interest rates 
that were facilitated in part by the controls, the reaction of 
international financial markets has been more negative.  
 The confidence of international investors in Malaysia has 
weakened relative to other countries in the region.  
 The cost of funding from foreign sources has increased, 
foreign direct investment continues to be relatively weak, and 
the strict implementation of the controls imposed significant 
administrative costs on investors, commercial banks, and the 
authorities.
148
  
 
The IMF analysis on China and India provided interesting examples in the 
context of how capital controls could be effective in preventing financial 
crises from damaging domestic economies. In the IMF analysis in 2000, 
they concluded that China and India were less affected by the Asian crisis 
of 1997-1998 than other countries in the region and the relatively closed 
capital account regimes of these two countries have been credited with 
helping to limit vulnerability to financial contagion. It admitted that both 
India and China experienced only a minor slowdown in their strong growth 
and the impact of the crisis on their financial system was limited. China 
was able to maintain the de facto peg of its currency to the US dollar. India 
continued to follow a flexible exchange rate policy.
149
   
 
In the IMF’s assessment, long-standing and extensive controls on capital 
transactions may have had some role in reducing the vulnerability in terms 
of helping shift the composition of capital inflows toward long-term flows, 
but not a crucial role. In their view, other factors such as a strong external 
position with ample foreign exchange reserves, larger sizes of the domestic 
markets, relatively weak trade and financial linkages with the rest of the 
world compared with the other countries in the region, relatively earlier 
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stages of financial market development, a lower level of financial 
intermediation by the banking systems, have played a role as well in 
reducing their financial vulnerability. In both India and China, enforcement 
of the controls was facilitated by strong administrative capacity.
150
  
 
In conclusion, the IMF review in 2000 illustrated the difficulty of precisely 
assessing the effects of capital controls, which may have benefits as well as 
costs. While they partially admitted that capital controls was effective in 
realising their intended objectives of reducing the ringgit’s 
internationalisation and helping contain capital outflows by eliminating the 
offshore ringgit market and by restricting the outflows of capital by 
residents and non-residents. It stressed that capital controls cannot 
substitute for sound macroeconomic policies and countries with serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and no credible prospect for improvement in 
the short run were regularly unable to address large-scale capital flows, or 
their adverse economic effective, with capital controls. In their analysis, it 
was difficult to disentangle the contribution of capital controls in achieving 
a certain objective, and more flexible exchange rate policies, prudential 
policies and liberalisation of outflows (in case of excessive inflows) were 
some of the policies that have been employed in conjunction with capital 
controls.        
        
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a large number of advanced nations 
moved slowly toward reducing the degree of exchange rate flexibility. The 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System, with 
its narrow plus and minus 2.25 per cent bands, represented the 
institutionalisation of a system of limited flexibility. It was thought that by 
reducing the extent to which nominal exchange rate could fluctuate it was 
possible to combine the best features of purely floating and purely fixed 
exchange rate regime. The crisis of the ERM in 1993 introduced, however, 
very serious doubts of the desirability of fixed exchange rates in a world 
with a very high degree of capital mobility.
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As the presence of the Chinese economy increased in the international trade 
and financial system, the Chinese authorities took an incremental approach 
towards increased flexibility of their currency. On 21 July 2005, China 
allowed the Chinese renminbi to appreciate 2.1 per cent discretely and 
announced that it was moving to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
This incremental process of appreciation against the US dollar has been a 
core of the China’s financial diplomacy as the China’s current account 
surplus has kept remaining substantial. In July 2008 just before the global 
financial crisis deepened, the Chinese authority announced that they would 
go back to the de facto US dollar-peg exchange system, which last almost 
two years until June 2010.      
 
The shift of the Chinese currency regime towards a basket currency regime 
was broadly in line with what Japan called on other Asian countries to 
introduce in the paper which they worked on with the French government 
as a part of preparation of the ASEM meeting in 2000. The nature of the 
currency issue in the international financial system along with the increased 
presence of the Chinese economy made the increased flexibility of the 
Chinese currency more an issue of the international financial system, rather 
than that of only the Asian regional financial cooperation. In the late 1990s 
when there was an increased momentum and call on the need for closer 
regional cooperation, the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s financial 
diplomacy was not primarily oriented towards the Asian regional 
cooperation.  
           
In retrospect, however, the financial diplomacy of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance has continued to be oriented towards the policy coordination in the 
international financial system. The regional cooperation has not been seen 
as a goal to be achieved independently from international policy 
coordination, but rather a goal which needs to be compatible with the 
broader goal of the policy coordination in the international financial 
framework including the G7 until the financial crisis in 2008, in particular.            
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Chapter 3: Globalisation of financial and fiscal policies and new form of 
international policy coordination   
 
 
3-1   New form of international policy coordination from macroeconomic 
policy to financial regulation and fiscal codes  
 
The Asian Financial Crisis provided the impetus for the new form of 
international coordination to contain and resolve the financial crisis by 
reforming the institutions, structures and policies underpinning the 
international financial crisis. The general trends of international financial 
liberalisation and growing international capital flows are largely inevitable 
and irreversible. The rapid development of information and communication 
technologies has made it far more difficult to restrict the financial 
transactions in which market participants engage. Controls on international 
transactions have run the risk of ending up with being is distortionary. On 
the other hand, policy makers were increasingly aware that the general 
trends of financial liberalisation and growing international capital flows do 
not mean that capital account liberalisation must be embraced before 
financial institutions developed their risk-management practices and 
supervisors have strengthened their oversight of financial institutions. 
 
Capital markets are characterised by information asymmetries that can give 
rise to overshooting sharp corrections, and in the extreme financial crisis. 
In a world of integrating financial markets partly due to technological 
development and growing capital flows, stabilising the financial system 
ultimately requires institutional reforms extending well beyond policies 
towards external trade and payments. It also requires domestic financial 
stability by imposing a certain level of disclosure requirements and 
effective supervision of financial institutions and corporations borrowing 
on financial markets through the use of internationally recognised auditing 
and accounting practices so that lenders can accurately assess the financial 
conditions of financial institutions and corporations to which they lend. It 
extends to investor protection laws to prevent insider trading market 
manipulation, fair and prompt corporate bankruptcy procedures.                  
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In the 1998 G7 summit, the Finance Minister of G7 countries presented the 
report on strengthening the architecture of the global financial system. In 
this report, the G7 finance ministers identified the need for action in five 
key areas:  
 Enhanced transparency;  
 Helping countries prepare for integration into the global economy 
and for free global capital flows;  
 Strengthening national financial systems;  
 Ensuring that the private sector takes responsibility for its lending 
decisions; and   
 Enhancing further the role of the International Financial Institutions 
and co-operation between them. 
 
The report was followed in the introduction part as follows:  
 
4. Broad based prosperity and growth require financial institutions, 
commercial enterprises and entrepreneurial individuals that are prepared 
to take risks. Risk inevitably involves the possibility of failure. We could not 
and should not seek to eliminate failure entirely, rather large financial 
systems need to be robust enough to accommodate the occasional failure 
and to contain risks which might threaten the whole financial system. And 
borrowers and lenders, be they governments, companies or individuals 
should be responsible for their decisions and actions. The principles and 
measures set out below are designed to help meet these objectives.  
 
5. This report focuses on a range of areas where specific changes could 
help prevent and handle future crises. This focus should not undermine the 
important message that, as far as individual countries are concerned, the 
pursuit of sound economic policies that promote sustainable broad based 
non-inflationary growth is the most important single contribution to 
avoiding a crisis. And when countries implement an IMF supported reform 
programme, their commitment to and ownership of the programme is 
crucial to its success. Sound policies need to tackle structural economic 
issues so that sufficient provision is made for the poorest sections of society 
and other vulnerable groups, development is sustainable and living and 
working standards for all are improved. This is also key to securing the 
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support needed for successful economic reform. In this respect we also 
encourage the IMF and MDBs to work with the ILO to promote core labour 
standards and with the competent international institutions to promote 
sound environmental standards. (underlined by the author)  
      
Strengthening National Financial Systems and Corporate Governance  
 
14. Weaknesses in the financial sectors in some Asian countries increased 
their vulnerability to external shocks. These weaknesses included 
over-extended lending to the property sector, the build up of large 
off-balance sheet positions, excessive exposure to highly leveraged 
borrowers, policy directed loans and excessive reliance on short-term 
borrowing in foreign currency. Had information about these developments 
been more widely available earlier, the international markets and 
International Financial Institutions might have been better placed to assess 
the risks in Asia and elsewhere. The crisis also highlighted weaknesses in 
risk assessment in our own financial sectors. Some institutions paid 
inadequate attention to risks. There is therefore a need for strengthened 
mechanisms to ensure appropriate risk analysis. This points to the need for 
enhanced international surveillance and improved prudential standards, 
and to the need to encourage internationally active financial institutions to 
act prudently on available information.  
 
 Supervisors, co-operating at Basle and elsewhere, should work to 
encourage private sector financial institutions to adopt better 
systems in private sector financial institutions for country risk 
assessment.  
 We need to continue to improve the supervision of large 
internationally active financial groups. A separate G7 report on 
financial stability addresses the need to improve co-operation and 
information sharing between national supervisors on the activities of 
such groups.  
 Supervisors and regulators should consider how best to encourage 
individual banks and their supervisors to monitor the adequacy of 
foreign currency liquidity (maturity of liabilities in relation to assets) 
separately from domestic currency liquidity.  
 160 
 
15. A primary need is to encourage countries to strengthen their own 
financial systems, to ensure that banks and other financial intermediaries 
have the information, skills and corporate incentives to take well founded 
credit and risk decisions, and are properly supervised and regulated; that 
corporate and financial sectors follow good accounting, disclosure and 
auditing practices; and to promote deeper, more transparent and more 
open local bond and equity markets that will provide alternative sources of 
finance to short-term foreign currency bank borrowing.  
 
 In addition to the core principles for banking supervision, we also 
need to develop internationally accepted principles for auditing, 
accounting and disclosure in the corporate sector, together with 
arrangements for ensuring that these principles are put into practice.  
 We also welcome the OECD's initiative to develop standards and 
guidelines on corporate governance, and to report by Spring 1999.  
 
16. Strong efforts are needed to ensure that sound and transparent 
standards are implemented. While this is primarily a matter for the national 
authorities concerned, incentives need to be put in place that will help 
deliver this. The primary incentive is the need for emerging markets to 
maintain confidence in order to access capital market. In addition:  
 
 The Fund has taken steps to sharpen the focus of its surveillance of 
the financial sector, for example during Article IV consultations. We 
encourage the Fund to build on this in collaboration with the 
supervisors, and to promote the Basle Committee Core Principles on 
Effective Banking Supervision. Similarly we encourage the World 
Bank to strengthen its reviews of countries' financial sector policies 
and corporate governance, and highlight these issues in its Country 
Assistance Strategies.  
 Further consideration should be given to how incentives to adopt, 
within a reasonable period of time, the core principles of financial 
supervision could be strengthened for example by making access by 
foreign financial institutions to major financial centres conditional in 
part on the implementation of adequate prudential and regulatory 
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standards in their home countries.  
 We encourage the World Bank and regional development banks to 
help foster transparent markets, open to all well founded financial 
institutions, skilled management, independent banks able to make 
professional credit and risk decisions, and market structures that 
support these objectives.  
 
17. There is a gap in the current international system with respect to 
surveillance of countries' financial supervisory and regulatory systems. 
Enhanced surveillance in this area would help encourage national 
authorities to meet international standards and help reduce financial risk. 
Such assessments of supervision and regulation can lay the groundwork for 
policy discussions and appropriate assistance, where needed, from the IMF 
and MDBs for programmes to strengthen financial systems. We need to 
address how best to organise international work in this and related areas. A 
number of international institutions are involved in various aspects of 
policy advice in the regulation of national financial systems. Their 
functions include assistance at times of financial crisis, long-term systems 
building and regular surveillance. There is a case for considering how to 
co-ordinate this work more effectively.  
 
 The International Financial Institutions and international regulatory 
bodies have an important role to play in providing technical 
assistance and advice to emerging markets on strengthening and 
restructuring financial systems. The World Bank has enhanced its 
capacity to provide advice on financial sector development, through 
the establishment of the Special Financial Operations Unit (SFOU) 
to provide assistance to crisis countries. Also the Basle Committee 
and the Bank for International Settlements have established an 
institute for financial stability at Basle.  
 We see an urgent need for a system of multilateral surveillance of 
national financial, supervisory and regulatory systems. This could 
encompass surveillance of such areas as banking and securities 
supervision, corporate governance, accounting and disclosure, and 
bankruptcy. We are considering ways, and ask the relevant 
institutions to develop proposals on ways, in which greater 
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co-operation can be achieved including options for institutional 
reform. In any event, this will include greater co-operation and an 
improved relationship among all these institutions, and drawing on 
national regulatory expertise. We will review progress on this 
important area by the autumn.  
 
The G7 Finance Ministers made clear that the focus would be to help not 
only handle but also prevent future crisis. In the context of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, they drew the conclusion that Asian Financial Crisis 
pointed to the need to strengthen the capabilities of financial regulators to 
assess risks in financial sectors and also the need for enhanced international 
surveillance and improved prudential standards. In terms of the need for 
safety net, the report struck a delicate balance not to undermine the role of 
IMF, without clearly mentioning the regional framework except the 
potential usefulness of bilateral financing to the extent that it is compatible 
with. The FSF was created in February 1999 to promote international 
financial stability through enhanced information exchange and international 
cooperation in financial market supervision and surveillance. One example 
of a series of renewed efforts to take coordinated efforts was the 
establishment of Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The FSF was established 
to bring together, on a regular basis, national authorities responsible for 
financial stability in significant international financial centres, international 
financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators 
and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The Forum was 
serviced by a secretariat housed at the BIS.             
 
IFI Resources and Financing  
 
21. The response of the IMF and World Bank to the Asian crisis has 
confirmed their role at the centre of the international financial system. The 
Asian Development Bank has also played a crucial part in responding to 
the crisis. However, this has involved an unprecedented level of new 
commitments for the IMF and other International Financial Institutions. 
We need to address the increased demand on resources:  
 
 To enable the IMF to play its central role in the international 
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monetary system, it is essential to implement from January 1999 the 
increase in quotas as agreed under the IMF's recent Quota Review in 
order to ensure the IMF has sufficient usable resources. It is also 
essential to bring the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) into effect 
as soon as possible. We welcome the creation of the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF).  
 
22. The Asian crisis also demonstrated that in special circumstances 
bilateral financing can provide a source of additional financing for balance 
of payments:  
 
 It will be important to ensure that bilateral financing is developed in 
conjunction with the IMF, is consistent with the IMF response and 
does not undermine IMF conditionality.  
 
23. We have suggested a number of ways to enhance the role of the IMF 
and World Bank.  
 
 It will be important to consider whether the distribution of staff and 
resources needs to be adjusted to address the new priorities.  
 Closer co-operation between the Bank and Fund will be particularly 
important to avoid overlap and maximise use of expertise. 
 
Against the background of increased awareness of the need to take a 
coordinated approach about crisis prevention, Japan continued to take a 
supportive approach as a part of the G7. In spite of some argument that 
Japan intended to build a regional block again the US-led Washington 
based international financial organisations, Japan did not opt out from the 
G7-led discussion and but rather took more supportive and assertive 
approach towards the global efforts to reform the international financial 
architecture. A set of Japan’s arguments was well summarised at then 
Japanese finance minister (Kiichi Miyazawa)’s speech at the IMFC 
(International Monetary and Financial Committee) in April 2000.  
    
Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s remark at the IMFC in April 2000   
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4. Responses to vulnerability to crisis  
 
Japan has made various proposals about policies that emerging markets 
need to pursue in order to reduce their vulnerability to crisis: (1) capital 
account liberalization needs to be carried out in a well-sequenced manner; 
(2) more detailed data of capital inflows and outflows need to be collected 
in order to strengthen the monitoring of capital movements; (3) domestic 
financial systems, including appropriate supervisory and regulatory 
systems need to be strengthened; (4) appropriate exchange rate regimes 
must be adopted in accordance with countries' particular situations; and 
(5) capital controls, though they should not be a substitute for sound 
macroeconomic and structural policy, may be helpful in certain cases. 
Many of these proposals are becoming part of an international consensus.  
 
As to issues concerning creditors, Japan has proposed for several years 
that: (1) disclosure and risk management of market participants, including 
highly leveraged institutions (HLIs) such as hedge funds, should be 
strengthened; (2) risk management by the counterparties to hedge funds 
and supervision by the authorities on those counterparties should be 
strengthened; and (3) emerging economies should adopt appropriate 
defensive policies and maintain the integrity of their markets. For example, 
monitoring by the authorities of emerging economies should be intensified 
when markets are being influenced by the activities of investors such as 
hedge funds.  
 
These Japanese proposals are reflected in the final report of the Financial 
Stability Forum's Working Group on HLIs, and we believe that, first of all, 
it is important that the recommendations of that report are fully 
implemented. We also wish to emphasize that the international community 
should keep a close watch on the conduct of international investors such as 
HLIs, and that we should continue to explore what measures are needed, 
including some type of direct controls. 
         
As was clearly mentioned in their finance minister’s remark, Japan pushed 
the agenda of highly leveraged institutions like hedge funds with priority. 
The issue was timely especially given the collapse of the Long Term 
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Capital Management (LTCM) in the financial turmoil. It raised the 
concerns about the potential systemic risks posed by highly leveraged 
institutions and the spill-over effects from financial crises like the Asian 
Financial Crisis and the Russian Crisis, where highly leveraged institutions 
raised the concerns of destabilising impacts on the financial markets. In 
more detail, there were two key issues identified in the LTCM episode. The 
first issue is concerned with how best to address the systemic risks arising 
from the accumulation of high levels of leverage in financial markets. The 
second is concerned with how to reduce the potential market and economic 
impact of the sudden and disorderly collapse of an unregulated highly 
leveraged institution. In the market conditions of late 1998, the disorderly 
liquidation of a hedge fund as large and as leveraged as LTCM could also 
have imposed substantial direct losses on its counterparties. Significant 
secondary losses could have been imposed on other firms, through the 
rapid liquidation and closing out of LTCM’s positions and the collateral 
supporting its funding. The potential widespread disruption in financial 
markets and possible collapse of some major firms would have posed grave 
dangers to the stability of the financial system and the health of the global 
economy.                                        
 
In terms of the wording of communique of G7 Finance Ministers, there was 
still much emphasis on macroeconomic policy coordination, notably 
exchange rate policy coordination, but was increasing awareness of the 
need to call for financial safeguards measures including financial regulation 
in international financial markets. For example, in the G7 Finance 
Ministers report to the Heads of State and Governments in Lyon on 28 June 
1996, the overall aim of the policy coordination was defined as to promote 
non-inflationary growth with the remaining shadow of the Mexican crisis 
in 1995.         
 
In our discussions in Halifax last year we concluded, more specifically, 
that:  
 the most important foundation for exchange rate stability is the 
maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies aimed at 
achieving sustained non-inflationary growth and avoiding the 
emergence of large external or internal imbalances;  
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 flexibility in exchange rates of the major currencies is a basic 
feature of the system because unanticipated events occur, 
economic fundamentals change, and national financial and 
economic developments are sufficiently different that they require 
that policies be able to respond to them;  
 
 exchange market intervention can be effective and even decisive 
in specific circumstances, but those circumstances are difficult to 
determine in advance;  
 
 there is no effective regulatory structure or tax mechanism that 
will produce greater exchange rate stability without major costs 
in terms of other economic objectives.  
 
These conclusions remain valid today. Our overriding objective is to 
promote sustained non-inflationary growth. In this context, the G7 can best 
promote greater stability in exchange markets through the pursuit of 
appropriate macroeconomic policies along with close cooperation in the 
exchange markets where appropriate. (underlined by the author)  
 
For the past two decades, the international monetary system has been 
based on a flexible exchange rate system among major currencies. There 
are circumstances when it is appropriate to allow exchange rates among 
major currencies to fluctuate rather than to adjust monetary and fiscal 
policies in a manner inconsistent with the needs of the economy. 
 
Experience since 1973 suggests that major exchange rate adjustments have 
been caused by clearly identifiable changes or distortions in the underlying 
economic fundamentals or in macroeconomic policies. Efforts to preserve 
an exchange rate that is inconsistent with underlying fundamentals are 
likely to introduce distortions to and constraints on central instruments of 
economic management. At the same time, financial authorities cannot be 
indifferent to exchange rate fluctuations that do not appear justified on the 
basis of macro-economic policies or fundamentals and as a consequence 
could adversely affect output or prices. There are circumstances where 
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close cooperation in exchange markets can reinforce sound economic 
policies and enhance stability in exchange markets. 
 
The G7 has an important responsibility in promoting an effective and stable 
monetary system by advancing policies that will strengthen our capacity to 
manage risk and prevent crises and improve our ability to respond to such 
events when they occur. Towards this objective, we have adopted a number 
of initiatives over the past several years and improvements were initiated at 
Halifax. This paper reviews the main initiatives, and proposes, where 
appropriate, further improvements. 
 
Continuing G7 close cooperation in exchange markets  
 
Exchange rate misalignments can heighten uncertainty in the global 
economy and can be detrimental to growth and trade. When exchange rates 
appear to move out of line with underlying fundamentals, close monitoring 
is necessary and coordinated responses may be required.  
 
The "orderly reversal" in key exchange rates since April 1995 is a positive 
and promising development. Several factors lie behind it. Most important 
were changes in economic policies and fundamentals, but the signals given 
to the markets by the G7 in 1995, through communiqués and - under 
appropriate circumstances - concerted intervention, were helpful in 
providing impetus to bringing exchange rates better in line with 
fundamental trends.  
 
We should continue our close cooperation in exchange markets on this 
foundation, taking into account the fact that:  
 
 clear and consistent articulation of a common G7 view can have a 
stabilizing influence and help reinforce the credibility of our 
commitment to cooperate in the exchange market when 
circumstances warrant;  
 interventions can be effective in certain circumstances, especially 
when they reinforce changes in policies and/or underlying 
fundamentals that lead to changes in market expectations about 
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future exchange rates;  
 the instrument of intervention must be used judiciously given its 
implications for monetary policy and the amount that the authorities 
can mobilize relative to the size of international capital markets. 
Nevertheless, these factors do not impede our joint ability to send a 
clear message to the markets, if and when appropriate;  
 interventions are more likely to be effective when they are concerted 
and reflect a common assessment;  
 an important condition for success is the appropriate timing of 
intervention.    
      
The communique at the G7 Halifax Summit in 1995 well illustrated the 
argument which the then G7 discussion was based on. Against the 
background of the 1995 Mexico crisis, there was a broad consensus that 
economic policy should be geared towards promoting non-inflationary 
growth by avoiding large external and internal imbalance. More emphasis 
was put on how to avoid inflationary and depreciating pressure leading to 
exchange rate instability caused by fiscal and current account imbalance.  
 
But, it should be also noted that the G7 Finance Ministers report to the 
Heads of State and Governments in Lyon on 28 June 1996 called for more 
cooperation between the bank and securities regulatory bodies on 
derivatives to promote improved risk management, a common reporting 
framework and improved disclosure practices through strengthening the 
relationship between the Basle Committee and IOSCO. The risks 
associated with derivative transactions were increasingly made aware by 
national regulatory authorities following the collapse of Bearing Bank in 
1995.                       
 
(Excerpt from Harifax G7 Summit Communique in June 1995)  
 
Strengthening the Global Economy 
 
12. The world economy has changed beyond all recognition over the last 
fifty years. The process of globalization, driven by technological change, 
has led to increased economic interdependence: this applies to some policy 
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areas seen previously as purely domestic, and to interactions between 
policy areas. The major challenge confronting us is to manage this 
increased interdependence while working with the grain of markets, and 
recognizing the growing number of important players. This is especially 
important in the pursuit of global macroeconomic and financial stability. 
 
13. Close consultation and effective cooperation on macroeconomic 
policies among the G7 are important elements in promoting sustained 
non-inflationary growth avoiding the emergence of large external and 
internal imbalances, and promoting greater exchange market stability. Our 
Ministers have adopted a number of changes to the structure of their 
consultations over time, in order to strengthen policy cooperation, 
including enhanced consultation with the IMF. (underlined by the author)  
 
14. The growth and integration of global capital markets have created both 
enormous opportunities and new risks. We have a shared interest in 
ensuring the international community remains able to manage the risks 
inherent in the growth of private capital flows, the increased integration of 
domestic capital markets, and the accelerating pace of financial 
innovation. 
 
15. The developments in Mexico earlier this year and their repercussions 
have sharpened our focus on these issues. We welcome the recent more 
positive turn of events in Mexico, as well as the positive developments in a 
number of emerging economies. 
 
16. The prevention of crisis is the preferred course of action. This is best 
achieved through each country pursuing sound fiscal and monetary 
policies. But it also requires an improved early warning system, so that we 
can act more quickly to prevent or handle financial shocks. Such a system 
must include improved and effective surveillance of national economic 
policies and financial market developments, and fuller disclosure of this 
information to market participants. To this end, we urge the IMF to 
(underlined by the author): 
 
 establish benchmarks for the timely publication of key economic and 
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financial data; 
 establish a procedure for the regular public identification of 
countries which comply within these benchmarks; 
 insist on full and timely reporting by member countries of standard 
sets of data, provide sharper policy advice to all governments, and 
deliver franker messages to countries that appear to be avoiding 
necessary actions. 
 
17. If prevention fails, financial market distress requires that multilateral 
institutions and major economies be able to respond where appropriate in a 
quick and coordinated fashion. Financing mechanisms must operate on a 
scale and with the timeliness required to manage shocks effectively. In this 
context, we urge the IMF to: 
 
 establish a new standing procedure--"Emergency Financing 
Mechanism"-- which would provide faster access to Fund 
arrangements with strong conditionality and larger upfront 
disbursements in crisis situations. 
 
18. To support this procedure, we ask: 
 
 the G10 and other countries with the capacity to support the system 
to develop financing arrangements with the objective of doubling as 
soon as possible the amount currently available under the GAB to 
respond to financial emergencies. 
 
19. To ensure that IMF has sufficient resources to meet its ongoing 
responsibilities, we urge continued discussions on a new IMF quota review. 
 
20. Solid progress on the elements discussed above should significantly 
improve our ability to cope with future financial crises. Nevertheless, these 
improvements may not be sufficient in all cases. In line with this, and 
recognizing the complex legal and other issues posed in debt crisis 
situations by the wide variety of sources of international finance involved, 
we would encourage further review by G-10 Ministers and Governors of 
other procedures that might also usefully be considered for their orderly 
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resolution. 
 
21. We continue to support the inclusion of all IMF members in the SDR 
system. Moreover, we urge the IMF to initiate a broad review of the role 
and functions of the SDR in light of changes in the world financial system. 
 
22. Closer international cooperation in the regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and markets is essential to safeguard the financial 
system and prevent an erosion of prudential standards. We urge: 
 
 a deepening of cooperation among regulators and supervisory 
agencies to ensure an effective and integrated approach, on a global 
basis, to developing and enhancing the safeguards, standards, 
transparency and systems necessary to monitor and contain risks; 
 continued encouragement to countries to remove capital market 
restrictions, coupled with strengthened policy advice from 
international financial institutions on the appropriate supervisory 
structures; 
 Finance ministers to commission studies and analysis from the 
international organizations responsible for banking and securities 
regulations and to report on the adequacy of current arrangements, 
together with proposals for improvement where necessary, at the next 
Summit. 
 
23. We also recognize that international financial fraud is a growing 
problem. We are committed to improving communication between 
regulators and law enforcement agencies.      
      
Excerpt from G7 Finance Ministers’ report to the G7 Summit in Lyon in 
1996   
                
Better prudential safeguards in international financial markets (underlined 
by the author)  
 
The globalisation of financial markets and the substantial increase in 
cross-border capital flows have created a more complex financial 
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environment. Comprehensive and effective financial regulation, 
market-reinforced prudential supervision and enhanced international 
cooperation among regulators are among the keystones for maintaining 
stability of the international financial and monetary system.  
 
Industrial countries have been cooperating in the development of 
prudential frameworks for many years. The BIS/Basle Committees have 
taken important steps to develop international standards for prudential 
supervision of banks and to strengthen payments and settlements systems 
which link international markets. IOSCO has undertaken similar work for 
prudential regulation of securities firms and markets. In recent years, 
banking and securities regulators have increased their contacts at the 
international level to address supervisory concerns that cut across markets.  
 
We recognise the substantial recent and ongoing cooperative work between 
the Basle and IOSCO Committees on derivatives to promote improved risk 
management, a common reporting framework and improved disclosure 
practices.  
 
We welcome the publication in December 1995 of the Basle Committee 
capital adequacy standards for bank's exposure to market risk, which will 
be a very useful complement to existing prudential ratios.  
 
Nevertheless, the changes in the structure of global finance and the 
emergence of new participants and markets require the supervisory 
response, including international cooperation, to evolve continually. We 
welcome the Basle and IOSCO Committees' reports on prudential 
regulation and supervisory cooperation. These reports should pave the way 
for continuing progress on current initiatives and expanding efforts in the 
following directions: 
  
 Enhance cooperation across markets to strengthen supervision of 
financial institutions. In this context, we welcome the joint efforts of 
the Basle and IOSCO Committees to enhance their collaborative 
arrangements and the work of the Joint Forum of banks, securities 
and insurance supervisors. Suitable arrangements should be 
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established within which that cooperation can be better organised. It 
would be useful to clarify the role and responsibilities of the relevant 
supervisors to foster an appropriate degree of cooperation in the 
supervision of internationally-active financial institutions, and to 
establish a more comprehensive network of bilateral arrangements 
between authorities.  
 
 Strengthen prudential standards in, and supervisory cooperation 
with, emerging markets. Effective prudential regulation and 
supervision must cover all important financial marketplaces, 
particularly those which are experiencing high growth rates and/or 
substantial capital flows. The Basle and IOSCO Committees are 
performing work in this area which reinforces bilateral and regional 
efforts underway. Because emerging markets are growing in 
significance, these Committees, and other appropriate fora should be 
encouraged to strengthen their outreach to and cooperation with 
emerging market supervisors in order to promote high prudential 
standards. The International Financial Institutions should give more 
attention to promoting effective regulatory and supervisory 
structures in emerging markets.  
 
 Encourage private sector efforts to enhance market transparency. 
Notwithstanding past or future regulatory activities, primary 
responsibility for risk management rests with market participants. 
Regulators should encourage - and where necessary exert pressure 
to induce - private sector efforts to enhance market transparency in 
order to strengthen market forces' capacity for sound and 
responsible risk taking and control.  
 
 Improve reporting and disclosure of derivatives activities. Effective 
monitoring of derivatives activities is crucial, and requires closer 
cooperation among supervisors. In this regard, we welcome the 
global market survey conducted in the spring of 1995 by the BIS, and 
the follow-up action which is being planned. We also look forward to 
the conclusion this year of a joint Basle/IOSCO approach to 
reporting standards for derivatives exposure and to further progress 
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in improving derivatives disclosure practices.  
 
 Enhance cooperation among exchanges. We look forward to 
implementation of the recommendations in the Windsor Declaration 
for increasing cooperation among futures exchanges and regulators. 
We also note with approval the development of information sharing 
arrangements among securities exchanges and welcome conclusion 
of an information sharing arrangement among major futures 
exchanges and relevant regulatory authorities. We also look forward 
to the IOSCO study of methods to identify large firm exposures that 
may have an effect on the market and to protect market participants 
from potential defaults by firms.  
 
Strengthening of our collective ability to respond to financial crises  
 
The increased integration of global capital markets, the change in 
magnitude and composition of capital flows, and the increase in the 
diversity and number of creditors and borrowers present new opportunities 
and challenges to the financial system. At Halifax, Heads proposed a range 
of initiatives to strengthen the global financial system, with particular 
attention to the IMF's role. We strongly welcome their implementation:  
 
 Improvement of the early warning system is being implemented: the 
IMF's surveillance capabilities have been enhanced; the IMF has 
established standards for timely publication of economic and 
financial data, and subscription on a voluntary basis is underway.  
 
 In order to better respond to crises, an emergency financing 
mechanism, aiming at faster procedures, has been set up in the IMF.  
 
 We welcome the agreement in principle reached on a doubling of the 
resources currently available to the IMF under the General 
Arrangements to Borrow. These arrangements will include a broader 
group of countries with the capacity to support the international 
monetary system. We welcome this sharing of monetary 
responsibilities, thereby adapting our cooperation to new economic 
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circumstances.  
 
 We welcome the report of the G10 Working Party on the Resolution 
of Sovereign Liquidity Crises.  
 
 We fully support the ongoing 11th review of IMF quotas to ensure 
that the IMF continues to have sufficient resources to meet its 
ongoing responsibilities. We believe it is important for the IMF to 
remain a quota based institution with the resources necessary to 
fulfil its important role in the global financial system             
 
Lyon Summit Economic Communique on 28 June 1996   
 
I. STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COOPERATION 
 
6. Growing international economic interdependence unquestionably 
holds out new opportunities for the entire global community. At the same 
time, it adds to our collective responsibilities and the need for more 
effective cooperation among our countries to face new challenges. 
 
7. Since we met in Halifax, economic developments have been on the 
whole positive and disparities of economic performance among us have 
been narrowing. Canada and United States continue to enjoy sustained 
non-inflationary growth. In Japan, the recovery is gathering strength. Some 
European countries, admittedly, experienced a slowdown, but economic 
fundamentals are improving and we are confident that growth will pick up 
in the second half of the year. 
 
Looking ahead, the economic fundamentals remain sound and well 
oriented: inflation has settled at a low level, the interest rates have come 
down substantially, reaching historically low levels in some of our 
countries and external and internal imbalances have been substantially 
reduced. However, we recognize that some difficulties still lie ahead: public 
deficits and debt remain too large and national savings too low, 
unemployment is still unacceptably high in many countries and despite all 
the progress already achieved in the area of structural reforms, our 
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economies are not yet as resilient and adaptable to changes as they should 
be. 
 
Outside the G7 sphere, economic prospects also look very encouraging. 
Emerging economies are experiencing robust growth. Sound 
macroeconomic policies and progress toward market-based institutions 
have contributed to improving economic performance in many developing 
countries and countries in transition (underlined by the author).  
 
 In this context, our economic policies will continue to be directed at 
sustaining non-inflationary growth. This is a vital prerequisite to the 
creation of jobs and bringing down unemployment. While 
recognizing that our individual circumstances may vary, we share a 
common commitment to a medium-term economic strategy: credible 
fiscal consolidation programs, successful anti-inflationary policies 
and as a consequence low interest rates, and strengthened structural 
reform. These should contribute to investment, growth and job 
creation. Such policies will contribute to reducing external 
imbalances, thereby promoting international monetary stability and 
maintaining the conditions for harmonious growth in global trade 
and business. 
 
9. Sound economic policies are the most important foundation for 
preventing exchange rate misalignment that may heighten uncertainty in 
the global economy and be detrimental to trade and growth. We welcome 
the broad movements in the major currencies since April 1995. These are 
positive and promising developments, and have helped to improve the 
conditions for sustained growth across the G7. We endorse the views of our 
Ministers of Finance on international monetary stability. We request our 
Ministers of Finance to continue to cooperate closely on economic policy 
and in the exchange markets. In this connection, we attach importance to 
the implementation of improved practical measures to deal with risks 
relating to the operation of the global financial markets and we request our 
Ministers to report to the next Summit on this issue. 
 
10. The globalization of the financial markets has contributed to the 
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creation of a more complex financial environment. Better prudential 
regulation and supervision in the financial markets are essential elements 
in preserving the stability of the international monetary and financial 
system. In this respect, we welcome the progress on the strengthening of 
capital standards, including the recent agreement on capital adequacy 
standards for banks' exposure to market risk, improved disclosure and 
enhanced surveillance. 
 
11. Cooperation among regulatory and supervisory authorities should 
continue to adapt to financial innovations, and to the growth in 
cross-border capital movements and internationally-active financial 
institutions. We welcome the work accomplished by the international bodies 
concerned with banking and securities regulation. Over the year ahead, we 
should seek to make maximum progress on the following objectives:  
 
 enhancing cooperation among the authorities responsible for the 
supervision of internationally-active financial institutions, 
importantly by clarifying their roles and responsibilities; 
 
 encouraging stronger risk management and improved transparency 
in the markets and connected activities, especially in the innovative 
markets ;  
 
 encouraging the adoption of strong prudential standards in emerging 
economies and increasing cooperation with their supervisory 
authorities ; international financial institutions and bodies should 
increase their efforts to promote effective supervisory structures in 
these economies. We ask our Finance Ministers in consultation with 
the relevant institutions to report back on this issue at our next 
meeting ; 
 
 studying the implications of the recent technological advances which 
make possible the creation of sophisticated methods for retail 
electronic payments and how to ensure their benefits are fully 
realized. 
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12. The increased integration of global capital markets, the changes in 
magnitude and composition of financial flows, and the increased diversity 
and number of creditors and borrowers present new opportunities and new 
challenges. That is why, in order to promote monetary stability, we 
proposed last year in Halifax a number of measures for the international 
financial system, notably the International Monetary Fund, to strengthen 
the ability to deal effectively with these challenges (underlined by the 
author). 
 
We welcome the work accomplished since the Halifax Summit toward the 
implementation of these proposals. The surveillance capacities of the IMF 
have been enhanced, standards for the provision of economic and financial 
information to the markets have been established and an emergency 
financing mechanism has been created. We welcome the G10 report on 
resolving the liquidity crises of sovereign borrowers. This report 
emphasizes the importance of market discipline, and calls for the 
enhancement of current procedures for handling international financial 
emergencies, in order to minimize the need for official support in the future. 
 
13. Together with the international community as a whole, we 
undertake to ensure that the IMF has the resources needed to perform its 
tasks in the service of international monetary stability:  
 
We welcome the agreement reached on a framework for doubling the 
resources currently available to the IMF under the General Arrangements 
to Borrow in order to respond to financial emergencies. These 
arrangements will include a broader group of countries with the capacity 
to support the international monetary system. We welcome this sharing of 
monetary responsibilities, thereby adapting our cooperation to new 
economic circumstances; 
 
The IMF should remain an institution based on quotas providing the 
resources necessary to accomplish its traditional tasks. Any quotas increase 
should take into account the changes in the economic and financial weight 
of its members. Given the prospective evolution of the Fund's liquidity, we 
request that the 11th quota review be completed as soon as possible 
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(underlined by the author). 
 
14. Lastly, the IMF should continue to reflect on the role of Special 
Drawing Rights within the international monetary system. We continue to 
hope for progress on proposals that would permit all Member countries to 
participate on an equitable basis in the SDR system. We invite the IMF 
Member States to pursue their dialogue in order to settle this issue. 
 
15. As we recognized last year, international financial fraud is a 
growing problem for our financial systems. In order to strengthen the fight 
against this phenomenon, we will continue to look for ways of facilitating, 
as much as possible, the exchange of information on cases involving 
serious financial crime and regulatory abuse between law enforcement 
agencies and regulatory bodies, in accordance with our own domestic legal 
systems and other basic principles. We intend to maintain our dialogue to 
review progress and developments in this field (underlined by the author). 
 
16. Finally, globalization is creating new challenges in the field of tax 
policy. Tax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically 
mobile activities can create harmful tax competition between States, 
carrying risks of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the 
erosion of national tax bases. We strongly urge the OECD to vigorously 
pursue its work in this field, aimed at establishing a multilateral approach 
under which countries could operate individually and collectively to limit 
the extent of these practices. We will follow closely the progress on work by 
the OECD, which is due to produce a report by 1998. We will also follow 
closely the OECD's continuation of its important work on transfer pricing, 
where we warmly endorse the significant progress that the OECD has 
already achieved (underlined by the author). 
 
In the late-1980s where US economy was in the deep trouble characterised 
by the dual deficits of fiscal and trade imbalances, the G7 functioned as the 
forum where the US called for reluctant Japan and Germany to take more 
expansionary measures by keeping interest rates low and taking a series of 
fiscal stimulus programmes in return for the US commitment to reduce its 
budgetary deficits and cooperate with stabilising dollar values.  
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However, as the US economy recovered in the early and mid-1990s, the 
focus of the G7 Finance Ministers meeting was gradually shifting to 
addressing the problems facing globalisation of international financial 
markets, rather than calling for each G7 country to take specific 
macroeconomic measures. In the macroeconomic terms, the G7 
communique was increasingly playing the role of endorsing the support of 
the US domestic economic policy approach characterised by fiscal 
discipline and the low-interest policy. In the Clinton administration era, the 
macroeconomic policy approach adhering to fiscal responsibility allowed 
the FED to lower the interest rates. Also the monetary policy was left to the 
FED. Partly thanks to his communicative skills of the Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, the FED achieved low and steady inflation and enjoyed the 
freedom of manoeuvre to adjust monetary policy.
152
  
 
Since the early and mid-1990s, the focus of the G7 agenda shifted from 
macroeconomic policy to the coordination of regulatory frameworks in 
financial and tax matters. There was already some degree of efforts of 
international policy coordination such as the bank capital regulation 
formulated at Basel Committee’s bank capital rule. The discussion was 
initiated by the joint proposal by the US and the UK. The rule was intended 
to work as a common standard for evaluating capital adequacy. The US-UK 
proposal provided for (1) a common definition of capita, which comprised 
shareholders’ equity, retained earnings, minority interests in subsidiaries, 
and perpetual debt; (2) adoption of a risk-weighted system for evaluating 
capital adequacy; and (3) the inclusion of all off-balance-sheet 
commitments in capital adequacy determinations.          
 
At the Halifax Summit in 1995, the communique called on the 
strengthening the international monetary system, including its capacity to 
prevent and where necessary respond to crisis. As a result of the outbreak 
Mexican crisis, the Halifax Summit communique explicitly raised the 
issues of the risks inherent in the growth of private capital flows, the 
increased integration of domestic capital markets, and the accelerating pace 
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of financial innovation, and also called on the need for international 
coordinated efforts. It urged finance ministers to commission studies and 
analysis from the international organisations responsible for banking and 
securities regulations and to report on the adequacy of current 
arrangements, together with proposals for improvement where necessary, at 
the next Summit.            
 
Halifax Summit communique in 1995  
 
14. The growth and integration of global capital markets have created both 
enormous opportunities and new risks. We have a shared interest in 
ensuring the international community remains able to manage the risks 
inherent in the growth of private capital flows, the increased integration of 
domestic capital markets, and the accelerating pace of financial 
innovation.  
 
15. The developments in Mexico earlier this year and their repercussions 
have sharpened our focus on these issues. We welcome the recent more 
positive turn of events in Mexico, as well as the positive developments in a 
number of emerging economies.  
 
16. The prevention of crisis is the preferred course of action. This is best 
achieved through each country pursuing sound fiscal and monetary 
policies. But it also requires an improved early warning system, so that we 
can act more quickly to prevent or handle financial shocks. Such a system 
must include improved and effective surveillance of national economic 
policies and financial market developments, and fuller disclosure of this 
information to market participants. To this end, we urge the IMF to:  
 
 establish benchmarks for the timely publication of key economic and 
financial data;  
 
 establish a procedure for the regular public identification of 
countries which comply within these benchmarks;  
 
 insist on full and timely reporting by member countries of standard 
 182 
sets of data, provide sharper policy advice to all governments, and 
deliver franker messages to countries that appear to be avoiding 
necessary actions.  
 
17. If prevention fails, financial market distress requires that multilateral 
institutions and major economies be able to respond where appropriate in a 
quick and coordinated fashion. Financing mechanisms must operate on a 
scale and with the timeliness required to manage shocks effectively. In this 
context, we urge the IMF to:  
 
 establish a new standing procedure--"Emergency Financing 
Mechanism"-- which would provide faster access to Fund 
arrangements with strong conditionality and larger upfront 
disbursements in crisis situations.  
 
18. To support this procedure, we ask:  
 
 the G10 and other countries with the capacity to support the system 
to develop financing arrangements with the objective of doubling as 
soon as possible the amount currently available under the GAB to 
respond to financial emergencies.  
 
19. To ensure that IMF has sufficient resources to meet its ongoing 
responsibilities, we urge continued discussions on a new IMF quota review.  
 
20. Solid progress on the elements discussed above should significantly 
improve our ability to cope with future financial crises. Nevertheless, these 
improvements may not be sufficient in all cases. In line with this, and 
recognizing the complex legal and other issues posed in debt crisis 
situations by the wide variety of sources of international finance involved, 
we would encourage further review by G-10 Ministers and Governors of 
other procedures that might also usefully be considered for their orderly 
resolution.  
 
21. We continue to support the inclusion of all IMF members in the SDR 
system. Moreover, we urge the IMF to initiate a broad review of the role 
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and functions of the SDR in light of changes in the world financial system.  
 
22. Closer international cooperation in the regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and markets is essential to safeguard the financial 
system and prevent an erosion of prudential standards. We urge:  
 
 a deepening of cooperation among regulators and supervisory 
agencies to ensure an effective and integrated approach, on a global 
basis, to developing and enhancing the safeguards, standards, 
transparency and systems necessary to monitor and contain risks;  
 continued encouragement to countries to remove capital market 
restrictions, coupled with strengthened policy advice from 
international financial institutions on the appropriate supervisory 
structures;  
 Finance ministers to commission studies and analysis from the 
international organizations responsible for banking and securities 
regulations and to report on the adequacy of current arrangements, 
together with proposals for improvement where necessary, at the next 
Summit. (underlined by the author)  
 
23. We also recognize that international financial fraud is a growing 
problem. We are committed to improving communication between 
regulators and law enforcement agencies. 
 
There was increasing recognition that the effects of unilateral or bilateral 
responses to economic problems that is inherently multilateral are 
increasingly limited and more efforts were needed to identify ways in 
which governments can best establish a common framework within which 
countries could operate individually and collectively. The internationally 
coordinated efforts were seen not only in financial regulation, but also 
fiscal rules.  
 
The OECD Ministerial Communiqué of May 1996 called upon the OECD 
to: 
 
“develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax 
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competition on competition on investment and financing decisions and the 
consequences for national tax bases, and report back in 1998.” 
 
This request was subsequently endorsed by the G7 countries, which 
included the following paragraph in the Communiqué issued by the Heads 
of State at their 1996 Lyon Summit: 
 
“Finally, globalisation is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. 
Tax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mobile 
activities can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks 
of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the erosion of national 
tax bases. We strongly urge the OECD to vigorously pursue its work in this 
field, aimed at establishing a multilateral approach under which countries 
could operate individually and collectively to limit the extent of these 
practices. We will follow closely the progress on work by the OECD, which 
is due to produce a report by 1998.” (underlined by the author) 
 
The OECD launched its work to establish an international framework to 
counter the spread of harmful tax competition and finalised in 1998 the 
report “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue”. The goal 
was to secure the integrity of tax systems by addressing the issues raised by 
practices with respect to financial and other geographically mobile 
activities that unfairly erode the tax bases of other countries and distort the 
location of capital and services, which could cause undesired shifts of part 
of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases such as labour, property, and 
consumption and increase administrative costs and compliance burdens on 
tax authorities and taxpayers. 
 
The OECD made it clear that their work was not intended to promote the 
harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or outside 
the OECD, striking the delicate balance between preserving fiscal 
sovereignty and needing to build internationally agreed code of tax 
practices. The OECD report in 2000 “Report to the OECD Ministerial 
Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices” 
stated that:  
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“It is important to note at the outset that the project is not primarily about 
collecting taxes and is not intended to promote the harmonisation of 
income taxes or tax structures generally within or outside the OECD, nor is 
it about dictating to any country what should be the appropriate level of tax 
rates. Rather, the project is about ensuring that the burden of taxation is 
fairly shared and that tax should not be the dominant factor in making 
capital allocation decisions. The project is focused on the concerns of 
OECD and non-OECD countries, which are exposed to significant revenue 
losses as a result of harmful tax competition. Tax base erosion as a result of 
harmful tax practices can be a particularly serious threat to the economies 
of developing countries. The project will, by promoting a co-operative 
framework, support the effective fiscal sovereignty of countries over the 
design of their tax systems. (underlined by the author)”   
 
The work on harmful tax competition was also carried out in the European 
Union (EU). The European Council agreed on 1 December 1997 to a 
package of measures to tackle harmful tax competition in order to help to 
reduce distortions in the Single Market, to prevent excessive losses of tax 
revenue and to develop tax structures in a more employment-friendly way. 
The package includes a Code of Conduct on business taxation, taxation of 
savings income and issue of withholding taxes on cross-border interest and 
royalty payments between companies. The Code of Conduct identifies 
potentially harmful regimes in the field of business taxation and gives 
factors for the assessment of harmful regimes. It includes a commitment 
not to introduce new harmful tax regimes and to rollback existing 
regimes.
153
  
      
The parallel works between the EU and the OECD made the OECD work 
easier in the sense that the EU countries accounting for more than half of 
the OECD memberships find it less difficult to accept the OECD work to 
the extent that they would accept in the EU work. In the EU context, the 
"Code of Conduct for business taxation" defined harmful tax measures as 
measures (including administrative practices) which affect or may affect in 
a significant way the location of business activity in the Community, and 
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which provide for a significantly lower level of taxation than those that 
generally apply in the Member State concerned. Under the Code, which 
applies both to Member States and to their dependent and associated 
territories, over 400 business taxation measures have been assessed and 
over 100 of these, being considered harmful, have been removed or 
amended.
154
 
        
 
3-2    Transcending the regional integration: Transformation of the role of 
G7 and its role in the new framework of G20 – the meaning of G7 for 
Japan       
 
Since the Financial Crisis in 2008, the G20 has also significantly 
contributed to the ongoing process to strengthen the international financial 
structure and governance, pushing forward key changes to ensuring global 
financial stability. The very reason of the emergence of the G20 is the 
coordinated efforts by G20 to enhance the voice and representation of 
emerging economies and developing countries. This is based on the broad 
consensus that level-playing-field in the regulatory and fiscal frameworks 
cannot be achievable without the commitment by emerging and developing 
countries, especially those key economies participating in the G20, notably 
such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, and Indonesia. 
 
The G20 Leaders’ Declaration on 15 November 2008 in Washington DC, 
the first G20 after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, pointed out that, as 
the root causes of the current crisis that weak, inadequately weak 
regulatory frameworks led financial market participants to undertake 
excessive risks and create vulnerabilities in the system.        
   
G20 Leaders’ Declaration on 15 November 2008 in Washington DC 
    
3. During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and 
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher 
yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise 
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proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, 
unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque 
financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create 
vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in 
some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the 
risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, 
or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory 
actions. 
 
4. Major underlying factors to the current situation were, among others, 
inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies, 
inadequate structural reforms, which led to unsustainable global 
macroeconomic outcomes. These developments, together, contributed to 
excesses and ultimately resulted in severe market disruption.   
 
               
In the letter released from Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) dated November 6, 
2008 to the Group of 20 Heads of Governments and Institutions, he 
identified two tasks ahead: (1) dealing with the immediate fallout of the 
financial crisis i.e., coordinating policy responses and providing financing 
to restore confidence and growth, and (2) dealing with the longer-term 
global architecture i.e., fixing an inadequate regulatory system and 
developing a reliable early warning and response system. 
 
In his assessment, global demand was falling rapidly around the world and 
additional monetary and fiscal policy response needed to be on the agenda. 
He stated that there was a scope for fiscal expansion in many advanced and 
some emerging market economies; and with inflation declining, some 
central banks have scope for further monetary easing. In terms of emerging 
market, he pointed out that emerging markets are under great stress as the 
capital flows that have sustained growth dry up across the board. Against 
this background, he announced the Fund’s proactive initiative to move 
rapidly to assist several countries with substantial financing and policy 
advice, and also put in place a new Short-Term Liquidity Facility to 
provide rapid financing for countries with strong fundamentals. 
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The G20 Summit highlighted the need to rethink the design of financial 
regulation. Based on the assessment that the financial crisis underlined the 
importance of having its ultimate implementation by national authorities 
subject to surveillance by a body or network of institutions alert to systemic 
implications across financial instruments, markets, and countries at the 
global level, the communique stressed the need to agree on a consistent 
approach that might frame follow up at the national and multilateral levels.  
 
The G20 Summit communique specifically referred to the need of 
strengthening transparency and accountability of financial market, 
enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets 
including international standards with respect to bank secrecy and 
transparency, and reinforcing international cooperation in terms of 
formulating regulations and other measures in a consistent manner.  
 
What is also noteworthy is that the G20 Summit communique emphasised 
the closer engagement of emerging and developing economies. It was 
apparent that the specific emphasis was put on G20 emerging countries 
such as China, Russia and India, in particular. It acknowledged the 
commitment of advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so 
that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the 
world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness. It 
further stated that emerging and developing economies, including the 
poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation. It also 
stated that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) must expand urgently to a 
broader membership of emerging economies, and other major standard 
setting bodies should promptly review their membership.   
                                     
The G20 has fundamentally changed the gravity of the rule-making power 
of the international financial system, shifting the G7 to the G20 as a forum 
playing a prominent role in formulating the international policy 
coordination in the international monetary and fiscal policy. Under this new 
paradigm of G20, the G7 has been increasingly faced with the dilemma. On 
the one hand, the G7 could be placed as a forum among like-minded 
developed countries and formulate the coordinated position among the G7 
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countries. On the other hand, the G7 has been increasingly less influential 
as a forum to formulate the international policy coordination.         
 
While it could be argued that the G20 has already been a dominant forum 
and the role of G7 has diminished, the G7 has remained a prominent forum 
to discuss at least the international currency issue for the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance. For example, when the Japanese Ministry of Finance made a 
coordinated foreign exchange market intervention in March 2011 in the 
aftermath of the big earthquake and the Fukushima, the G7 issued a 
statement that the G7 countries were ready to provide any needed 
cooperation and our confidence in the resilience of the Japanese economy 
and financial sector, in order to prevent the Japanese yen from appreciating 
in an excessive way.  
 
China participated in the G7 Finance Ministers meeting on 1 October 2004 
for the first time. The statement of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors met informally with China's Finance Minister and Central 
Bank Governor, and stated that they discussed the global economic outlook, 
macroeconomic policies in G7 economies and the Chinese economic 
situation in a candid way. The statement also stated that, among other 
things, they exchanged views on economic impact of oil prices, fiscal and 
monetary policies in G7 economies, Asian economic outlook, and exchange 
rate flexibility. The statement further stated that G7 and China agreed that 
this meeting was a constructive channel to share views on issues of mutual 
concern and to promote mutual understandings.     
                         
This statement in October 2004 made it clear that they had a collective 
interest in monitoring the Chinese currency regime. The G7 statement in 
April 2006 further stated that greater exchange rate flexibility was desirable 
in emerging economies with large current account surpluses, especially 
China, for necessary adjustments to occur. From the Japanese government’s 
perspective, the increased collectiveness of the G7 finance ministers calling 
on China to increase the exchange rate flexibility gave more legitimacy and 
impacts on the Chinese financial diplomacy than if Japan unilaterally 
pressed China to do. This G7’s collective call on China to increase the 
flexibility of their currency in the foreign exchange markets continued in 
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the statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 
October 2008. It stated that given China's important role in the global 
economy we encourage the authorities to allow accelerated appreciation of 
the Chinese renminbi’s effective exchange rate as a means of further 
rebalancing of the domestic economy and promoting external stability. In 
the G7 statement, the tone was as modest as stressing that the increased 
flexibility of the Chinese renminbi would be a means of rebalancing of the 
domestic economy and promoting external stability, rather than rebalancing 
a great deal of current account surplus.      
 
In the late 1990s after the Asian financial crisis, there was a growing 
momentum for establishing a framework for regional cooperation to 
enhance the prospects for financial stability. As a statement of the first 
Manila Framework in November 1997 stated, a series of then initiatives 
underscored the importance of maintaining sound macroeconomic and 
structural policies, appropriate exchange rate policies, strong domestic 
financial institutions and supervisory regimes in fostering and sustaining 
growth.
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 The increased flexibility of the Chinese currency was a potential 
issue for a regional financial framework to discuss as a part of the process 
of engaging China in establishing a regional mechanism. However, there 
was not substantive development in the regional framework in terms of 
engaging China to persuade them to increase the flexibility of their 
currency. For the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the G7 process was 
increasingly a major channel for Japan to call on China to increase the 
flexibility of their currency, along with their bilateral talk with the Chinese 
financial counterparts.               .        
 
Compared with the Japan’s experiences in the 1980s, the G7’s approach 
towards China was rather modest and soft. In the late 1980s after the Plaza 
Accord, Japan was under pressure from the US to accept the foreign 
exchange market adjustment. There are a few reasons which can be 
identified to explain this difference. Japan was already in the part of the G7 
countries in the late 1980s. For the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the G7 
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was the most prominent and important forum to participate in the 
discussion on the policy coordination in the international financial system. 
Especially in the late 1980s since the Plaza Accord, the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance was under the increased pressure from the US to accept the 
Japanese yen’s appreciation as a means of addressing current account 
surpluses. The US administration repeatedly called on Japan to accept the 
Japanese yen’s appreciation and take substantial fiscal stimulus measures.   
 
In the late 1980s, Japan was also increasingly aware of the great role of the 
Japanese economy in the international economy as China is now. As the 
Diplomatic Bluebook 1986, the Japanese government stressed that the 
economic prosperity of Japan in the post-war period was achievable only as 
a result of the political and economic cooperation with the liberal and 
democratic world, notably the US, and that Japan would need to undertake 
the special responsibility of contributing to the peace and prosperity of the 
international community. Based on this awareness of increased 
responsibility and self-achievement, the Japanese government stressed that 
the continued cooperative Japan-US relationship was the fundamental pillar 
of the Japanese diplomacy. This sense of responsibility of Japan making 
contribution to the peace and prosperity in the international society was 
linked with the sense that Japan pursued economic prosperity relying on the 
US on the Japan’s security and defence policy. This sense of guilt or at least 
paying too little costs in enjoying the economic prosperity and peace in the 
post-war period was the key element in affecting the policy-making of the 
Japanese government.                            
 
The primary reason why the Japanese government accepted the sharp 
appreciation of the Japanese yen was that they considered that reducing 
rapidly increasing current account surplus of Japan was essential to the 
stability of the international economy. The Japanese government was 
particularly aware of the responsibility which Japan needed to play in 
providing international public goods such as sustainable international 
monetary system and free trade systems which underpinned the prosperity 
of the Japanese economy in the post-war period.
156
 The Japanese 
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government was increasingly concerned that if the Japanese economy 
continued to increase the current account surplus, the world economy 
would become unstable and give negative impacts on the Japanese 
economy. The Japanese government was also aware of the need to change 
the structure of the Japanese economy from export-led growth to domestic 
demand-led growth.  
 
In Japan, domestic demand-led growth was considered by the Japanese 
government as essential to enable Japan to achieve sustainable growth. 
While a series of Economic White Paper stressed the self-efforts by the US 
to reduce their budgetary deficits and current account deficits, the Japanese 
government pointed out that economic growth had not yet improved the 
quality of living of the general Japanese public in proportion to its sharp 
increase in the GDP. The Economic White Paper recognised that the impact 
of monetary and fiscal policies were giving greater impacts on the 
economies of the other countries and Japan would need to play a greater 
role with the US in stabilising the international economy. While the 
Economic White Paper 1987 pointed out that the shift of the Japanese 
economy to domestic demand-led growth by itself would not contribute to 
addressing the US current account deficits, it stressed the need of the 
Japanese government to coordinate their fiscal and monetary policies with 
other G7 countries, notably the US. In the process leading up to the Plaza 
Accord, the US Treasury in principle approached the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance and worked to reach the agreement between the two countries first. 
In the Japan-US Yen-Dollar Committee, the Japanese Ministry of Finance                    
                            
At the same time, China was increasingly aware of the increased presence 
of the Chinese economy and the global nature of its currency issue. Since 
2002, the Chinese authorities have used massive, largely sterilized, official 
intervention to prevent their currency from appreciating excessively. The 
Chinese authority kept the nominal exchange rate pegged at 8.28 to the 
dollar until July 2005. The Chinese authority intervened to resist strong 
upward pressures on the exchange rate of the Chinese renminbi. While the 
Chinese authority felt its need to respond to the increasing call by others for 
increased flexibility of the Chinese currencies, they were not inclined to 
give the impression that they simply succumbed to external pressures to 
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call for the increased flexibility of the Chinese currency.  
 
From the Chinese perspective, China has been sensitive about at least 
giving the impression that China was forced to increase the flexibility of 
their currency. The Chinese foreign exchange policy has been based on the 
view that free floating exchange rate system could result in exchange rate 
distortions and are vulnerable to currency crisis and speculative capital 
flows. In terms of the increased flexibility of the Chinese currency, the 
Chinese authority considered that an incremental approach rather than a 
big-bang approach with a radical reform was more appropriate to achieve 
the balanced balance of payments as well as avoid the risk of further 
disputes with trade partners to the extent possible.
157
 The Chinese authority 
has had the view that foreign exchange market intervention can be justified 
when the exchange rate exceeds the predetermined band, or when the 
capital account experiences large imbalances and there are excessive trades 
in the foreign exchange market, or the financial market falls into 
crisis-scale turmoil. In their view, market intervention is still necessary to 
prevent and correct a large, short-term fluctuation of the exchange rate.                
                        
Evidently the Chinese authorities have been considering the increased 
flexibility of the Chinese currency could result in excessive capital inflows 
and outflows and give undesirable effects on the domestic economy and 
fail to achieve the goal of balanced balance of payments.
158
 There have 
been some literatures on what lessons the China should learn from what the 
Japanese economy experienced between its rapid expansion in the bubble 
economy and the so-called lost decades after the burst of the bubble 
economy in the early 1990s. One possible argument could be that the 
Chinese authorities are particularly cautious about the increased flexibility 
of the Chinese currency because they consider that the Plaza Accord was 
the cause of the bubble economy and the subsequent lost decades of the 
Japanese economy in the sense that the Plaza Accord forced Japan to accept 
the Japanese yen’s appreciation and constrain their monetary policy, 
                                                 
157 Yi, Gang. “Exchange Rate Arrangement: Flexible and Floating Exchange Rate Debate 
Revisited”, 16-17 April 2013, IMF, 
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thereby resulting in excessively long period of low interest rates.     
 
If the Chinese authorities seek to achieve more balanced balance of 
payment and avoid increased conflict with trade partners like the Japanese 
authorities in the late 1980s, the increased flexibility of the Chinese 
currency and the acceptance of currency appreciation are sure to be a part 
of major means of achieving these goals. But, it is not clear to what extent 
the Japan’s experiences could have to do with the Chinese foreign 
exchange policy.  
 
The Economic White Paper 1987 called for the shift from export-led 
growth to domestic-demand led growth. As the Economic White Paper 
1987 stated, the call for the domestic demand growth was based on the 
view that the living standards of the ordinary Japanese public did not 
improve at the same pace and extent as the Japanese yen appreciated and 
the Japanese trade surplus increased. The Economic White Paper 1987 
admitted that while the competitiveness of tradable goods was significantly 
enhanced, the competitiveness non-tradable goods and services was still 
lagging behind and the disparity between domestic prices and foreign 
prices became more clearer. The US administration called on Japan to 
stimulate the domestic demand, but they were not interested in the 
structural reform at the Japanese domestic industry including the shift of 
labour force to less competitive economic sectors to more competitive 
industrial sectors. The domestic-led growth was wrongly oriented towards 
taking additional fiscal stimulus measures to stimulate domestic demand at 
the macroeconomic level rather than encouraging the Japanese domestic 
industries to make structural reform by themselves, and ended in 
discouraging individual companies and economic sectors to make structural 
efforts after the Japanese yen’s sharp appreciation.                                                      
 
The biggest difference between Japan and China is that essentially China 
does not belong to any international economic framework which would 
constrain their freedom of economic policy to a significant extent as Japan 
did to the G7 in the late 1980s. While Japan has belonged to many 
economic initiatives such as G7 and APEC, China has not substantively 
committed to economic multilateral frameworks such as the G7 beyond a 
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soft framework of exchange of views on particular topics. Though the G20 
has become a paramount economic regime in the international economic 
and financial system, the G20 itself has not been a framework which forces 
each of member states to commit to particular macroeconomic policies.  
 
In terms of the macroeconomic policy framework, the G7 has been a 
framework of a group of more likeminded countries. Because of its more 
likemindedness, the G7 functioned as a framework which gave more peer 
pressure on member countries. Since the defeat in the Second World War, it 
was the first experience of Japan which felt the sense of achievement both 
economically and politically. In the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates, the national authorities were committed to intervening in 
the foreign exchange markets whenever the exchange rate reached a 1 
percent band on either side of its part vale vis-à-vis the US dollar. In the 
World Economic White Paper 1971, the Japanese government considered 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as a result of the US’s inability to 
deal with the current account deficits and force the other countries to adjust 
their macroeconomic policies to help the US to address the external balance 
domestically
159
. It was based upon the view that the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system represented the end of the US’s dominance as an economic 
superpower to uphold the international monetary system. But, it also stated 
that while the current account imbalance of the US was largely attributed to 
the failure of economic policies of the US, the current account surplus 
countries needed to undertake a due responsibility. What is most 
noteworthy was that the Japanese government did not consider the yen’s 
appreciation as the mere constraint of reducing the volume of exported 
goods and the competitiveness of Japanese companies, but rather an 
opportunity to modernise the structure of the Japanese industry by shifting 
labour forces to more efficient sectors.
160
  
 
In 1972, while the Japanese government was concerned about the impacts 
of the Japanese yen’s appreciation on the domestic industries through the 
decline in competitiveness, they were also concerned about the inflationary 
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risks exacerbated by the rise of oil prices. In terms of the impact on prices, 
the Japanese yen’s appreciation after the collapse the Bretton Woods 
regime was not necessarily a negative element in the sense that it worked to 
mitigate the upward pressures of the rise of the imported goods. The 
Economic White Paper 1972 stated that the Japanese yen’s appreciation 
would give positive impacts on prices and would mitigate the risks of 
inflationary pressures becoming out of control.                   
 
 
3-3  Emergence of the new alliance between the US and Japan?     
 
As the economic growth of China has been accelerating and their position 
in the international political economy has become larger, the relationship 
between Japan and the US has been gradually shifting from the competing 
rivals to a sort of alliance against China. One of the key issues on which 
Japan and the US made a coordinated position against China was exchange 
rate policy. Since 2005, China began to attend the G7 Finance Ministers 
and Central Governors meeting informally. The Statement on the Meeting 
of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors with Chinese 
counterparts, London, 5 February 2005, stated that “The Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors of the G7 countries met informally with 
China’s Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor to continue the 
productive dialogue begun in Washington in October 2004. They enjoyed 
an open and helpful exchange of views on a wide range of economic issues 
of mutual interest in a candid way. Among other things, they exchanged 
views on fiscal and monetary policies in G7 economies, the Asian 
economic outlook, and exchange rate flexibility. It was agreed that this 
meeting was an effective means of increasing shared understanding of the 
challenges and opportunities of an increasingly integrated global 
economy”.  
 
Having an opportunity to meet the China’s Finance Minister and Central 
Bank Governor and release the statement as the G7 was politically 
important especially in the US. The undervalued Chinese currency 
allegedly gave an incentive to other Asian countries to intervene in the 
currency markets to remain competitiveness with Chinese goods. The US 
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administration has been faced with the political pressure to give the 
impression that the US government has been calling on the Chinese 
authority to accept increased flexibility of their currency. In this respect, the 
US and Japan were increasingly aware of the shared interests and concerns 
about the lack of exchange rate flexibility of the persistently undervalued 
Chinese currency and their impacts on trade patterns.  
 
From the US perspective, there are some key differences between the 
current China and the Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, China 
does not depend on the US military forces and but rather has been 
increasing their military presence in the Pacific. In the case of Japan, the 
Japan-US Security Treaty was been the key cornerstone of the Japanese 
defense and diplomatic policy. Second, unlike Japan, China has not 
expressed enthusiastically their wish to be recognised as one of the 
developed countries. China has been cautious about being recognised as 
one of the developed countries and treated on an equal footing, because the 
Chinese authorities has been always weighing carefully the risks of 
promoting liberalisation of capital controls and the flexibility of their 
currency in the foreign exchange markets leading to less control by the 
Chinese authorities. It has been generally said that both the potential and 
the incentive for economic policy coordination have increased as the world 
economy has become increasingly integrated.
161
  
 
However, economic policy coordination depends on to what extent any 
single government authority in the framework considers the economic 
benefits and is ready to accept the results of the negotiations among the 
countries concerned. In the case of Japan in the 1980s, Japan was ready to 
accept the policy coordination as a part of their responsibility to play its 
expected role in accordance with the growing economic presence. In the 
case of China, there is a political constraint facing the Chinese authority. 
Unlike Japan, the risk of any economic disorder leading to political 
instability was a key consideration which the Chinese authority has taken 
into in terms of maintaining a political system upheld solely by the Chinese 
Communist Party. In China, capital and exchange controls for current 
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international transaction is heavily intertwined with its political desire to 
maintain their political system and avoid any risk of creating economic 
disorder which could have the spillover effects.  
 
The increased trade surplus and inbound foreign direct investment in China 
has inevitably given increased upward pressure on the Chinese currency for 
further appreciation. Faced with this upward pressure, the Chinese 
monetary authorities have worked to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to buy the US dollar and sell Chinese currency. It is well-known 
that in this process the Chinese authorities have adopted the so-called 
sterilised intervention to mitigate the inflationary risk of domestic economy 
through increased monetary base in the domestic market. This sterilisation 
led to the increase in China’s foreign exchange reserve in recent periods. 
The accumulating trade and capital account surpluses under the regime of 
capital control have made the Chinese authority aware of the need to 
contain inflationary pressure in the domestic economy.  
 
Today it seems that the financial diplomacy of the Chinese authorities is 
broadly oriented towards the two major directions. The first is that they are 
increasingly looking at the more liberalisation of capital account, outbound 
flow of the Chinese currency overseas, in particular. This is evidently 
witnessed in the China’s approach to the London city market. The UK 
Treasury and the London City have been welcoming the China’s approach 
to use London as a hub for the Chinese currency’s business. From the UK 
perspective, they believe that London is best equipped with the technical 
infrastructure for the renminbi business and could play a leading role in 
development of the renminbi product market in Europe and beyond Europe. 
At the same time, the China has started to call on the IMF to include the 
renminbi as a part of the SDR. The second is that against the background of 
the accumulating foreign reserves, China has been aggressively using it to 
exert a diplomatic influence in the infrastructure investment. It is clear that 
the idea of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was based on the 
accumulating foreign reserves in China in terms of financing. The SDR and 
the AIIB are the clear examples of the attempt of the Chinese authorities to 
use the accumulating trade and capital surpluses to exert more diplomatic 
influence.    
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Although the G7 has been collectively calling on China to increase the 
flexibility of their currency, the division between the two camps, i.e. the US 
and Japan, on the one hand, and the others, the UK, in particular, could 
become larger. G7 is now increasingly functioning as a forum of 
like-minded countries within the framework of G20. G7 has been the 
driving force for setting the international standards and promoting 
international coordination of macroeconomic policies. Although the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies has been increasingly difficult, 
there still remain some policy areas for promoting cooperation or 
coordination of international standards in financial regulation and 
combatting international tax evasions and avoidances. Nowadays, the 
global landscape of positions of each country on specific policy issues is 
rather difficult to give a holistic view to. It depends on an issue by issue. In 
general, as the economic presence of China and the impact of the Chinese 
economy on other countries and regions are growing, there are almost 
shared interests among the other countries to keep China engaged in the 
international framework.  
 
An important fact to bear in mind is that as far as the financial diplomacy is 
concerned, China is increasing aware of the need to take a global strategy 
and use the renminbi as a tool to exert diplomatic pressure in relation to not 
only Asian countries but also other global regions including Europe. While 
Japan saw the special relationship with the US as the cornerstone of 
financial diplomacy, China has been seeking to leverage their global 
relationship including Europe to counter the balance against the pressure 
from the US. China is not likely to follow the same path as Japan in the 
sense that Japan attached the greater importance on seeking to strengthen 
the tie with the US and accepting the responsibility to undertake the 
responsibility in proportion to its increased economic power. For Japan, 
which has not had as much military and political power in the international 
regime as China with a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council 
in the United Nations, strengthening the tie with the US and accepting the 
responsibility in the G7 framework has been the best and most effective 
way to increase their presence in its financial diplomacy. As China has been 
increasing its economic presence, the strengthening tie with the US will be 
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even more important for Japan, which would maintain its economic 
presence in financial diplomacy in the international financial regime.                                            
 
 
Chapter  
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Chapter 4:  Conclusion 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis marked the watershed in terms of strengthening 
a regional financial cooperation. The Crisis raised the awareness among the 
majority of East Asian countries of the need to create and strengthen 
regional financial cooperation as a means of securing regional financial 
stability. This was based on the assumption that Japan would continue to 
play a leading role in strengthening the regional financial cooperation in 
Asia. When the proposal of “Asian Monetary Fund” was partly formulated 
as the “Chiang-Mai Initiative”, Japan took the initiative of establishing a 
regional mechanism of bilateral swap arrangement. It could be argued that 
the strengthening of the regional financial cooperation in Asia showed that 
the Japanese financial diplomacy was increasingly oriented towards Asia.  
 
In fact, the Japanese Ministry of Finance did not seek to take a regional 
initiative at least from an early stage of the Asian Financial Crisis. As the 
turmoil of the Asian Financial Crisis was deepening, the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance attached the greatest importance on how to play the role of 
moderating the two sides, i.e. the IMF and the Asian countries facing 
financial difficulty. In fact, the proposal of Asian Monetary Fund was made 
by the Japanese Ministry of Finance realised that the IMF approach with 
the so-called “Washington consensus” underpinned by a neo-liberal 
ideological position, was not appropriate, while the US kept supporting the 
IMF. For Japan, a series of their attempts to strengthen a regional financial 
cooperation were a part of their efforts to deal with domestic financial crisis 
in 1997-1998.       
 
The cooperation with the US has been a cornerstone of the Japanese 
financial diplomacy. In the Plaza and Louvre Accord era, the time when 
Japan increased its economic presence in the international economic regime, 
the financial diplomacy of Japan was driven by how to respond to the 
political pressure from the US. Then establishing the strong G2 (US and 
Japan) cooperation was a key element in the Japan’s financial diplomacy. 
Japan attempted to use the G2 special relationship as the base of its 
increased influence in the international financial regime within the 
framework of the G7. This G2 relationship strengthened in the late 1980s 
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weakened badly in the awkward partnership between the US and Japan 
under the Clinton administration in the 1990s, where the US regained the 
confidence with its economic recovery and Japan suffered from a 
prolonged recession characterised by bad loan problem. The alliance 
between Japan and the US was strengthened again under the Bush 
administration partly in response to the need to fight against the terrorism 
after the 9.11 and the emergence of China as an economic power.                           
      
In financial diplomacy, the foreign exchange policy has been at the heart of 
the US-China relationship. US called on China to increase flexibility of the 
Chinese currency. China has been increasingly criticized by the US for 
alleged currency manipulation which they claim that caused China’s 
accumulating trade surplus. In response to these calls, China has taken an 
incremental approach in its foreign exchange policy. As the economic 
growth of China has been accelerating and their position in the 
international political economy has become larger, the relationship between 
Japan and the US has been gradually shifting from the competing rivals to a 
sort of alliance against China. Exchange rate policy is one of the key issues 
on which Japan and the US has taken a coordinated position against China.   
 
From the Chinese perspective, China has been sensitive about at least 
giving the impression that China was forced to increase the flexibility of 
their currency. In terms of foreign exchange policy, China’s position has 
been based on the view that free floating exchange rate system could result 
in exchange rate distortions and are vulnerable to currency crisis and 
speculative capital flows. The Chinese authorities have considered that an 
incremental approach rather than a big-bang approach with a radical reform 
would be more appropriate to achieve the balanced balance of payments as 
well as avoid the risk of further disputes with trade partners to the extent 
possible.  
 
The greatest difference between Japan and China is that essentially China 
does not belong to any international economic framework which would 
constrain their freedom of economic policy to a significant extent as Japan 
made great efforts to contribute to the policy coordination in the G7 in the 
late 1980s. There was no similar incentive in the Chinese authorities to the 
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one which Japan had in the late 1980s. Rather, China has tacitly chosen the 
strategy of how China should be seen depending on the policy context. For 
example, China has been making efforts to make them seen as a developing 
country rather than the second biggest economy in the world in some 
policy areas such as climate change and trade negotiation where developing 
countries are supposed to pay as much price as developed countries.  
 
However, as China’s sheer number of GDP is expected to continue to 
increase at a higher rate than most developed countries, China will be faced 
with more pressure by other countries to call on them to play a more 
positive role in at least adjusting their economic policies to the 
internationally coordinated framework. It seems that China has been 
seeking to adopt the more selective approach based on the globalization of 
financial markets. The China’s approach to the UK with an indication of 
their wish to use London as a hub for the Chinese currency’s businesses as 
an international currency seems to have a certain influence on the UK’s 
application of its membership to the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank). The currency policy cannot be decoupled from the globalisation of 
financial markets. While the regional framework of financial cooperation 
could be supplementary to the global framework, the forces of globalisation 
of financial markets are becoming greater and expected to continue to do. 
Japanese financial diplomacy is expected to be determined more by how 
they see the Japanese Yen and Chinese Renminbi in the international 
financial markets than by merely in the Asian financial markets.           
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